LACLIMA’S COP 29 SUMMARY

Our traditional COP summary provides an overview of the COP 29 negotiations and their main outcomes.

We already knew it would be extremely challenging to adopt a fair new climate finance goal at this COP, considering the current geopolitical context, the inherent complexity and sensitivity of finance discussions within the UNFCCC, and the circumstances that led oil-producing Baku to preside over this COP. But no one could have imagined that it would be possible to accumulate so many failures in a single COP.

COP 29 may be remembered as the COP that failed to deliver. It failed to deliver a decision to operationalize the Just Transition Work Programme, a programme that will continue for another year completely weakened and with an undefined scope. It failed to deliver a decision to implement the recommendations of the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement and ensure that the next round of NDCs will be aligned with its outcomes, including a process of transitioning away from fossil fuels. And it failed to deliver a unanimous decision on the new climate finance goal, with several objections raised during the plenary and ambiguous, weak language.

With the exception of the long-awaited decision on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, COP 29 was not only unrepresentative in terms of substantial progress on the UNFCCC agenda, but also helped destabilize trust in the multilateral process as a form of cooperation to address the climate crisis, given the Presidency’s lack of transparency and obstructive handling of the process, including during the plenary. As always in these negotiations, decisions are won at the expense of everyone else’s exhaustion.

It will fall to Brazil at COP 30 next year to “save” the UNFCCC regime from this crisis of confidence.

But first… about LACLIMA

LACLIMA, the Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action, is an institute dedicated to studying, researching, developing, and disseminating knowledge on climate change law in Brazil and Latin America.

Our work aims to support Brazilian and Latin American society in implementing the Paris Agreement, promoting a decarbonized economy, and building a more climate-resilient society with climate justice.

Since 2019, LACLIMA has been present in UNFCCC regime negotiations, systematically monitoring the main negotiation agenda items, producing content, informing and training members and civil society organizations in Brazil and other Latin American countries.

LACLIMA monitors the progress of negotiations, the agenda, and the outcomes of events and meetings mandated by the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement through its Paris Agreement Monitor, a monthly bulletin sent by email. Anyone can sign up to receive the Paris Agreement Monitor by email at the bottom of the Paris Agreement Observatory page on our website.

LACLIMA also fosters a network of legal professionals and law students, currently with more than 1,350 members from across Brazil: the LACLIMA Network. This initiative seeks to create a community of trained and engaged professionals, promoting actions focused on education, research, and awareness in the field of climate law.

If you are a law student, law graduate, or lawyer interested in joining the LACLIMA Network, access the registration form.

Our work at COP 29

LACLIMA was present at COP 29 with a delegation of six lawyers, following negotiations on Adaptation, Loss and Damage, Carbon Markets, Mitigation, Finance, Just Transition, Technology Transfer, and Transparency, with the main objective of translating the development of negotiations for civil society.

Six briefing meetings were held throughout the conference and can be accessed on LACLIMA’s Instagram or through the links below:

1. Briefing on November 15 on negotiation updates;
2. Briefing on November 16 with the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the general overview of the first week of COP 29;
3. Briefing on November 19 on negotiation updates;
4. Briefing on November 20 with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on transparency;
5. Briefing on November 21, opened by Mary Robinson, on negotiation updates.

LACLIMA’s delegation also trained 12 young people throughout the year and six young people aged 20 to 28 from the states of Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Pernambuco, São Paulo, and Tocantins during COP 29, in partnership with Climate Reality Project Brazil through the “Operação COP” project. The initiative aims to train young leaders specialized in climate negotiations, offering training sessions and workshops on the most relevant topics of the UNFCCC regime.

These young people attended COP 29 and followed LACLIMA delegates in the negotiation rooms, learning in practice how the multilateral climate negotiation process works.

Throughout the two weeks, LACLIMA also participated in 15 COP 29 panel discussions.

LACLIMA’s delegation included Executive Board members Flávia Bellaguarda, Caroline Rocha, and André Santos, as well as coordinators and consultants Gaia Hasse, Enéas Xavier, Juliana Marcussi, Maria Gabriella, and Yago Freire. LACLIMA Board members Caroline Prolo, Carlos Rittl, and Rodrigo Sluminsky were also present.

