LACLIMA SUMMARY

2025 Bonn Climate Conference

SB 62

In the spirit of a “mutirão,” LACLIMA’s summary of SB 62 is longer than usual, filled with information and background on the outcomes of some of the main negotiation topics in Bonn, as well as on relevant mandated events that took place, setting the stage for COP 30.

As always, there was drama. But almost everything reached a conclusion or at least some form of direction toward Belém, with draft texts to finalize negotiations in Brazil.

Adaptation

Adaptation remains one of the central pillars of climate negotiations and continues to mobilize active engagement from a wide range of stakeholders, both inside and outside the negotiation rooms. Discussions on the main agenda item, the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), focused on three main fronts:

1. The work programme on climate resilience indicators;
2. The Baku Adaptation Roadmap, established at COP 29;
3. The incorporation of diverse approaches to adaptation.

Alongside the GGA, Parties also discussed other relevant fronts of the adaptation agenda, including National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Adaptation Communications (AdComs), the review of the Adaptation Committee (AC), and the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP).

Global Goal on Adaptation

Negotiations on the GGA were the most prominent topic on the adaptation agenda, advancing through significant negotiation efforts and under intense pressure. At the beginning of the Conference, a hybrid workshop was held under the United Arab Emirates–Belém Work Programme to discuss the current list of nearly 500 climate resilience indicators.

The workshop revealed weak coordination in the process, fragility in the definition of mandates, and growing frustration among Parties and experts. Despite the turbulence on the first day, the broad recognition of the need to refine the list by COP 30 was taken into the negotiation room, where Parties began to define the continuation of the experts’ mandate, with the goal of providing stronger guidance and clearer criteria to reduce and refine the list of indicators.

Deep divergences persisted throughout all sessions regarding indicators for measuring means of implementation and cross-cutting considerations.

The conclusion approved at the end of SB 62 requests that experts reduce the list to a set of no more than 100 globally applicable indicators, including indicators related to means of implementation and enabling factors, as well as cross-cutting considerations such as social inclusion, youth, gender, and human rights.

Parties also decided to incorporate methodological criteria and guidance for the next stage, including the removal of irrelevant indicators, for example those related to mitigation, the improvement of overly broad indicators, and the inclusion of qualitative narratives where relevant.

It was also defined that sub-indicators should capture the diverse contexts of adaptation actions, allowing Parties to choose those most appropriate to their national circumstances. In addition, indicators of means of implementation should be included to measure access, quality, and finance for adaptation, including its provision, in line with the Paris Agreement.

It was also recognized that limited data availability should not restrict the development of new indicators, provided that this is accompanied by support for capacity-building in developing countries.

It was established that experts should meet again before the workshop scheduled to take place between SB 62 and SB 63, in a hybrid meeting, to review the consistency of metadata, conduct quality control, and verify the adequacy of the indicators in light of the defined guidance, as well as present a final version of the technical report by August 2025. Based on this, the Secretariat will prepare two consecutive synthesis reports: one on the technical meeting and another on the preparatory workshop.

Considerations on transformational adaptation and other approaches to adaptation, as well as on the future of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, ended up taking a secondary role. Although they received attention from Parties in some negotiation sessions, the sections of the text reflecting these views were included only as an informal note in the SB provisional conclusions on the GGA, which should serve as a basis for discussions in Belém in November.

Nairobi Work Programme

The Nairobi Work Programme managed to reach consensus among Parties during the first week of SB 62. After a heated start to the negotiations, Parties reached a balanced compromise and approved provisional conclusions.

The text recognizes the progress achieved in the implementation of NWP activities between May 2024 and March 2025 and reiterates the central role of the NWP in strengthening adaptation action and resilience to climate impacts, including transboundary impacts and those resulting from compound risks.

It also reinforces the importance of integrating incremental, urgent, transformational, and nationally contextualized approaches into NWP activities, and requests the Secretariat to strengthen collaboration with different knowledge holders, including Indigenous Peoples, local communities, the private sector, and scientific institutions, as well as the use of emerging and innovative technologies, among other points.

This negotiation item represents a rare point of convergence within the adaptation agenda at SB 62, highlighting the NWP as a constructive space with the potential to strengthen the technical foundation of the UNFCCC adaptation regime.

