SB 64 Summary

The SB64, held in Bonn, was the first major negotiating stage after COP30 and served as an initial test of the climate regime's capacity to translate the legacy of Belém into implementation. The session confirmed that the post-COP30 agenda is already organized around delivering on the commitments made, but also revealed significant frustration with the slow pace of progress on key issues such as mitigation, adaptation, financing, response measures, and means of implementation.

The main political theme of Bonn was the dispute over the very meaning of implementation. For developing countries, moving to a delivery phase requires funding, technology, capacity building, institutional strengthening, and effective access conditions. For other groups, implementation should proceed cautiously, avoiding new mandates, new obligations, institutional duplication, or anticipating decisions that will be made at COP31/CMA8. This tension permeated different agendas and helps explain some of the impasses observed in the session.

The results were mixed. Some tracks progressed with procedural conclusions, adopted texts, or referrals for new submissions, workshops, and reviews. Others ended under Rule 16 or had substantive decisions postponed to Antalya. Sensitive negotiations, such as GGA, MWP, and response measures, required political elevation at the close of the session, showing that Bonn preserved processes but failed to resolve structural roadblocks.

Financing remained a central point of friction in an international context marked by fiscal constraints, a cost-of-living crisis, and cuts in international cooperation. Developing countries reinforced that the implementation of climate commitments depends on the effective provision of support, including within the framework of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The discussion on financing ceased to be just a specific agenda item and began to structure debates on adaptation, transparency, just transition, agriculture, oceans, GST, and mitigation.

The preparation for GST2 also brought to the forefront a dispute over what information should guide the next global stocktake. For some groups, the credibility of the process depends on strong scientific grounding; for others, GST2 should balance scientific evidence, implementation experiences, and information reported by the Parties. This discussion indicates that the relationship between science, implementation, and political accommodation will remain relevant in the design of the next Global Stocktake cycle.

Bonn also served as the first political test of COP31. Turkey began to present priorities for the Action Agenda, highlighting electrification and waste management, while Australia adopted a more cautious stance in the negotiations but signaled interest in issues such as access to financing for LDCs and SIDS. This arrangement between the Presidency and the Negotiating Presidency will be relevant in determining whether Antalya will be able to translate the processes kept alive in Bonn into clearer political results.

This report summarizes the main developments of SB64, highlighting convergences, roadblocks, formal outcomes, and implications for COP31. The overall takeaway is that Bonn confirmed the centrality of implementation in the climate regime, but also showed that this transition remains politically contested. The challenge in Antalya will be to connect ambition, means of implementation, science, institutional design, and political trust into a more coherent delivery agenda.

Adaptation

Adaptation was at the political heart of SB64. The main outcome of Bonn was the consolidation of a structural division between two visions of the agenda: a technical-methodological vision, focused on indicators and monitoring mechanisms, and a political-implementation vision, defended mainly by developing countries, which seeks to link adaptation to financing. The failure to reach an agreement on the GGA meant that the main adaptation agenda was transferred to COP 31, making Antalya the main political test for the implementation of the adaptation legacy left by Belém.

GGA

SB 64 was the first session after COP 30, which approved the Belém Adaptation Indicators (BAI), launched the Belém-Addis Vision (BAV), and established the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR). In Bonn, the Parties aimed to begin operationalizing these outcomes, particularly through the creation of the BAV task force and the definition of the first elements for implementing the GGA. From the outset, developing countries argued that financing and means of implementation should be at the heart of the discussion, while developed countries sought to maintain focus on the technical aspects of the indicators.

Over the course of two weeks, the negotiations evolved into a political impasse centered on three issues: the reference to tripling adaptation funding, the composition of the BAV task force, and the role of the BAR. Developing countries advocated for a task force overseen by the Parties and the inclusion of funding as a structuring element of the BAR. Developed countries, on the other hand, prioritized a more technical approach focused on the operationalization of the BAIs.

Despite several attempts at mediation, no consensus was reached. Negotiations were elevated to the level of Heads of Delegation, but ended under Rule 16, without a substantive decision. Therefore, it was not possible to define the composition of the task force or formally begin the implementation of the BAV. The issue will proceed to COP 31.

NWP, AdComs and AC

SB 64 also had the mission of advancing other fronts of the adaptation agenda. The Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) arrived in Bonn under pressure to support the implementation of the GGA and the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. Adaptation Communications (AdComs) were discussed in light of the need to revise their guidelines and define their role in the new adaptation architecture, while the Adaptation Committee (AC) awaited the continuation of its institutional review.

The negotiations followed distinct paths. In the NWP, the main debate revolved around the degree of alignment of the program with the GGA, the financing of its activities, and future thematic areas of work. In the AdComs, the Parties disagreed on the timetable for reviewing the guidelines and their relationship to the transparency system of the Paris Agreement. The review by the Adaptation Committee remained stalled during the session.

The results were mixed. The NWP was one of the few adaptation tracks to conclude its negotiations with an approved text, reinforcing its role as a knowledge platform to support adaptation implementation and strengthening cooperation with universities and UNFCCC bodies. Negotiations on AdComs failed to produce consensus and were referred for continuation at COP 31, with the entire text remaining in brackets. The AC review was postponed to COP 31.

Financing

Work Programme on Climate Finance

The topic originated from the COP30 Joint Effort Decision, which established a two-year work program on climate finance, including Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, within the context of Article 9 as a whole. Article 9.1 specifically addresses the responsibilities of developed countries in providing financing to developing countries, and the request for a specific agenda item on this Article stems from dissatisfaction with the NCQG decision – the $300 billion financing target adopted at COP29 in Baku. The mandate did not specify how the program should be structured, which was a source of disagreement among the Parties even before the start of discussions in Bonn.

The topic was discussed in three workshops during the first week of SB64. Developing countries wanted to first discuss the scope and modalities of the program, seeking to secure a formal decision at COP31 that would allow for a greater focus on Article 9.1. However, developed countries preferred to move directly to substantive elements related to Article 9 more broadly, including private sector participation. During the second week, the COP30 Presidency sent a letter to the UNFCCC Executive Secretariat requesting the inclusion of a specific agenda item on the topic in the provisional agendas of WMC8 and WMC9, reiterating the mandate of the Joint Decision. This initiative was not well received by developed countries, who considered it interference in the negotiation process, as they interpreted that the Joint Decision did not foresee this specific mandate and preferred to maintain the work program in the form of dialogues, without a formal decision at the end of the two years.

No text was agreed upon in Bonn on this topic. The co-facilitators will need to work with the COP31 Presidencies to propose a path forward to be discussed with the Parties in the coming months, determining whether the elements raised in Bonn will be incorporated into a proposal for the continuation of the two-year program or whether a new process will begin at COP31.