All of this was also only possible thanks to LACLIMA’s administrative support team, Bárbara Prado and Giovana Serra, and the communications team from Causo and Mariana Maraschin.

Climate Finance

The finance agenda at COP 29 addressed several negotiation items. However, countries chose to focus their efforts primarily on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), given the deadline for adopting a decision on the topic at this COP.

Background of the negotiations

Discussions on the NCQG began with Parties’ reactions to the draft text prepared by the co-facilitators of the ad hoc work programme. This preliminary text was widely rejected because it did not adequately reflect Parties’ views.

As a result, the document was reformulated and expanded, allowing discussions to move forward on some technical issues, such as transparency, access to finance, and capacity-building. Despite these specific advances, no significant progress was achieved on the central elements of the goal by the end of the first week.

At the end of the first week, the text was sent to the COP Presidency, which then took measures to advance the negotiations. Two Ministers were appointed to conduct political engagement with Parties in an attempt to make progress on fundamental issues such as the total amount of the goal, the contributor base, and the overall finance structure.

In addition, under the guidance of the Presidency, sessions with heads of delegation were held to address the technical aspects of the goal. Brazil and the United Kingdom were also invited to advise the Presidency in the search for balanced outcomes at COP 29.

Throughout the second week of negotiations, several versions of the NCQG draft decision were released, reflecting ongoing interactions among Parties.

Initially, a first simplified compilation of proposals was presented as a transition toward the Presidency’s preliminary decision text, including options emerging from the ministerial consultations. This document was considered balanced, containing qualitative and quantitative elements, obligations for provision by developed countries, regional finance floors and floors for vulnerable countries, the provision of financial resources in the form of grants or highly concessional finance, among other provisions.

However, as negotiations progressed, the Presidency released a new version of the text, with shorter and simplified language. Although this version sought to facilitate consensus, it was widely criticized for its ambiguous language and for omitting essential elements.

It made no explicit mention of resource provision obligations, instead considering a global goal under the responsibility of all actors to mobilize USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035. The text also did not address human rights, nor did it exclude certain financial flows, such as loans, from climate finance accounting.

In addition, the new language did not include any position against investments in fossil fuels, raising concerns about its adequacy in promoting a just and effective climate transition.

Decision adopted

The adopted decision calls on “all actors” to work together to enable the scaling up of finance for developing countries, from all public and private sources, to reach at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035.

Specifically in relation to developed countries, it decides to establish a goal “in extension of the goal” of USD 100 billion per year referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21.

This goal counts on developed countries taking the lead, in the amount of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035, for developing country Parties.

Although developed countries are expected to take the lead in delivering this portion of the goal, it may be achieved from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources. It may also account for all climate-related financial flows and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks.

The request from developing countries for a specific allocation of the goal for the provision of public finance by developed countries did not materialize.

The decision also encourages developing countries to make contributions, including through South-South cooperation, on a voluntary basis.

The decision further emphasizes the critical importance of significantly reducing the cost of capital, increasing the mobilization ratio of finance from public sources by 2030, and creating fiscal space in developing countries through the use of innovative instruments, such as first-loss instruments, guarantees, local currency financing, and foreign exchange risk mitigation instruments.

In terms of the amount, there is also a decision that a significant increase in public resources should be provided through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund. The decision also seeks to at least triple annual flows from these funds compared to 2022 levels by 2030.

In terms of process, the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion” was launched, aiming to scale up climate finance for developing countries to support low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development pathways, as well as the implementation of NDCs and National Adaptation Plans, including through grants, concessional and non-debt-creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space, taking into account relevant multilateral initiatives, as appropriate.

The respective COP Presidencies are expected to produce a report summarizing the work as they conclude it by COP 30/CMA 7.

Finally, it was decided that the implementation of this decision will be reviewed as part of the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement, and that deliberations on next steps before 2035 will begin, including a review of this decision in 2030.

“Consensus” in the adoption

After the President of COP 29/CMA 6 proclaimed the adoption of the decision, India requested the floor to explicitly object to the adoption of the decision, claiming that it had intended to request the floor before the President gaveled the decision.