Adaptation Communications

The discussions began with an exchange of experiences on the preparation of Adaptation Communications, with a focus on defining next steps. Negotiations progressed relatively positively, with broad recognition that the evolving characteristics of adaptation in the context of the Paris Agreement require adjustments to the formats and content of AdComs.

There was broad convergence on the need to preserve their flexible and voluntary nature, especially to avoid imposing new burdens on developing countries. Even so, the multiplicity of vehicles currently used has generated fragmentation, and coherence should be pursued in the information communicated by Parties through reporting instruments.

Despite areas of convergence, Parties concluded that more time would be needed for reflection on the topic and decided to continue considering the issue in June 2026, during SB 64.

National Adaptation Plans

Informal consultations on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) focused mainly on procedural issues, without reaching agreement on concrete next steps. This is in line with a dynamic that has dragged on since previous conferences, in which procedural questions take center stage amid deep divergences among Parties regarding the content of the texts, especially with respect to language on means of implementation and finance.

Negotiations were concluded with the forwarding of provisional conclusions containing a draft text to be used in negotiations at COP 30, as indicated in the footnotes.

Adaptation Committee

The review process regarding the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee (AC) remained stalled, reflecting significant divergences over governance arrangements. The Grupo Sur presented proposals aimed at conciliation to finalize the process, but it was not possible to reach consensus on the role of the COP and the CMA in relation to the AC.

Parties agreed to postpone this decision to SB 70. The slow pace of these secondary agendas reveals a certain mismatch between the growing political recognition of the importance of adaptation and the regime’s effective ability to advance technical and operational decisions that can sustain this momentum.

Global Stocktake

Discussions on the implementation of the outcomes of the Global Stocktake (GST) under the UAE Dialogue advanced slowly and were marked by strong political divisions over the scope, expected outcomes, and mandate of the process.

The negotiations began under the impact of the blockage that occurred at COP 29 in Baku, led by the EIG and AILAC. With the resumption of negotiations at SB 62, the G77+China, supported by AOSIS and the LMDCs, defended that discussions should be based on the latest COP 29 text. Saudi Arabia, however, rejected any attempt to address monitoring of GST implementation, insisting that the dialogues focus on ensuring means of implementation, especially finance.

The LMDC also rejected the inclusion in the text of references to GST paragraphs on energy transition and the phase-out of fossil fuels, whose maintenance was defended by Australia and AOSIS.

On the penultimate day of the conference, the facilitators presented two drafts, one in the morning and another in the afternoon. The most recent version, dated June 25, reorganized and expanded the options under negotiation without consolidating consensus.

The text presented multiple alternatives on the nature, scope, and duration of the dialogue, reflecting divergent positions. Among the changes were the expansion of the thematic scope from four to seven options and the detailing of sources of information and more operational language for the expected outputs.

The controversies remained bracketed, signaling progress in structuring the discussion, but not in resolving the deadlocks.

Australia, Japan, the European Union, and others supported forwarding the afternoon version to Belém, while the LMDCs and the Arab Group preferred the earlier version. India, supported by Egypt, Morocco, Australia, and the Maldives, proposed forwarding both versions in a single document.

The facilitators took the proposal to the SBI Chair, presenting four possible paths: the morning draft, the afternoon draft, a combination of both, or no text.

In plenary, Parties approved the continuation of discussions at COP 30 based on an “informal note,” prepared to organize Parties’ divergent proposals and positions on how to operationalize the UAE Dialogue. The two text versions presented the previous day, both containing different drafting options, were considered in the note.

The first days in Belém should define which of these versions will be considered as the basis for the beginning of negotiations.

Just Transition

The first two days of SB 62 were taken up by negotiations on the adoption of the agenda. This moment was important for the Just Transition Work Programme because, as a solution to the impasse created by the LMDCs’ proposal to include two additional agenda items, one on restrictions on unilateral measures and another on finance under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies determined that these topics would be discussed under the negotiation item on just transition.

This decision meant that the negotiation room was dominated by interventions from Parties on unilateral measures, shifting the focus of the discussion to this topic.

During the first week, the co-facilitators of the Work Programme, one representative from Italy and another from Singapore, addressed seven themes identified as relevant based on previous dialogues. They then presented an informal note.