Diálogo de Veredas and Xingu Finance Talks (Article 2.1.c in conjunction with Article 9)

COP30 decided to continue the Sharm El Sheikh Dialogue through the Veredas Dialogue and the Xingu Finance Talks, with the aim of deepening the understanding of the alignment of financial flows with the adaptation and mitigation objectives foreseen in Article 2.1.c, in complementarity with Article 9, which concerns the legal obligations of developed countries to provide and mobilize financing to developing countries.

Over two days of meetings in Bonn, case studies were presented focusing on building national investment ecosystems capable of aligning financial flows with climate and development goals. Part of the discussion centered on how to mobilize the private sector and reduce investment risks, including in adaptation, with less emphasis on strengthening public financing systems. There was also progress in defining the first high-level meeting of the Xingu Finance Talks, scheduled to take place in parallel with the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF, with an initial focus on fiscal policies and the cost of capital.

There was no formal agreed text, since these dialogues are an exchange of experiences and do not generate negotiated decisions. There is an understanding between the Parties that the design of the next sessions needs to be improved to avoid repetitions and alternation between Article 2.1 and Article 9, as well as to create more space to discuss structural reforms, such as the international financial architecture and global fiscal reforms.

Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund is the only formal agenda item under negotiation regarding financing, with three mandates pending from previous sessions: the transition arrangements for the Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement, the composition of the board, and the fifth review of the Fund.

The SBI chairs conducted consultations with the Heads of Delegation throughout the session, but no agreement was reached among the Parties, particularly regarding the composition of the council. This is an important issue as it defines which countries will have access to funding and which will contribute resources mainly through donations. Developed countries argue that the mandates for transition arrangements and council composition are interconnected and should be agreed upon jointly, proposing to replace the current Annex 1/non-Annex 1 division with the language of the Paris Agreement of "developed and developing countries," which is self-determined. Developing countries argue that the composition can be agreed upon independently of the transition, which must happen urgently to allow access to the resources ( share of proceeds from Article 6.4) allocated to the Fund.

The SBI adopted procedural conclusions that acknowledge the progress made on the elements relating to transitional arrangements and the fifth review, but postpone consideration of the three mandates — composition of the council, transitional arrangements and fifth review — to SB65 at COP31, given the persistence of disagreements on the composition of the council.

Just Transition

Following COP30 in Belém, the Parties had agreed to create a Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), with a mandate to advance its operationalization by WCC 8. Therefore, at SB64, there were three central issues to be resolved: consolidating the political messages arising from the JTWP dialogues, developing the terms of reference for the formal review of the program in 2026, and initiating negotiations on the institutional design of the new just transition mechanism. In political terms, the main tension already existed between developing countries, which sought a robust mechanism focused on implementation and the means of implementation, and developed countries, which advocated a leaner structure based on coordination and leveraging existing institutions.

The negotiation process throughout SB64 was marked by intense discussions surrounding the scope and function of the mechanism. In the contact groups, there was convergence on the importance of maintaining the JTWP as a central space for dialogue, but profound divergences on what the JTM should become. Developing countries advocated for a mechanism permanently linked to the CMA, capable of mobilizing concessional financing, technology transfer, capacity building, and international cooperation, as well as addressing structural barriers such as fiscal restrictions and unilateral trade measures. In contrast, groups from developed countries argued that the focus should be on avoiding institutional duplication and using the exercise of mapping existing mechanisms before moving forward with new structures. Disagreements also arose regarding the centrality of the 1.5°C target, the relationship between the mechanism and the Global Stocktake, and the extent to which issues such as agriculture, adaptation, and food security should be explicitly incorporated into the mechanism. Despite these differences, SB64 allowed the debate to mature and produced a first structured draft text on the functions, governance, and modalities of the JTM.

At the end of the session, the Parties adopted important conclusions. SBSTA and SBI formally approved the terms of reference for the JTWP review, establishing that the review will assess the effectiveness, efficiency, inclusiveness, and usefulness of the current modalities, including dialogues, ministerial roundtables, and reports, as well as possible improvements for their continuity. A new submission period was also opened until September 1, 2026, with a request for the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report with proposals for improvement. Regarding the Just Transition Mechanism, however, there was no substantive decision on its final structure. The Parties only noted the beginning of the discussions and agreed to continue negotiations at SB65 in Antalya, using the informal note from the co-facilitators as non-binding input, with the aim of recommending a final decision to CMA 8.

Global Stocktake

At SB64, the Global Stocktake appeared less as an isolated item and more as a cross-cutting reference for different debates on implementation. The theme was present in the UAE Dialogue on the implementation of GST outcomes, in the Annual NDC-GST Dialogue, in the informal meeting on the preparation of GST2, and in events and consultations promoted by the COP30 Presidency on Roadmaps. Together, these spaces showed that GST1 already influences the formulation of NDCs, NAPs, and policy initiatives, but also highlighted the gap between multilateral commitments and concrete conditions for their implementation.

The first dimension concerns the material and institutional barriers to implementation. In the UAE Dialogue and the Annual NDC-GST Dialogue, interventions by developing countries brought back to the center of the debate the difficulty of transforming commitments into national policies when constraints on financing, technology, capacity building, and institutional capacity persist. Climate finance was presented as the most sensitive bottleneck, not only due to the insufficient volume of resources, but also due to the cost of capital, the low predictability of flows, and the difficulties in accessing instruments suited to the needs of the countries.

The second dimension involves the relationship between GST1 and the 2035 NDCs. At the Annual NDC-GST Dialogue, presentations from countries and organizations indicated that GST1 is already influencing the preparation of new contributions, but also highlighted common difficulties, such as short deadlines, coordination between participatory processes and strategic guidance, setting achievable goals, integrating adaptation, and building implementation frameworks. Adaptation and loss and damage emerged as particularly complex areas, both due to cost-effectiveness and lower methodological maturity compared to mitigation.

The third dimension refers to the design of GST2. In the informal meeting conducted by the Secretariat and the SB Chairs, the Parties discussed the timetable, call for inputs, guiding questions, and organization of the process. There was support for opening the contribution phase earlier, especially to broaden the participation capacity of developing countries. Disagreements focused on the time required for the process, the level of detail of the guiding questions, and the possibility of replicating or expanding on the experience of the technical dialogues of the first GST.