The President read the report and immediately gaveled it, without waiting for reactions from the Parties and without announcing the traditional phrase “Hearing no objections, it is so decided,” catching everyone by surprise.

After India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and the Least Developed Countries Group also endorsed India’s position. The President took note of the countries’ statements and continued the session, maintaining the decision as adopted.

For an analysis of the consensus process in the UNFCCC, we recommend reading this opinion prepared by our colleagues at Legal Response International.

Adaptation

The adaptation negotiation agenda faced several challenges at COP 29.

While negotiations on the Report and Review of the Adaptation Committee (AC) were blocked by the African Group of Negotiators, it was also not possible to reach a decision on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), due to resistance from developed countries to including commitments on the provision of climate finance for the preparation of NAPs. As a result, the discussion was postponed until next year.

Thus, attention turned entirely to negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which centered on three fundamental aspects:

1. The UAE-Belém work programme on indicators to measure progress toward the thematic and dimensional targets established at COP 28;
2. Aspects related to paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5, concerning operational issues for the functioning of the GGA and its relationship with future Global Stocktake processes;
3. Discussions on the concept of transformational adaptation and its possible relationship with the GGA.

At the end of two intense weeks of debate, consensus among Parties was achieved with great difficulty, resulting in a decision that defines the path of the GGA toward Belém.

The decision reaffirms the request that the group of technical experts conduct a review and refinement of the mapping of indicators to measure progress toward the adaptation targets, confirming that the final decision on the list of indicators will be made by CMA 7 in Belém.

The decision highlights the importance of gender balance and geographic diversity among the members of the expert group, as well as the relevance of including traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge, and local knowledge systems within the indicators work programme.

The decision also encourages continued dialogue among Parties, experts, and other stakeholders in the process of refining and developing indicators, providing for dialogues and workshops throughout the next year to allow progress on this complex work.

The text highlights additional criteria for the potential set of indicators, including:

1. Measurability and availability of data that enable transparent monitoring of progress;
2. The ability to use already available or easily collected data;
3. The use of consolidated and available metrics;
4. Relevance to multiple thematic targets;
5. Results-oriented design.

To avoid imposing additional reporting burdens and requirements on countries, the decision also defines that the final outcome of the UAE-Belém Work Programme on indicators should consist of a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators.

These indicators should also be globally applicable and compiled into a menu covering diverse contexts of adaptation action, allowing Parties to choose which indicators to report in light of their national circumstances.

In addition, they should be designed to enable assessment of progress toward fulfilling the various components of the targets.

The decision also recognizes the relevance of indicators being able to capture information related to social inclusion, Indigenous Peoples, participatory processes, human rights, gender equality, migrants, children and youth, and persons with disabilities.

It also provides for the mapping of quantitative and qualitative indicators to facilitate the implementation of adaptation actions.

The reference to means of implementation, meaning the availability of finance, capacity-building, and technology transfer resources for adaptation actions, was included only in the final moments of COP 29, and even then in a very tangential way.

The decision provides for the need for technical experts to develop, as necessary, indicators of enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation actions, including means of implementation. It also provides that the final outcome of the UAE-Belém Work Programme should include such qualitative and quantitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation actions, including means of implementation.

In parallel, following a suggestion made by the Arab Group, which initially faced resistance, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap was launched, with the objective of advancing progress in accordance with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and supporting the implementation of the elements described in paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5.

Parties understood that there was not enough time to deeply discuss views on these aspects, and therefore discussions should continue at a future moment.

Finally, regarding transformational adaptation, Parties opted for an intermediate solution: they recognized that both incremental and transformational adaptation approaches are essential to protecting the well-being of people and the planet, and acknowledged the technical report prepared by the Secretariat, but decided to continue considering the matter next year.

Article 6

Unlike the failure at COP 28, when no decisions were adopted on the topic, progress on the operationalization of the cooperation instruments under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement began right away with a decision during the opening plenary of the COP on the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism, provided for under Article 6.4.

In this decision, Parties agreed to recognize the adoption, by the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM), of requirements for the approval of methodologies and greenhouse gas removal activities from the atmosphere. These requirements will serve as the basis for selecting activities that may issue certified emission units to be traded in the market.