The second week began with the first discussion of this note. Right at the start, three problems emerged:

1. The language used on energy transition and renewable energy;
2. The space dedicated to unilateral measures;
3. The options for “institutional arrangements,” meaning the creation of a body to address the global dimension of just transition and support countries in their implementation efforts.

In the final two days of negotiations, an impasse took shape. The LMDCs and other groups expressed dissatisfaction that the space reserved for discussions on unilateral measures did not expressly mention the term. They then requested that an option with this language be included.

In addition, the LMDCs, the Arab Group, and Russia indicated that they would not move forward unless the language on “transitioning away from fossil fuels,” contained in paragraph 11g of the text, was reviewed.

On the other hand, countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia argued that there was not enough time to include all Parties’ views in a way that would be fully reflected in the informal note. Therefore, any change to the text would necessarily be unbalanced. They argued that the text should either be forwarded to Belém in full or not be forwarded at all.

Faced with the impasse, two informal negotiation sessions were needed, the classic “corridor negotiations,” for the United Kingdom and other countries to accept the inclusion of options related to priority topics for the LMDCs and their allies. In return, the LMDCs also had to show flexibility, accepting drafting options that would be acceptable to both sides.

In the end, a decision was adopted forwarding the informal note to COP 30 in Belém as the basis for discussions. The forwarded text is not consensual and contains several points of dissonance among Parties, reflecting two of the most difficult debates under the Paris Agreement: the transition away from fossil fuels and the unilateral measures adopted by developed countries that particularly affect developing and least developed countries.

Topics expected to generate renewed clashes in Belém include references to NDCs, the 1.5°C goal, and international cooperation, which includes discussions on means of implementation.

It has been a long road since COP 29 in Baku, where the process ended without a decision and, consequently, without a text. The informal note now represents an important basis for the beginning of discussions in Belém.

Mitigation

Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) in Bonn were marked by intense debates over the scope of the mandate, the concept of a “safe space,” and the proposal to create a new digital platform to facilitate implementation.

Countries such as Egypt, China, the LMDCs, and the Arab Group argued that the MWP must remain strictly within the mandate established by decision 4/CMA.4, meaning non-prescriptive, non-punitive, based on national sovereignty, and without imposing targets.

On the other hand, AOSIS, the European Union, and Australia emphasized the need for the MWP to contribute to increased ambition and implement key messages from the dialogues, including references to GST outcomes and NDC synthesis reports.

Brazil’s proposal for a digital platform to connect projects with funders generated controversy. While some countries valued its potential for innovation and implementation, others warned of risks of duplication, lack of clarity regarding its objectives, and possible undue overlap with the MWP mandate.

AOSIS and Colombia emphasized that the platform should not divert focus from core mitigation messages or be used as a justification to delay decisions.

Although the discussion on the platform served, in part, as a release valve for countries with little interest in concrete progress on the MWP to spend time on a new item, the Brazilian proposal also represented a break from the stale dynamic that had blocked progress in the programme for years.

By introducing a new element into the debate, the initiative forced reactions, drew attention to implementation, and reopened negotiation pathways that had previously been stuck.

Despite the technical clarifications provided by Brazil regarding modular scope, low costs, and complementarity with existing platforms, the debate revealed divergences over the feasibility of the proposal within the MWP timeline, whose continuation will be discussed in 2026.

The discussion on the elements of a decision to be adopted in Belém also advanced timidly, with divergent proposals on the inclusion of next steps, including whether or not to consider the platform within the scope of negotiations, the continuation of the MWP, and the expected outcomes.

In the absence of consensus, the facilitators committed to preparing an informal note reflecting only the structure discussed, without substantive elements, as a preliminary record of the conversations.

In the final session, Parties met to resolve points of divergence and bracketed sections of the text. After more than an hour of informal discussions, with negotiators standing in a corner of the room, they reached agreement on the text from which negotiations would begin in Belém.

However, at the last moment before the session closed, Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, requested that the wording of the conclusion introducing the informal note include provision for an informational session before COP 30 to address and deepen discussions on the platform. This point had not been agreed among Parties, preventing approval of the informal note during that session. The decision was therefore left for the final plenary.

The document adopted in plenary did not reflect Saudi Arabia’s request. Parties ultimately approved the text that had been agreed in the final negotiation session.