The relationship between science and implementation also emerged as a sensitive point in this preparation. Even at the informal meeting on GST2, some Parties advocated for flexibility to incorporate the outputs of the IPCC's AR7, while others argued that the next global assessment should consider a broader set of sources, including implementation experiences and information reported by the Parties themselves. The discussion suggests that GST2 will need to balance scientific integrity, practical learning, and political accommodation amidst differing expectations regarding the role of the global assessment.

The COP30 Presidency Roadmaps entered this debate as potential instruments to bring the GST closer to implementation. In events and consultations held during SB64, the Roadmap for the transition away from fossil fuels was presented as an attempt to translate the Dubai outcome into practical action pathways, although it still depends on greater political support among negotiating groups. The Forests Roadmap advanced more visibly and was presented as a contribution to the process leading to GST2, connecting the commitment to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation to the next cycle of the global balance sheet.

The outcome from Bonn was therefore ambivalent. SB64 confirmed that the GST has become a structuring reference for NDCs, national plans, roadmaps, and implementation narratives. At the same time, the dialogue spaces functioned more as environments for systematizing experiences than as moments for collectively building solutions to the main bottlenecks. The challenge leading up to WMA8 will be to ensure that the GST2 moves beyond simply recording gaps and becomes more capable of organizing useful information, connecting implementation and support mechanisms, and guiding the concrete delivery of the Paris Agreement.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)

The MWP arrived at SB64 still marked by the disputes left over from COP30. In Belém, the Parties reaffirmed its voluntary, non-prescriptive and sovereign character, discussed the Brazilian proposal for a digital mitigation platform and left the substantive decision on its continuity or reformulation to CMA8 in November 2026.

In Bonn, positions remained polarized. AILAC, AOSIS, the European Union, LDCs, and countries such as New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, and Norway advocated for greater operationalization of the program, with clearer links to the GST, better thematic organization, greater technical participation, and more useful results to support mitigation actions. LMDCs, the Arab Group, China, India, Russia, and others insisted that the MWP should remain strictly within its original mandate, without new obligations, guidance on NDCs, monitoring of national policies, or the creation of new structures. The central tension was between strengthening the MWP as a space for ambition in mitigation and preserving it as a forum for implementation, exchange of experiences, and discussion of barriers, especially in financing, technology, and capacity building.

Discussions focused on topics such as the role of the GST and NDCs, the annual or multi-year selection of themes, the nature of program outcomes, the proposal for a technical mitigation committee, and the format of investment events. For some groups, these elements could make the MWP more relevant in addressing the ambition-implementation gap. For others, they could shift it outside its mandate and transform it into an indirect space for guidance on national policies. There was, however, some convergence on the need to improve investment-focused events, bringing mitigation opportunities closer to funders, multilateral banks, climate funds, technology providers, and project preparation support.

The textual process reflected the impasse. The co-facilitators circulated a draft of conclusions, an informal note to organize future discussion, and a non-exhaustive reflection on the Parties' views. This last one was the most controversial: some groups wanted to preserve it as a record of the discussions; others rejected it because it contained elements without consensus and, in their view, outside the mandate.

Faced with a lack of agreement, the co-facilitators sought support from the Brazilian negotiator, who moderated huddles and presented a compromise proposal based on procedural conclusions, holding a pre-sectional workshop with SB65 in Antalya, and preserving a more neutral informal note. Even so, the impasse persisted. The issue was then brought to the attention of the SB Chairs, who presented a short final text, merely noting the consideration of the item, its continuation within SB65 with a view to a decision at CMA8, and a request to the Secretariat to organize the pre-sectional workshop, conditional on the availability of resources.

Bonn concluded the item without a substantive decision on the future of the MWP and without formally preserving the detailed reflection of the Parties' views. The main result was keeping the negotiations alive until Antalya. However, the central disagreements remain open: mandate, scope, ambition, implementation, links with the GST, and the future format of the program.

The challenge leading up to CMA8 will be to use the pre-sectional workshop to rebuild trust, organize divergences, and identify areas of convergence. The lack of a substantive outcome in Bonn shows that the continuity of the MWP is not yet guaranteed. At the same time, as it is the only formal negotiating forum specifically dedicated to mitigation, its eventual weakening would have significant implications for the climate agenda.

Roadmaps for reversing deforestation and transitioning away from fossil fuels.

At SB64, the Roadmaps were treated as one of the main fronts of political continuity from COP30. Their role was not to reopen negotiations on sensitive issues, but to offer voluntary instruments to support the implementation of consensuses already reached in the Global Stocktake, especially on two central agendas: the transition away from fossil fuels and the end of deforestation and forest degradation.

The relevance of the Roadmaps became apparent in various venues in Bonn. In consultations led by the COP30 Presidency, in side events with strong participation from Parties and observers, and in interventions on the GST-associated tracks, the common message was the need to move from policy formulation to concrete delivery. Within this framework, the Roadmaps were presented as tools to help countries organize their own implementation pathways, without imposing uniform models and without altering the nationally determined nature of climate commitments.

A primary point of discussion was the role of the Roadmaps as coordination tools. In the case of the energy transition, consultations on the Roadmap indicated support for the idea of national pathways capable of combining reduced dependence on fossil fuels with economic development, energy security, industrialization, job creation, and poverty reduction. This approach was also reinforced at the Santa Marta Conference, convened by Colombia and the Netherlands, where the discussion focused less on the necessity of the transition and more on the practical conditions for achieving it.

A second central theme was financing. In consultations on transitioning away from fossil fuels, developing countries emphasized expanding concessional financing, reducing the cost of capital, addressing indebtedness, accessing technology, and reforming the international financial architecture. In discussions on forests, the same problem emerged, associated with strengthening instruments such as TFFF and REDD+, redirecting economic incentives that favor deforestation, and ensuring direct access to resources for indigenous peoples and local communities.

A third axis was the connection between the Roadmaps and the next GST cycle. In discussions about forests, there was a perception that the Roadmap can contribute to consolidating forests and land use as central components of the implementation of the Paris Agreement in GST2. Similarly, in consultations on energy transition, the Roadmap was treated as a means of transforming the GST's outcome into practical options for action, including through national pathways that can engage with future NDCs.

The forest agenda also highlighted that the main bottleneck is not just the lack of technical knowledge. Monitoring systems, political commitments, and diagnoses of deforestation drivers already exist. The challenge identified in the consultations was primarily political, institutional, and financial: coordinating initiatives, removing barriers, mobilizing resources, and creating conditions for large-scale implementation. In this context, indigenous peoples and local communities were treated as central actors, with emphasis on territorial rights, local governance, and direct access to financing.