With this resolved, countries had room to move forward with other resolutions essential to market implementation.

As a result, decisions and mandates were established, including the request for the SBM to accelerate work on implementing the mechanism’s registry and creating standards and instructions related to aspects necessary for selecting activities that will issue credits.

In addition, Parties deliberated on the form of authorization of corresponding adjustments for the use of these credits in the fulfillment of NDCs or other international mitigation purposes.

An extension was also granted for the transition of forestry activities already registered under the Clean Development Mechanism to the Article 6.4 mechanism. Transition requests must be submitted by December 31, 2025.

Based on these decisions, work can begin on detailing the requirements for approving activities that will generate Article 6.4 credits, as well as on implementing the registry structure and processes required for the mechanism to function.

Regarding cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, aimed at the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), negotiations began with the challenge of a 43-page draft decision full of options and divergent country positions.

Throughout the Conference, and after being warned by the SBSTA Chair and the COP Presidency, negotiators joined efforts to overcome their differences. By the end of the first week, a clean 19-page draft decision had been produced.

This text became the basis for negotiations in the second week, which took place mostly in closed-door meetings, without the participation of observers.

Based on this decision, countries sought bilaterally to overcome remaining points of divergence, such as:

1. The process for the authorizations required for the use of ITMOs;
2. The information that must be included in these authorizations and the possibility of future changes or revocation of authorizations;
3. The inclusion of additional information to be communicated in the initial report on ITMO agreements;
4. Rules on the first transfer of ITMOs;
5. The forms and tables to be used for annual information reporting;
6. The process for identifying, notifying, and correcting inconsistencies verified in reports as part of the work of the Article 6 technical review team;
7. The interoperability between the Article 6.2 international registry and the Article 6.4 registry;
8. Additional functionalities of the Article 6.2 international registry so that it can also support countries that do not have a national registry, among other deliberations.

The instrument provided for under Article 6.8, concerning the sharing and use of non-market approaches (NMAs) for mitigation and adaptation, had a faster outcome.

By the end of the first week, Parties had reached agreement on the decision text, which was sent directly for CMA approval.

The text reflected the activities carried out during COP aimed at exchanging information on NMAs under development, successful cases, and initiatives supporting capacity-building, technology transfer, and finance.

It also indicated that countries had begun registering NMAs on the Platform created by the Secretariat to optimize the exchange of this information.

During the negotiations, some countries proposed initiatives to foster connections between the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity, in order to explore possible synergies between NMAs and joint initiatives.

The proposal was not accepted, but the decision recognizes the importance of developing NMAs that can link the fight against climate change to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development, including what were called Mother Earth-Centric Actions, composed of different value systems, including those aimed at living in balance and harmony with Mother Earth.

Finally, Parties prepared for the continuation of capacity-building and information-sharing activities, both through the Platform and through events to be promoted over the next year, with the aim of encouraging greater participation from stakeholders such as international organizations, technical experts, the private sector, civil society organizations, Indigenous Peoples, and financial institutions.

Mitigation

The main mitigation agenda item at COP 29 was the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP).

This work programme once again became one of the most polarized, with Parties taking firm and inflexible positions, especially regarding the possibility of the MWP addressing mitigation metrics and gaps identified in the COP 28 decision on the Global Stocktake (GST).

Developing countries from the LMDC group and the Arab Group remained uncompromising in their opposition to the possibility that GST outcomes would guide the work of the MWP. Countries such as Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) pushed in the opposite direction.

The LMDC and Arab Group justified their position by arguing that including metrics or objectives, even collective ones, in the MWP would undermine the nationally determined nature of mitigation commitments, something they considered unacceptable.

Brazil, in turn, did not align itself with either side of the polarization, arguing that the MWP should be a space of trust and exchange of experiences among Parties, focused on implementation rather than increasing mitigation ambition.

Due to the lack of consensus in the first week, Parties applied Rule 16 of the UNFCCC rules of procedure, which postpones discussions to the following year without considering any of the documents produced during the session.

However, due to a major effort by the Presidency and pressure from countries that wanted discussions to continue during this session, it was possible to resume negotiations in the second week.