The text consists merely of a list of headings that should form the decision to be adopted in Belém:

1. Preamble;
2. Acknowledgement of the co-facilitators, host countries, and the Secretariat;
3. Improvements to the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), including global dialogues and investment-focused events, [including consideration of the digital platform];
4. Outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, taking into account the annual report;
5. [Views on the continuation of the work programme];
6. Submissions as mandated by decision 4/CMA.4, decision 4/CMA.5, and decision 2/CMA.6.

The visible divergences in the text are the bracketed sections: whether the digital platform will be considered in discussions on improvements to the MWP and whether there will be a chapter in the decision dedicated to addressing the continuation of the work programme.

Article 6

Article 6.2: Dialogue on Ambition and Cooperation

At COP 29, the UNFCCC Secretariat was mandated to promote ambition dialogues during all sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies, with the goal of encouraging the exchange of information among Parties and observers on how cooperative approaches can support increased climate ambition.

The first Article 6.2 Dialogue on Ambition was therefore held, marking the beginning of the full implementation phase of the instrument. The event was divided into two parts, “Ambition” and “Cooperation,” with roundtables guided by key questions.

In the first part, presentations stood out from Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, the European Union, and CfRN on the contribution of Article 6.2 to increasing the ambition of NDCs; from ICAO and Sweden on the use of ITMOs for other international mitigation purposes (OIMP), such as CORSIA; and from Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Kenya, which addressed private sector engagement and the potential of Article 6.2 to finance voluntary climate commitments.

In the second part, the focus was cooperation. The first session addressed benefit sharing and justice in cooperative approaches, with contributions from the PACM SBM, the European Union, Zambia, Carbon Market Watch, and the Grassroots Justice Network.

The second session addressed capacity-building, with contributions from the Secretariat, GGGI, A6IP, Germany, and Chile. Finally, the third session addressed multilateral cooperation, with interventions from AGN, EBRD, ADB, and IETA.

Among the main points discussed was the need for caution by ITMO-selling countries regarding their carbon budgets, avoiding “overselling,” as well as the urgency of joint capacity-building efforts to expand participation in the market.

Buyer countries also warned of the risk that the absence of a domestic legal framework and delays in issuing corresponding adjustments could hinder the formalization of agreements.

Technical sessions led by the Secretariat addressed the data review process, reporting requirements, and the functioning of the International Registry.

Article 6.4: Capacity-Building on the Crediting Mechanism (PACM)

After the adoption at COP 29 of the basic operational rules for the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), established under Article 6.4, the focus shifted to the development of complementary guidance necessary for the full functioning of the mechanism, such as rules on additionality, baseline setting, and methodology approval. This work is being conducted by the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM), with the support of its expert panels.

In this context, a capacity-building day was held in Bonn on the functioning of and participation in the PACM, bringing together a diverse range of stakeholders, including government representatives from Parties interested in hosting activities, experts from the UNFCCC Secretariat, the private sector, and project developers.

The capacity-building session addressed the main outcomes of COP 29 and the benefits of the PACM in the context of Article 6.2 approaches, as well as technical and procedural aspects.

Discussions covered:

1. The transition process from the CDM to the PACM;
2. The mechanism’s information system;
3. Forms for participation by Parties and other entities;
4. The status of the designation of Designated National Authorities (DNAs);
5. Requirements for host Party participation;
6. The functioning of the registry system;
7. Procedures for the authorization of entities and activities;
8. The features of the official PACM website.

Article 6.8: Non-Market Approaches and the NMA Platform

During the negotiations in Bonn, the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), established under Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, held a workshop with Parties and observers to discuss the use of the NMA Platform, a digital tool intended to give visibility to climate mitigation and adaptation projects.

Structured in a world café and roundtable format, the event highlighted relevant obstacles, such as the limitation that project registration can only be done by national authorities and only when projects have already been established in partnership, which restricts dissemination.

Other issues raised included low usability, lack of mobile responsiveness, and the scarcity of records. By the end of the conference, only two projects, from Uganda and Japan, were listed on the platform.

In thematic groups, known as spin-off groups, participants discussed experiences in renewable energy and green infrastructure, pathways to identify NMAs, and suggestions on how to allow registration by only one Party.

In the formal negotiation meeting, the LMDC group proposed presenting a comprehensive text with measures such as the inclusion of projects not yet implemented, the creation of a financing channel through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the holding of side events at COP 30, including a session on the Amazon Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation with Integrated and Sustainable Forest Management, and a forum on NMA financing in 2027.