The relationship between agriculture, bioeconomy, and deforestation remained sensitive. In discussions about the Forest Roadmap, the trend was to avoid an approach focused solely on constraints and to emphasize a narrative of sustainable development, productivity, productive restoration, income generation, and bioeconomy. This formulation seeks to address the drivers of deforestation without excluding countries for which agriculture, food security, and rural development are politically strategic issues.

Future Presidencies will also influence the continuity of the Roadmaps. Turkey, associated with the COP31 Action Agenda, has prioritized electrification and waste management, without opposing the Roadmaps, but also without explicitly supporting them in consultations. Australia, in turn, has expressed clearer support, including at the UAE Dialogue, treating the Roadmaps as useful tools for the implementation of the GST (Globally Sustainable Tourism). The electrification agenda, being prepared in the context of COP31, could function as one of the concrete options within the broader set of solutions for the energy transition.

Platform for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

Between June 2nd and 5th, 2026, the 15th meeting of the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) took place within the framework of the UNFCCC. The main objective of the meeting was to advance the implementation of the Baku Work Plan (2025–2027), as well as to initiate discussions on the platform's next work cycle (2028–2031). In a context of growing recognition of the importance of traditional knowledge for climate action, the FWG also sought to strengthen the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities in key UNFCCC agendas.

The negotiations were marked by discussions on strategic planning, representation, transparency, and the protection of traditional knowledge. One of the debates focused on the development of the ethics protocol foreseen in the Baku Work Plan, with disagreements on how to guarantee free, prior, and informed consent and prevent the misappropriation of community and indigenous knowledge. Transparency emerged as a cross-cutting concern, both in relation to the internal processes of the LCIPP and the use of knowledge shared on the platform. Participants demanded greater clarity on how this knowledge is incorporated by UNFCCC bodies and how it contributes to formal negotiation processes, as well as advocating for more accessible mechanisms for communication, translation, and information provision to communities. There were also debates on the governance of the platform, especially regarding the demand for greater representation of local communities in the FWG, including filling the three seats designated for these groups. Simultaneously, participants advocated for greater inclusion of young people and women, increased linguistic diversity, and strengthening the LCIPP's communication mechanisms.

As a result, the FWG renewed its leadership, electing new Co-facilitators, and approved the LCIPP's annual theme for 2026, focused on promoting holistic climate action based on kinship, balance, and collective well-being. The group also approved a new engagement strategy for mandated platform events, specifically aimed at increasing inclusion and transparency, and decided to move forward cross-sessionally in developing the ethics protocol and formally begin building the 2028–2031 work plan. It was also agreed to develop LCIPP contributions to the next Global Stocktake and to hold monthly meetings until FWG 16, scheduled for November 2026 during COP31.

Article 6.2

The item on financing the infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building activities related to Article 6.2 addresses the operationalization of international carbon markets under the Paris Agreement. Although accounting, reporting, and technical review rules have already been agreed upon, their implementation depends on the existence of permanent systems, such as the centralized accounting and reporting platform, the Article 6 database, expert technical review processes, and capacity-building programs for participating countries. The discussion in Bonn focused on how to ensure sufficient and stable funding to keep these elements functioning in the coming years.

The agenda reached SB64 following growing concerns expressed by the UNFCCC Secretariat regarding the resource shortfall for developing and operating the Article 6.2 infrastructure. At CMA 7, held in Baku, the Parties requested a technical study on financing options and formally initiated discussions on sustainable models for funding the system. The challenge stems from the fact that Article 6.2 combines permanent elements of international governance with a voluntary participation mechanism. This has generated disagreements about who should bear the costs: whether the entire Convention through the UNFCCC central budget, only the user countries of the system, or a combination of different funding sources.

The negotiations in Bonn revealed profound political differences regarding the financing architecture. Some countries argued that costs should be covered primarily by voluntary contributions or by developed countries, arguing that charging fees could create barriers to participation for developing countries, especially least developed countries (LDCs) and small island states (SIDS). Other countries advocated for the application of the "user pays" principle, according to which participants in the mechanism should contribute financially to its maintenance. There were also disagreements about adopting fees based on the volume of ITMOs traded, fixed fees for participating countries, the creation of specific trust funds, and the possibility of incorporating part of these costs into the UNFCCC's regular budget. A common element in the interventions was the recognition that there is an urgent need for short-term financing to avoid delays in the implementation of the Article 6.2 infrastructure.

The outcome of SB64 was relatively modest, reflecting the still preliminary stage of the discussions. The Parties did not reach an agreement on a specific financing model, but took note of the Secretariat's updated technical study and the options discussed during the session. The SBI requested its Chair to prepare an informal document containing textual proposals to support the negotiations at SBI 65, with the aim of recommending a formal decision for adoption by CMA 8. At the same time, the Parties expressed concern about the significant funding shortfall identified by the Secretariat, reiterated their appeal for voluntary contributions, and requested that the Secretariat intensify its fundraising efforts.

In practical terms, the decision keeps the issue under negotiation and postpones until COP31 the more political choices about who will finance, and under what conditions, the infrastructure needed to make the Article 6.2 system fully operational.

Article 6.8

Two elements marked the negotiations on Non-Market Approaches at SB64: the 9th meeting of the GCNMA, a body mandated to support the implementation of Article 6.8, and the discussion on the revision of the Work Programme, a step foreseen in the cycle initiated by CMA3 in Glasgow in 2021.

This review is relevant for evaluating the progress achieved, the effectiveness of existing instruments—such as workshops, spin-off groups, technical documents, and the NMA Platform—and possible adjustments for the future. The discussion was also informed by reports from the UNFCCC Secretariat, including a technical document with options for making the NMA Platform more operational and better articulated with other Convention processes.

The negotiations were marked by caution and disagreements regarding the scope and depth of the review. Discussions focused primarily on the language of the texts and how to reflect different views on the future of the Work Programme. Several delegations argued that the review should not anticipate any decision by CMA8, avoiding assumptions about continuity, renewal, or expansion of the mandate related to Article 6.8. There were also disagreements about proposals for the NMA Platform, with some groups resisting the discussion of new functionalities before a more in-depth evaluation of the technical reports presented by the Secretariat.

The agreed text reflected this cautious approach. The conclusions acknowledged the importance of Non-Market Approaches to support the implementation of the NDCs and noted progress within the Work Programme, but did not indicate a definitive direction for the future of the arrangement. For COP31/CMA8, it is expected that the Parties will move forward in defining the next steps, while maintaining the caveat that the current discussions neither anticipate nor limit future decisions on the continuation or reformulation of the Work Programme.