The MWP negotiations therefore restarted from scratch, with Parties invited to express their expectations for the CMA 6 decision on the programme.

Despite the repetition of old disagreements, the Brazilian proposal to create a digital platform connecting mitigation initiatives and projects to potential investors was generally well received.

In this new context, Parties agreed to exclude references to the GST and the mitigation gaps recognized in the Dubai decision.

The Brazilian proposal to create a “digital platform to facilitate the implementation of mitigation actions, promoting collaboration among governments, funders, and other stakeholders in the development of investable projects in a manner aligned with national interests and determined by the country itself” was maintained.

This initiative could give a new purpose to the MWP, whose implementation would be discussed at the 2025 Bonn conference.

The decision adopted in plenary takes note of the Brazilian proposal and invites Parties, observers, and other stakeholders to submit, through the submissions portal, by May 1, 2025, their views on the design and features of the platform mentioned, with the objective of exchanging views in Bonn in June 2025.

Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement

The controversial issue that blocked progress on the MWP in the first week was addressed in the UAE Dialogue decision, an agenda item intended to discuss the modalities of a continued dialogue on the implementation of the recommendations of the First Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement adopted at COP 28.

There was great expectation that this agenda item would address how to monitor implementation of the First Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement to ensure that new NDCs follow these recommendations, including those related to transitioning away from fossil fuels.

But the truth is that, from the beginning, these discussions proved contentious, with the LMDC group strongly resisting the topic and attempting to frame it only as a discussion on finance for the adoption of the recommended measures.

In the end, the draft decision submitted to the plenary was a highly diluted draft, but it contained some elaboration on the operationalization of the dialogue until 2026, through parallel pathways for following up on GST recommendations, including mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and response measures.

However, the text was widely rejected during the final plenary. As a result, Rule 16 was applied, and the matter was referred for consideration at the next COP.

Loss and Damage

With the adoption of COP 28 decisions on the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund and the Santiago Network, and the closure of a politically heated decision-making cycle on Loss and Damage, expectations for COP 29 were that negotiations on the seemingly straightforward items on the negotiation agendas would be more technical and less disputed.

However, this proved wrong in the very first week.

Kenya’s dissatisfaction with the decision to locate the Secretariat of the Santiago Network in Geneva proved to be a major negotiating barrier.

In the end, Parties agreed on a procedural decision, vaguely recognizing progress in the work of the WIM and the Santiago Network, but referring discussions on the Joint Annual Report (JAR) and the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism to SB 62.

Once again, Parties indicated that considerations regarding the governance of the WIM will continue to be debated at COP 30/CMA 7.

On the other hand, negotiations addressing the review of the first year of work of the Loss and Damage Fund since its operationalization by COP 28 advanced, resulting in the adoption of a decision that, among other things, recognizes the selection of the Philippines as the host country of the Fund’s Board and the signing of the cooperation agreement.

The decision also appreciates the work of the World Bank in operationalizing the Fund.

The decision also thanks the pledges made to the Fund by the governments of Australia, Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Sweden, as well as by the government of the Walloon Region in Belgium.

Just Transition

At COP 29, the expectation was to engage the Just Transition Work Programme in substantial negotiation processes. However, this expectation was frustrated already in the first week, as no consensus among Parties was possible on the draft decision that would serve as the basis for negotiations during the political week.

The second week of COP was marked by silence in the corridors and negotiation rooms.

While the Presidency and the delegations of Brazil and the United Kingdom conducted consultations with regional groups of delegates, there was no text to share, and Parties had no mandate to self-organize or hold more informal conversations.

As a result, the Presidency presented a text on Thursday morning, the penultimate day of formal negotiations, with some text options, but it made little substantive progress toward effectively operationalizing the work programme.

On the morning of what should have been the final day of negotiations, the Presidency sent a communication informing Parties that new draft decisions would be shared by noon, for targeted contributions from Parties, so that the final text could be presented by midnight on Friday, November 22, before the plenary on Saturday, November 23, 2024.

At noon on November 22, a new draft was presented which, in summary, contained four main points.

First, the text mentioned expressions such as “human rights” and “gender” only as acknowledgements, without establishing concrete links.