The proposal, however, faced resistance from countries such as Switzerland and CfRN, especially regarding the inclusion of forest activities linked to Article 5 as NMAs. The Secretariat presented cost estimates to support decisions on events and technical improvements to the Platform.

After more than six hours of negotiations, a new generic text was presented, providing for the improvement of the Platform’s functionalities but without addressing the controversial points.

Bolivia expressed opposition to the text, while other Parties voiced frustration over the disregard for the efforts invested in the negotiations. Without consensus, it was decided only to forward the status of the discussions to the SBSTA Chair, without a finalized text.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

The agenda related to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol focused on the process of its discontinuation, in light of the creation of the PACM and its future absorption by the new mechanism.

During SB 62, Parties discussed deadlines for closing CDM activities, including the issuance of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), approval and review of methodologies, accreditation of designated operational entities, interaction with stakeholders, closure of Executive Board activities, and deactivation of the mechanism’s registry.

The final draft decision maintained date options for closure ranging from 2025 to 2028, to be defined at COP 30.

There were divergences among countries. The LMDC group defended extending deadlines until the PACM is fully operational, while other Parties, such as AOSIS, warned about the excessive costs of a prolonged extension.

As a way forward, the Secretariat was requested to present, at COP 30, an update on the resources available in the CDM trust fund and an assessment of the costs and resources associated with the proposed dates, to support Parties’ decision.

Another point discussed was the destination of the remaining resources in this fund. Some Parties proposed keeping the resources tied to the maintenance of the CDM until its complete deactivation. Others suggested redirecting them, in whole or in part, to the Adaptation Fund, to capacity-building activities on Article 6 for developing countries, to market infrastructure, or to actions to improve transparency under the Paris Agreement.

In the end, Parties agreed to resume discussions at CMP 20, during COP 30, based on the draft decision agreed in Bonn.

Finance

The topic of finance was not present on the formal negotiation agenda, but it was discussed in other meetings mandated by previous decisions.

Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3 Trillion

The Roadmap, to be produced by the COP 29 and COP 30 Presidencies, is not a formal negotiation item, but consultations were conducted during SB 62 to hear the views of Parties and stakeholders on the initial draft prepared by the Presidencies.

During the consultation with non-state actors, Brazil’s Ministry of Finance, which supports the COP 30 Presidency with inputs for the Roadmap, presented the main priorities for the report of the Circle of Ministers of Finance:

1. Reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs);
2. Expansion of concessional finance and climate funds;
3. Creation of national platforms and strengthening of national capacity to attract sustainable investments;
4. Development of innovative financial instruments to mobilize private capital;
5. Strengthening of regulatory frameworks for climate finance.

There were calls for adaptation finance to be treated as a priority and for the use of innovative financial instruments, such as mechanisms based on the polluter-pays principle.

Developing countries highlighted barriers related to the quality of climate finance, including bureaucratic issues that undermine direct access, increasing indebtedness, and the complementary role of Multilateral Banks and International Financial Institutions, which does not replace the responsibility of developed countries to provide public finance.

From the side of developed countries, feedback focused on the importance of the Roadmap considering a wide variety of sources of resources, especially ways to mobilize more private finance.

Regarding the process, there is frustration with the lack of clarity on next steps and on how contributions made during the consultations will be reflected in the Roadmap. It is still unclear how the Roadmap will be incorporated into or recognized in the formal negotiations at COP 30, and how effective it will be in relation to actors beyond the UNFCCC structure.

Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) in Complementarity with Article 9

The mandate of this Dialogue is for Parties to exchange views and improve their understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c), which concerns making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, and its complementarity with Article 9, which addresses the responsibility of developed countries to provide finance to developing countries.

The first workshop of 2025 included expert presentations on three previously selected themes: adaptation, just transition, and how Article 2.1(c) can support the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG). These presentations were followed by discussions in smaller groups among Parties and stakeholders.

However, there was not enough time to deepen the discussions, and some Parties were unable to intervene on the final day.

The next workshop will take place before COP 30, a crucial moment to discuss what viable decision can be made in Belém to recognize the work carried out, whether or not to continue the dialogue, and what format would be most effective to ensure not only the continuity of discussions but also an implementation process.