At the same time, the Bonn outcome signals an interest in continuing to examine ways to strengthen the operationalization of Article 6.8, including possible improvements to the NMA Platform and its articulation with other existing tools. The main challenge will be to transform this interest into a clearer working path, without overstepping the sensitivities of the Parties regarding the mandate, scope, and non-market nature of this Article 6 component.

Synergies between the Rio Conventions

Within the agenda item on cooperation with other international organizations, currently focused on strengthening cooperation among the Rio Conventions, the debate was supported by a report from the Secretariat. The document indicated that cooperation between the UNFCCC, United Nations agencies, and other international organizations is already a consolidated practice in areas such as climate finance, adaptation, transparency, technology, capacity building, and implementation of the NDCs. It also highlighted the growing role of the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) in coordinating among the Rio Conventions. Based on this diagnosis, the Parties focused their discussions not on the need for cooperation itself, but on how to strengthen it, what its limits should be, and what role the JLG could play in the future.

Negotiations took place over four informal consultations led by the co-facilitators, with the aim of constructing a concluding text that would record minimum convergences and guide future work. Although there was broad recognition of the importance of cooperation between conventions, the exchange of information, and respect for the specific mandates of each process, significant divergences arose regarding the meaning of "synergies," the possible strengthening of the JLG, and the risks of mandate expansion. Brazil, AILAC, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Fiji, Canada, and others advocated for greater visibility for the JLG and the creation of spaces for sharing experiences. Conversely, the Arab Group, China, Russia, and others warned of possible institutional implications, additional costs, and overlap between processes. In the final consultations, the main impasse became the degree of formalization of future activities and the political recognition of the continuity of the agenda.

Despite the efforts of the co-facilitators, there was no consensus on the text of the conclusions. The versions under negotiation provided for the continuation of discussions through presentations by the Secretariat on cooperation activities, updates from the Executive Secretary on the work of the JLG, and opportunities for the Parties to share national experiences. However, the Arab Group and its allies objected to the inclusion of language that could be interpreted as a mandate to deepen or institutionalize the agenda, while several countries advocated maintaining a formal reference that would allow the debate to advance in future sessions.

Given the impossibility of reaching an agreement, Rule 16 of the regulations was applied, without any substantive conclusions being adopted. Therefore, the discussion about the future of cooperation between the Rio Conventions remained open for COP31, but without any additional political guidance agreed upon in Bonn.

Agriculture and Food Security

The Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Working Group on Climate Action Implementation in Agriculture and Food Security (SJWA) arrived in Bonn at an important time. Renewed at COP 27 as a four-year work program, the group is nearing the end of its current mandate, scheduled for COP 31. At this session in Bonn, SB64, the expectation was that the Parties would advance the analysis of the report from the first workshop, on systemic and holistic approaches to sustainable agriculture, consider the second annual synthesis report from the secretariat on activities conducted in 2025, and hold a new workshop on needs and access to means of implementation, such as financing, technology, and capacity building.

This second SJWA workshop was dedicated to identifying needs and accessing means of implementation for climate action in agriculture and food security. Discussions reinforced known challenges such as the low participation of agriculture and food systems in climate finance, difficulties in accessing resources, gaps in planning, data and technical capacity, and the need to better connect financial mechanisms to national and territorial realities. The workshop also highlighted the importance of financing, technology, and capacity building to support adaptation, resilience, and food security. Furthermore, it was an important space for exchanging experiences and sharing information among countries, civil society, and other relevant actors.

The negotiations, however, made little progress in terms of content. The Parties had difficulty reaching an agreement on substantive messages, especially regarding the scope of the work and the language of the text. One of the main points of tension, and one that is not new in the group's discussions, was the extent to which the SJWA should only address agriculture and food security, as per its mandate, or incorporate broader discussions on food systems, mitigation, and other implementation-related issues. Faced with a lack of consensus, the Parties opted for a short text, primarily procedural in nature.

The approved text takes note of the report from the first workshop and the second annual synthesis report, but postpones consideration of both until the SB 65 in November 2026. It also records the holding of the workshop on means of implementation, whose report will be considered at the next session, and acknowledges the role of the SJWA online portal in facilitating collaboration, knowledge exchange, and connection to funding opportunities. Thus, Bonn preserved the continuity of the process but transferred to the SB 65 the task of addressing the main substantive points with a heavy agenda: resuming pending reports, discussing access to means of implementation, and preparing the way for COP 31, when Parties will assess the results of the SJWA and decide the future of the agriculture and food security agenda in the UNFCCC.

Transparency

Financial and technical support for the implementation of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.

Item SBI 5 arrived at SB64 with the aim of evaluating the financial, technical, and capacity-building support provided to developing countries for the implementation of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, at a particularly relevant time for the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). By June 12, 2026, 132 Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) had already been submitted to the UNFCCC, and Parties were reminded that the second BTRs must be delivered by December 31, 2026. In this context, the negotiations in Bonn sought to answer a central question: whether the support currently available, especially via GEF, CBIT, and other capacity-building initiatives, is sufficient to enable developing countries to implement permanent national transparency systems and fulfill their reporting obligations in a continuous and sustainable manner. The debate also sought to identify lessons learned from the first cycle of BTRs and guide the future capacity-building activities of the Secretariat and the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE).

Developing countries advocated for more robust language, acknowledging the inadequacy of current resources and highlighting that the formal availability of funding does not necessarily mean adequacy, predictability, or ease of access. They also pressed for greater recognition of the challenges related to maintaining technical teams, data systems, and permanent institutional arrangements. On the other hand, developed countries preferred to emphasize the progress already made by the GEF, including maintaining specific resources for transparency and simplifying access procedures. The main impasse centered on how to characterize the adequacy of funding; while one group argued that the text should explicitly acknowledge funding gaps and persistent barriers to access, another preferred to emphasize the progress already achieved by existing mechanisms, avoiding formulations that could suggest structural inadequacy of the support provided.

Given the lack of consensus on characterizing the adequacy of financial and technical support for the implementation of Article 13, the item was closed under the application of Rule 16. Therefore, the agenda will automatically be resumed at the next session of the subsidiary bodies in November, without any text reflecting the discussions in SB 64 being considered.

Support for National Communications from countries not listed in Annex I of the Convention

SBI item 4(b) arrived in Bonn focusing on providing financial and technical support for non-Annex I countries to continue preparing their National Communications and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) under the Convention. While the transparency regime is gradually shifting to BTRs under the Paris Agreement, this item remains politically sensitive because many developing countries still rely on traditional support mechanisms to complete this transition. In Bonn, the Parties' task was to assess the support provided by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and discuss how to ensure continued funding during this period of overlap between the Convention and Paris Agreement instruments. The debate also sought to decide how frequently this item will continue to be negotiated on the SBI agenda in the coming years.