Second, regarding the two annual dialogues held in 2024, there were divergences among Parties, since the G77+China opposed including this mention due to criticism of the unbalanced conduct of the processes. Thus, the text only recognizes the work of the subsidiary bodies in holding the dialogues, without mentioning their outcomes.

Third, regarding the scope of the workplan, the text emphasized that aspects related to energy, the workforce, and socioeconomic aspects should be addressed in a balanced manner, to avoid excessive focus on the workforce issue, a point more strongly emphasized by developed countries.

Finally, the fourth and most important point was the Brazilian proposal to create a committee to study concrete outcomes for this work programme.

Although this specific proposal was not incorporated, the decision text invites Parties, observers, and other actors to submit their views on concrete outcomes to achieve the objectives of the work programme, in accordance with paragraph 2 of decision 3/CMA.5.

It also requested that a compilation of these views be prepared and presented at the next session of the Subsidiary Bodies.

However, the text was rejected during the final plenary. As a result, Rule 16 was applied, and the matter was referred for consideration at the next COP.

Technology Transfer

At COP 29, the central issues related to technology transfer involved the assessment and future of the Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer (PSP), launched at COP 14 in 2008.

This programme aims to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) to developing countries, addressing local priorities and specific needs.

Another key point was the structuring of the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), initially discussed at COP 28. The expectation is that this new programme will strengthen the implementation of climate technologies essential for mitigating and adapting to climate change at a global scale.

During the negotiations, delegations reached consensus on the beginning of the closure of the PSP and on a general assessment of the programme.

Regarding the TIP, there was intense debate, but no consensus.

The main points of divergence included the structure of the programme, with proposals for the creation of a technology implementation accelerator and a knowledge transfer hub.

In addition, Parties discussed the participation of civil society organizations in the process and whether the scope should include initiatives to facilitate access by developing or least developed countries to technologies, such as the flexibilization of intellectual property rights and the overcoming of trade barriers.

However, these issues were postponed until next year.

In summary, the decision:

1. Recognizes the efforts of the GEF in financing and implementing the programme’s initiatives in recent years;
2. Requests the preparation of a report assessing the Poznan Strategic Programme, to be completed by June 2026, with an overview of the progress achieved, main challenges faced, successes, and lessons learned during implementation;
3. Requests an analysis of the report to be discussed at COP 31, with the objective of supporting activities identified in the NDCs, National Adaptation Plans, Technology Needs Assessments, and long-term strategies of developing countries;
4. Indicates that the process will also help inform next steps for the TIP;
5. Recommends a final decision on the creation and structuring of the TIP at COP 30.

Transparency

The Baku Conference represents an important milestone for transparency in the context of the Paris Agreement, as the last conference before the submission of Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) in December 2024.

It is worth noting that Parties had already decided that 2024 would be the transition year from BRs and BURs, transparency reports under the UNFCCC, to BTRs.

However, in light of the possibility that countries might withdraw from the Paris Agreement while remaining in the UNFCCC, Parties discussed the need for these countries to continue submitting reports under the Convention.

In this scenario, countries that are not Party to the Paris Agreement would continue to submit BRs, for Annex I countries, or BURs, for non-Annex I countries.

Thus, the Secretariat would continue preparing synthesis reports for the Convention instruments, even if few reports, or even only one report, were submitted.

Although no official negotiation document reflected this debate, the topic is expected to return during the Bonn session in June 2025, especially if the United States or other countries begin withdrawal processes from the Paris Agreement while remaining in the UNFCCC.

Another key point in the negotiations was finance for transparency. Developing countries reported difficulties in accessing sufficient resources and capacity-building to comply with BTR requirements.

On the other hand, developed countries argued that the funds available through the GEF had not been fully used by countries eligible for this purpose.

Discussions advanced on which developing countries would be entitled to access these funds, whether all developing countries or only the poorest, and on how to make financial flows and access more efficient.

In this context, the decision recognized that developing countries need additional support for institutional arrangements, data management, and capacity-building, as appropriate, to strengthen their capacities related to data collection, analysis, and management.

In addition, it requested the Secretariat to organize workshops with the participation of the GEF to facilitate exchanges of experiences among countries, in order to identify and overcome difficulties faced in preparing BTRs.