Workshop on Article 9.5

The third biennial workshop on Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement brought together Parties and observers to discuss experiences in preparing biennial climate finance communications, their usefulness for developing countries, and ways to improve them, especially to inform the Global Stocktake.

Challenges highlighted included:

1. Low predictability of financial commitments due to political and budgetary obstacles in developed countries;
2. Technical difficulties in consolidating data;
3. The need for a clear definition of climate finance.

Other Parties also defended common standards and more quantitative data on the balance between mitigation and adaptation.

The workshop also addressed improvements in coordination with Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), the separation of voluntary communications, and the importance of aligning reports with the needs of developing countries.

Finally, it was emphasized that the next COP will include a High-Level Ministerial Dialogue focused on updating the guidelines for these communications, with attention to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, direct access to finance, and comparability between ex ante and ex post reports under Articles 9.5 and 9.7.

Gender

During SB 62, Parties began the construction of the new Gender Action Plan (GAP), which is expected to be negotiated and adopted at COP 30.

This was the first round of negotiations under the new mandate of the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG), which was extended for another ten years at COP 29.

The process began with a three-day technical workshop that brought together Parties and civil society representatives to review the activities of the current plan, identify gaps, and propose new actions.

The methodology adopted was participatory and collaborative, using the previous Gender Action Plan as the central reference for the new plan.

Based on the technical inputs resulting from the workshop, the Secretariat prepared a first draft of the new plan, which was then discussed in informal consultations among countries.

Throughout the three sessions held, Parties reviewed the 31 proposed activities, choosing to leave discussions on expected deliverables, responsible entities, and timelines for COP.

The negotiation environment was marked mostly by cooperation, with joint efforts by Parties to make progress despite divergences.

The main point of impasse was the inclusion of language on finance. Countries from the G77+China, the African Group, and AOSIS defended the need to recognize the importance of financial support for the implementation of the plan, including references to direct finance for women-led grassroots organizations.

Developed countries, on the other hand, argued that the current mandate does not allow the creation of new financial commitments, suggesting that the focus should remain on implementation and institutional capacity-building.

Norway proposed an intermediate position, accepting the inclusion of references to awareness-raising and capacity-strengthening on gender-responsive finance, as long as there were no explicit commitments.

Another very present topic was the mention and recognition of specific groups, such as Afro-descendant people, women farmers, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities.

The negotiations were concluded over eight days, with the final informal consultation. After the second version sent by the Secretariat, the text underwent no further changes and was maintained as the basis for final negotiations during COP 30.

However, Parties agreed to hold a new technical workshop before the conference, with the goal of consolidating activities, discussing deliverables, and reducing the number of informal notes currently present in the text.

The African Group proposed that this meeting be hosted in Ethiopia during Africa Climate Week in September.

The outcome of SB 62 is an extensive preliminary document, strongly anchored in the previous plan, incorporating a diversity of proposals presented, and now requiring political maturation in Belém.

Transparency

Discussions on transparency at SB 62 were intense and reflected both technical challenges and political tensions.

One of the main agenda points was the provision of financial and technical support to developing countries. Throughout the week, the G77+China, AILAC, LMDCs, and African countries reported obstacles faced in accessing GEF funding, pointing to delays, bureaucracy, and harm to the institutional continuity of reporting processes.

The United Kingdom and other developed countries insisted that the UNFCCC does not have a mandate to directly guide the GEF, blocking part of the negotiations.

In the second week, with the aim of having a more structured basis to work from in Belém at COP 30, Brazil requested additional negotiation time. As a result, a draft was produced with proposals such as the simplification of finance processes, workshops, and incentives for dialogue between countries and the GEF.

However, the text remains full of brackets, signaling divergences still to be overcome.

Another important point was the debate on the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE), considered essential for technical support and capacity-building for developing countries.

There was consensus among Parties on the importance of the group, especially in the context of implementing the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement.

However, divergences persisted on three central points of the text:

1. The renewal period of the mandate;
2. The composition of members;
3. The review of the terms of reference.

Developing countries, led by the G77+China, defended a permanent mandate, maintenance of the current composition, and no substantial changes to the terms of reference.