Negotiations in SBI 4(b) were marked by disagreements over the assessment of available funding, particularly regarding the controversial paragraph 6 bis. While the main text acknowledged that resources allocated to enabling activities and the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency were maintained in GEF-9, a paragraph introduced language of “deep concern” about the 27% reduction in resources for the GEF climate focal area compared to the previous cycle, stating that this reduction would be incompatible with the growing reporting needs of developing countries. For developing countries, this paragraph was essential to record the structural inadequacy of funding; developed countries, however, resisted this formulation, considering it excessively critical and politically unbalanced.

Without consensus on the final text, particularly regarding the language on the reduction of GEF climate resources and its suitability for the reporting needs of developing countries, item SBI 4(b) was also closed under rule 16.

Dialogues on Trade and Climate

The topic of trade and climate arrived at SB64 following a mandate agreed upon at COP30 in Belém, within the framework of the Global Task Force decision. After consultations conducted by the Brazilian Presidency of COP30 on the impacts of the growing interactions between climate policies and international trade, the Parties decided to establish a dialogue process to discuss opportunities, challenges, and barriers related to the role of trade in implementing climate action.

The holding of this dialogue stems from a concern that has been growing in recent years, especially among developing countries. Several Parties have argued that climate measures with commercial repercussions, such as border carbon adjustment mechanisms, environmental due diligence requirements, and restrictions related to value chains, were being discussed and implemented outside the scope of the UNFCCC, despite having a direct impact on countries' ability to implement their NDCs and promote their sustainable development. It was in this context that the Parties agreed to initiate a dialogue dedicated to the topic within the Convention process.

During SB64, many developing countries such as the G77 and China, BASIC, LDC, and the Arab Group emphasized concerns about unilateral trade-related measures, arguing that certain climate policies adopted by large economies can create trade barriers, increase compliance costs, and restrict development opportunities. Several interventions advocated for greater attention to the principles of equity, CBDR-RC, and the capacity-building and financing needs for adapting to new regulatory requirements. On the other hand, several developed countries highlighted the potential of trade to accelerate the diffusion of clean technologies, facilitate sustainable investments, and support the transition to low-carbon economies.

One of the most relevant debates was whether trade and climate should become a permanent agenda item of the UNFCCC. While several countries in the Global South supported the creation of a more robust and continuous institutional space to discuss the impacts of climate-related trade measures, other countries showed caution, arguing that the topic should remain an exercise in information exchange, without the creation of new negotiating structures.

As a result, the secretariat will produce an informal note on the dialogue, seeking to guide future dialogues that will take place in subsequent sessions until 2028. Furthermore, there was recognition of the first dialogue and an invitation to continue discussions on trade and climate within the framework of the UNFCCC.

Response Measures

At SB64, the agenda on the impacts of climate change response measures (or simply “response measures”) had three mandates: (i) analysis of the case studies mentioned in the 2025 annual report of the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI); (ii) definition of the technical contributions to the Second Global Stocktake (GST2), as per activity 2 of the work plan for 2026-2030 (Annex to Decision 16/CP.29); and (iii) discussion of the transboundary impacts of response measures (Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC), as per activity 6 of the work plan.

Regarding the case studies, the experts presented the seven studies developed in 2025, one for each region, with three main messages: the design of public policies is crucial; the results of the same policy can vary radically depending on the national context; and approaches should be customized according to the national context. Developing countries raised several questions to the experts , suggesting that socioeconomic indicators be included in future studies (G77+China, supported by the Arab Group) and that the tools presented be better calibrated for developing countries (AGN and Brazil). Furthermore, the AGN questioned the studies for Africa, mentioning that public policies should be analyzed specifically within the economies of different countries, with special attention to countries dependent on commodity exports.

As had already happened at COP 30, the governance relationship between the Forum and the KCI was a subject of debate. The G77+China, the AGN, Honduras, South Africa, and Brazil argued that the KCI is a technical body linked to the Forum, and should submit its conclusions for approval and political decision-making by the Forum, including regarding technical input for GST2. Canada stated that the decision mandating the Forum already outlines how inputs to GST2 should be made, as per activity 2 of the work plan. Furthermore, countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Switzerland expressed a preference for procedures that align the KCI directly with the general guidelines of the GST, without creating new mandates or substantive reports.

A draft text was prepared and extensively debated in several sessions that were extended until the last day of SB64. However, after several postponements of the group meetings, in the end, no consensus was reached to approve the draft text, and Rule 16 was applied. The group will continue the discussion at SB65.

Technology

The technology negotiations at SB64 focused on three main agendas. The first was the analysis of the Joint Annual Report (JAR) of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the main policy oversight mechanism of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism. The second involved the selection of the CTC host institution. Finally, the Parties continued discussions on the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Finance Mechanism, an agenda aimed at bridging technological assistance and access to climate finance.

Joint Annual Report (JAR) of TEC and CTCN

The Joint Annual Report is a permanent item on the UNFCCC agenda through which the Parties assess the performance of the TEC and the CTCN, the two arms of the Technology Mechanism. In recent years, the Technology Mechanism has sought to strengthen its role as an implementing instrument, expanding coordination among its bodies, cooperation with financial entities, and support provided to developing countries.

The 2025 report highlighted the continued implementation of the 2023–2027 Joint Work Programme, the expansion of cooperation between TEC and CTCN, engagement with youth, indigenous peoples and the gender constituent, as well as initiatives aimed at mobilizing resources and improving monitoring and evaluation systems. It also noted the strengthening of CTCN's activities in providing technical assistance and support to developing countries in identifying and implementing technological solutions.

Although most of the text was considered relatively consensual, the main political controversy arose around references to the outcome of the first Global Stocktake (GST).

Several developed countries advocated maintaining references to the GST, arguing that the global balance sheet provides relevant guidance for the future work of the Technology Mechanism. On the other hand, the Arab Group and some other countries expressed resistance to any language that could be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the most sensitive elements of the GST, especially those related to the energy transition and the reduction of dependence on fossil fuels.

In practice, the debate was not directly about technology, but rather about the attempt by some groups to prevent technical decisions from being used to reinforce political compromises negotiated in other processes.

The end result was the adoption of decisions under the COP and the CMA that welcome the joint annual report and recognize the progress achieved by the TEC and the CTCN in implementing their respective work programs. The decisions reinforce the importance of coordination between the two bodies, cooperation with the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Adaptation Fund, as well as the continuity of the regional forums of the designated national entities.

The decision also recognizes important operational advancements by CTCN, including the approval of its operational plan for 2026, a 9% increase in its budget, and the expansion of the maximum limit for technical assistance requests from US$250,000 to US$300,000.

More importantly from a political standpoint, the text was approved without explicit references to the GST, reflecting the compromise reached between the different negotiating groups.

Institutional Arrangements of CTCN (Host Institution)

The CTCN is the operational arm of the Technology Mechanism and relies on a host institution to provide administrative, operational, and institutional support. Since its creation, this role has been performed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in cooperation with other partner organizations.

With the current hosting cycle drawing to a close, an evaluation process has begun to define the future arrangements for the CTCN. This topic has gained relevance because the center has significantly expanded its activities in recent years and has come to play an increasingly important role in providing technical assistance and implementing projects related to climate technology.

Prior to SB64, the CTCN Advisory Board concluded its evaluation process and indicated UNEP as the preferred organization to continue serving as host.

The main issue was the choice of host institution, which was between maintaining UNEP and a consortium formed by UNIDO and UNOPS. In addition to the decision itself, the institutional details that will govern the next period of operation of the CTCN were also under discussion.

The discussions focused on the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the governance arrangements, and the definition of responsibilities between UNEP and other organizations that have historically supported the center's operation, especially UNIDO and UNOPS.

Several parties understood that further clarification was still needed before the final approval of these instruments. Therefore, the negotiations shifted from a discussion about who would host the CTCN to a discussion about how the future institutional structure should function.

SB64 consolidated the political understanding that UNEP will continue to play the role of host institution for the CTCN, but did not conclude negotiations on the legal and institutional instruments necessary to operationalize this decision.

As a result, discussions on the Memorandum of Understanding and other institutional arrangements were postponed until COP31. The approved text also encourages continued cooperation between UNEP, UNIDO, and UNOPS, recognizing the importance of these organizations for the functioning of the UNFCCC's technology support system.

In practice, the decision resolved the broader political issue — the choice of host country — but left the finalization of implementation details to COP31.

Connections between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism

Since COP21, the Parties have been trying to strengthen the link between the Technology Mechanism (TEC and CTCN) and the Financial Mechanism (mainly the GCF and GEF). The objective is to ensure that the needs identified by the countries can effectively access financing for implementation.

In recent years, workshops, calls for submissions, and synthesis reports have been conducted to identify challenges and opportunities related to these connections. SB64 represented the most recent stage of this evaluation process.

The negotiations revealed broad consensus on the need to strengthen the relationship between technology and finance, but also highlighted disagreements about how to measure the success of these connections and what the institutional framework should be to monitor them.

Several Parties highlighted persistent challenges, such as the difficulty of transforming technical assistance into fundable projects, the lack of coordination between national institutions, and the obstacles faced by developing countries in accessing resources from climate funds.

Another important point was the discussion about the future of the agenda itself. Some countries, especially the United Kingdom, advocated maintaining periodic reviews to assess the effectiveness of the linkages.

The end result was a decision that institutionally strengthens the monitoring of linkages and expands cooperation between TEC, CTCN, GCF, and GEF. The text encourages CTCN to support countries in transforming the results of technical assistance and technology needs assessments into projects eligible for funding. It also reinforces the importance of coordination between nationally designated technology entities, GEF focal points, and national GCF authorities.

The main political outcome was the creation of a mechanism for future review. The Secretariat will prepare a survey on progress, challenges, and lessons learned by 2028 and update it again in 2032. Based on this information, the SBI will formally review the topic again in Bonn in 2029 and again in 2032. The 2032 review should also assess whether the agenda should continue, how often, and in what format.

In practical terms, the decision does not create new sources of funding or new financial mechanisms. However, it establishes a clearer framework for monitoring whether the technological support provided by the Technology Mechanism is effectively accessing financial resources and generating concrete implementation in developing countries.

Gender

The gender agenda arrived at SB64 in an early stage of implementation of the Belém Gender Action Plan (GAP), adopted at COP30 for the period 2026–2034. The GAP was approved after significant political disputes regarding gender language, intersectionality, and human rights, including debates on violence against women and girls, care work, protection of environmental defenders, and the recognition of Afro-descendant women and girls in climate action. However, governance issues remained unresolved after the failed attempt to extend the Lima Work Programme on Gender and the GAP to the CMA. The outcome of COP30, therefore, was a politically important plan, but one still dependent on consistent implementation to consolidate the gender agenda within the climate regime.

In Bonn, SB64 did not reopen the GAP negotiations, but it served as the first forum for operationalizing its mandates. Three mandated events took place during the session: a workshop on strengthening national gender and climate change focal points; an expert dialogue on gender- and age-disaggregated data and gender analytics; and a dialogue on progress in delivering gender-responsive climate finance. Discussions addressed institutional best practices, core and optional focal point activities, elements for monitoring, future recommendations on health, violence against women and girls, care work, engagement of men and boys, gender and environmental data, and the need to advance the translation of commitments on gender-responsive finance into more concrete practices.

Overall, SB64 seems to have highlighted that the implementation of the GAP is still in a very early stage. The mandated events were a necessary first step to begin organizing institutional aspects of the agenda, but the debates remained at a relatively basic level when compared to the complexity of the challenges of effectively integrating gender into climate action. This reading suggests that the gender track will still need greater political energy, technical capacity, and resources to consolidate within the UNFCCC system. Therefore, the point of attention going forward will be to monitor whether the next steps will succeed in transforming this initial structure into a more substantive and operational agenda.

Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings (AIM)

At SB64, discussions on the Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings (AIM) agenda addressed three themes: (i) elements for organizing COP 31; (ii) efficiency of UNFCCC processes; and (iii) participation of observer organizations.

Regarding COP 31, as with Brazil, Antalya's logistical capacity was heavily questioned, particularly concerning the availability of flights and affordable accommodation. Turkey strongly defended the host city's infrastructure, highlighting its extensive airport capacity and hotel network, guaranteeing affordable accommodation for all expected COP 31 participants. Ultimately, COP 31 was confirmed for November 9-20, with the High-Level Meeting ( Leaders Summit ) taking place between November 11 and 12. Regarding the Pre-COP, Australia detailed its strategic cooperation with the Pacific Islands Forum to co-host the event in Fiji. No candidates have yet emerged to host COPs 33 and 34, which are expected to be from the Asia-Pacific region and Eastern Europe, respectively.

Another issue frequently raised, especially by developing countries, particularly AOSIS and LDCs, was the systemic barriers to accessing UNFCCC meetings due to visa denials, excessive administrative fees imposed by host countries, and unilateral cancellations of hotel reservations. Regarding the Host Country Agreement, some Parties, such as the EU and EIG, expressed the need to include clauses safeguarding human rights and freedom of expression, as well as cost control.