Developed countries, in turn, proposed that the CGE have a renewable mandate, of three or six years, with options for 2029 or 2032, as well as a new composition with numerical distribution of members by region, including specific seats for LDCs, SIDS, and representatives of international organizations.

Phrases such as “transition to BTRs” and “full implementation of the ETF” were especially contested by the G77+China, while the EU defended their inclusion.

The text remains with multiple bracketed options and will be resumed at COP 30.

Regarding the provision of financial and technical support under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Parties sought to organize a more structured response to the difficulties faced in implementing the ETF.

The G77+China proposed a three-year work plan, periodic syntheses of lessons learned, and more channels of dialogue with the GEF.

The opposition of the United Kingdom and other developed countries to any mention of guidance to the GEF marked the debates.

The text under discussion included guidance on actions to simplify finance processes, standardized project templates, and strengthening of institutional capacities.

The content will be resumed in Belém, with expectations for new workshops and submissions on national experiences.

The agenda item regarding information contained in National Communications from countries not included in Annex I to the Convention had limited progress.

Discussions did not advance around the proposal to consolidate information into synthesis reports, a proposal contested by countries such as South Africa and the African Group, which warned of the risks of improper comparisons among countries with very different technical capacities.

In the absence of consensus, it was decided that the topic will be included in the provisional agenda of SB 63, but will be considered held in abeyance until more favorable conditions exist for its consideration.

The mandated event on the Facilitative Multilateral Consideration of Progress (FMCP) allowed for a rich exchange of experiences among countries such as Guyana, Panama, and Andorra on their processes for preparing and reviewing BTRs.

Technical difficulties were reported, along with strategies to overcome them, such as the use of domestic resources and the rehiring of teams involved in the first reporting cycle.

The FMCP format was considered useful, and suggestions such as the prior submission of technical questions were proposed to facilitate future rounds.

Response Measures

The impacts of the implementation of response measures refer to the effects, both within and outside national jurisdictions, resulting from mitigation policies and actions adopted by Parties under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement.

In negotiations on the topic, in addition to the Forum on Response Measures, the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) was established in 2018 to provide technical support to the Forum through annual reports.

In Baku, at COP 29, a new workplan for the Forum on Response Measures for the 2026-2030 period was adopted, covering 17 activities.

On that occasion, the KCI was also requested to determine, in its 2025 report, a timeline and modes of implementation for the activities provided for in the workplan.

In addition, it was determined that the Forum would incorporate into its workplan the consideration of “substantive matters,” based on the KCI annual report.

In this context, at the very beginning of the negotiations, the G77/China, supported by the Arab Group, the African Group, and the LMDCs, requested discussion of priority activities for the KCI and the Forum, considering the 2026-2030 workplan.

There was significant controversy regarding one activity listed in the plan as an analysis of the impacts of response measures, “including transboundary impacts.”

Based on this wording, the G77/China suggested that the discussion of unilateral trade measures, or protectionist measures, be established as a priority activity for the KCI and the Forum, arguing that such measures lead to the withdrawal of climate finance from developing countries.

On the other hand, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and other developed countries argued that there was no reason to rush these discussions, considering that the KCI’s 2025 report will only be published in the second semester and that, in their view, the Forum did not have a mandate to discuss unilateral measures.

Another topic discussed was the holding of annual global dialogues on the impacts of response measures. Some countries, such as Japan, expressed concern about the financial resources involved.

For developing countries, such dialogues represent opportunities to bring new impacts of response measures into the discussion, including those resulting from unilateral measures.

On the final day of SB 62, Parties agreed to accept the consolidation of an informal summary of the discussions, which does not represent a formally adopted agreement but will serve as the basis for negotiations in Belém.

Technology

Negotiations on climate technology focused on three main fronts:

1. Defining the structure and scope of the new Technology Implementation Programme (TIP);
2. Reviewing the functions and future of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN);
3. Institutional linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, which includes funds such as the GCF and the GEF.

Linkages Between the Technology Mechanism and the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism

Discussions on the connections between the Technology Mechanism and the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism revolved around three main axes:

1. The scope of institutional collaboration and the role of the Secretariat;
2. The type and frequency of reports on financial support for technology transfer;
3. Whether or not the specific agenda item on linkages should remain on the UNFCCC agenda.