Regarding the efficiency of the UNFCCC processes, some Parties indicated concern that the pursuit of efficiency could make the processes superficial, and that the party-driven nature of the Convention should be preserved. China criticized proposals to increase efficiency that aim only to superficially streamline the process by reducing speaking times for groups representing a large number of States Parties, suggesting that efficiency should be measured by tangible results in each session, strictly preserving the party-driven nature of the Convention.

Considering the progressive increase in the accreditation and participation of various observer organizations, the presence of these actors in negotiation meetings was debated. Several Parties, as well as constituencies such as RINGO and BINGO, indicated an imbalance in the diversity of observer organizations, suggesting the need for increased regional diversity, as well as improvements in transparency regarding meeting participants, especially concerning party overflow credentials. Norway proposed that States adopt moderation and establish self-determined limits ( caps ) on their delegations to avoid the collapse of the physical space of the COPs. The Disability Caucus argued that the current UNFCCC structures lack physical accessibility, sign language, and simplified communication, and demanded formal recognition as an independent constituency .

Finally, a draft was prepared that addresses several of the topics discussed, such as consideration of measures to ensure financial accessibility to meetings, particularly regarding accommodation, and the requirement that host country agreements reflect the principles of the UN Charter and international human rights obligations. Furthermore, the draft requests that authorities simplify and facilitate visa application processes. Additionally, it invites the Parties to consider the implications of granting credentials as party overflow , including meeting prices and accommodation availability.

Capacity building

At SB64, the capacity building agenda had three main themes: (i) annual monitoring of the implementation of the capacity building landscape in developing countries under the Kyoto Convention and Protocol; (ii) the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity building landscape in developing countries under the Kyoto Convention and Protocol; and (iii) the sixth comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity building landscape in countries with economies in transition under the Kyoto Convention and Protocol. In addition, on June 9th, the 15th Durban Forum was held, featuring presentations of various practical cases supporting capacity building in developing countries, in accordance with the plan for the Paris Committee on Capacity Building 2025-2026.

The informal consultations were quite contentious. Early in the consultations, some Parties, notably the G77+China and AGN, rejected initiating discussions with the draft document from the COP30 meetings, arguing that it did not reflect the political balance of the Belém discussions. The G77+China proposed the inclusion of an inter-session workshop to methodologically reflect on how to measure and improve the real effectiveness of the capacity-building landscape, providing robust technical input for the Sixth Review. However, Parties such as the EU and Japan expressed strong resistance to new mandates or events, arguing that the creation of new mechanisms generates functional overlap with already established and consolidated bodies, such as the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), in addition to raising budgetary concerns.

Regarding revisions to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU questioned their necessity, considering the end of the protocol's time horizon and the depletion of its few remaining activities. The G77+China positioned itself as agreeing to evaluate the relaxation of the Kyoto Protocol regime only if the EU and other developed countries agreed to convert the political time saved into a real and mandatory expansion of the negotiating space to strengthen the framework of capabilities under the Convention.

Following several informal consultations, discussions extended into the second week of the SB, culminating in the publication of a draft document with the points of divergence highlighted in brackets. The document incorporates the Secretariat's summary reports on the implementation of the capacity overview, acknowledging the progress made at the individual, institutional, and systemic levels, but reiterating the persistence of gaps and needs in the initial areas of scope, primarily affecting LDCs and SIDS. Furthermore, it reinforces the Capacity Building Portal and the Durban Forum for the continuous exchange of best practices.

From a procedural standpoint, the SBI formally forwarded the draft decisions regulating the Fifth Comprehensive Review (for developing countries) and the Sixth Review (for Economies in Transition), under the Kyoto Convention and Protocol, for adoption at COP 31.

Oceans

In 2025, the topic of oceans gained more prominence in climate negotiations, with the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogues held during SB62 and COP30, and a mention in the Joint Decision. With the Australian co-chairmanship and the pre-COP being held in partnership with Pacific island nations, the topic of oceans should regain significant relevance at COP31. Last year , the focus of discussions was on three pillars: (i) integration of ocean-related targets into the NDCs; (ii) recognition of the ocean in the GGA, with the inclusion of the topic in the NAPs; and (iii) recognition of synergies between climate and marine biodiversity, including with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

This year, in the dialogues held on June 10th and 11th at SB64, as per the message from the dialogue co-facilitators, the focus shifted to the implementation of what was discussed last year. During the two-day event, the following topics were addressed: (i) means of implementation as a cross-cutting aspect; (ii) synergies between international ocean, climate, and biodiversity regimes and international cooperation; and (iii) discussions on priorities for ocean-based actions in the NDCs, identifying five key sectors. Finally, participants met in breakout groups to discuss the three themes.

Regarding implementation methods, discussions focused on financing. AGN and AOSIS indicated that approximately half of the ocean targets in NDCs are contingent on external support. Developing countries argued that financial contributions should preferably be made through grants rather than loans. The breakout group highlighted the lack of access to existing financing mechanisms, as well as inconsistencies between financing and implementation, arguing that there should not be a single mechanism for all cases.

Regarding synergies between regimes, in addition to the CBD, the Marine Biodiversity Treaty beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ or "High Seas Treaty") was mentioned. In the breakout group , participants emphasized the need to strengthen science-based data. Furthermore, the relationship between NDCs, NAPs, and NBSAPs was also frequently mentioned.

Regarding the NDCs, it was mentioned that the latest synthesis report demonstrated that several countries included ocean-based measures in their contributions. Furthermore, it was announced that the Blue NDC Challenge, launched in 2025 by Brazil and France, has been formally structured as an Implementation Task Force, with its launch planned for COP31.

In discussions between the Parties, Saudi Arabia repeatedly questioned the role of the Dialogues, stressing that it should only be facilitative, not having a negotiating mandate or prescriptive character, and requesting that its report not adopt preferences for specific energy routes, which should be determined nationally. The EU advocated for the inclusion of mitigation measures aimed at decarbonizing maritime transport and advancing offshore renewable energies within the context of the TAFF. AOSIS and SIDS reiterated the role of island nations, which have special circumstances, highlighting capacity and financing gaps . Observers expressed opposition to deep-water mining and blue carbon credit market mechanisms.

A report on the Dialogues will be prepared, which will feed into the negotiation processes at COP 31, including as technical input for the information gathering phase of GST2. Furthermore, it was suggested that the report serve as input for the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) Forum in September 2026.