The G77+China has maintained that this topic is strategic to ensure access to resources in the replenishment processes of the GCF and GEF, and has shown openness to adjusting the language, provided that the discussion is handled by finance negotiators.

Developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada, proposed diluting the item by transferring the discussion to joint reports by the TEC (Technology Executive Committee of the Technology Mechanism) and the CTCN, which would reduce its political strength.

There were also controversies over the G77’s proposal to include regular technical reports detailing how requests for technical assistance do, or do not, become financed projects.

Finally, the future of the item on the agenda remains disputed. The draft text includes an option proposing its closure as a standalone item, and other options defending its maintenance, with periodic reviews linked to fund replenishment cycles.

Parties decided to continue consideration of the agenda item at SBI 63 based on the available text, for a decision at COP 30.

Review of the Functions and Future of the CTCN

Parties also discussed the renewal of the CTCN mandate. Despite general recognition of its importance, the duration of the renewal remains undefined, as does the need to review the selection process for the host entity.

The G77 has pushed for a broader, implementation-oriented mandate with a greater regional presence. Developed countries, in turn, prefer to preserve the technical focus of the centre, avoiding institutional expansion without a clear performance assessment.

Another point under debate in the review of the CTCN’s functional scope, led by developing countries, is whether the centre should act more directly in the formulation of funding proposals and in supporting technology implementation.

Some developed countries, however, have expressed concern about a possible overlap of functions with the GCF, the GEF, and even the TEC.

The role of the CTCN in relation to the new TIP is also at stake: whether it will be the main executor of the programme or merely a technical partner remains an open question.

Technology Implementation Programme

Created by a COP 28 decision, the TIP aims to support the implementation of technology priorities defined by developing countries. It seeks to move beyond the planning phase to become an operational instrument for technology delivery.

For the TIP to come into force, it is necessary to define its governance, functional scope, sources of finance, and institutional coordination. All of these points are still under debate.

Parties expressed divergent views on the level of ambition of the programme. The G77, especially LDCs and small island developing States, defends a robust structure, with concrete targets, a focus on endogenous innovation, and climate justice.

Developed countries showed caution regarding binding commitments, especially those related to finance, trade barriers, and intellectual property.

There is also disagreement over the criteria for defining the technologies included in the programme. The United Kingdom, for example, wants them anchored in GST outcomes, with an emphasis on the energy transition, while countries such as Brazil and China, as well as AILAC and the African Group, argue that priorities should be guided by national needs.

Another central debate concerns the type of relationship the TIP will have with financial mechanisms. Options range from a model based on flexible partnerships with development banks and private actors to another focused on strengthening endogenous capacities, with more direct involvement by the TEC and CTCN.

The structure of the programme and how it will be operationalized are also under discussion.

The G77 and China propose a broad model, with annual global technical dialogues coordinated by the SBI/SBSTA or the TEC, multisectoral participation, and strong integration with existing UNFCCC programmes. This proposal also includes regional dialogues and systematic reports.

On the other hand, countries such as the European Union, Norway, and the United Kingdom showed preference for more limited and episodic models, with two technical dialogues focused on specific themes, or mixed formats combining technical meetings with high-level events.

These options prioritize political visibility and targeted contributions to the Global Stocktake, but with a lower degree of institutionalization.

Thus, the options vary between permanent multisectoral governance models, as preferred by the G77, and more restricted alternatives centered on specific implementation cycles.

Parties decided to continue consideration of the agenda item at SBI 63 based on the available text, for a decision at COP 30.

Oceans

Although it was not an item in the formal SB 62 negotiations, the topic of oceans received significant attention at SB 62 through mandated events, given the strong synergies between climate change and ocean protection.

At COP 26, the Glasgow Climate Pact had been adopted, a decision that requested the SBSTA to organize annual dialogues to strengthen ocean-based action.

Thus, at SB 62, two days of “Ocean and Climate Change Dialogues” were held, during which different stakeholders presented actions centered on oceans, demonstrating their relationship with topics discussed in international climate negotiations.

In addition, on the second day of the dialogues, a workshop was held in which participants were divided into small groups to discuss actions and the role of the dialogues within the UNFCCC system.

Discussions on oceans were based on three main themes:

1. The adoption of ocean-based measures in NDCs;
2. The inclusion of ocean-based indicators in the GGA;
3. The synergies between oceans, climate, and biodiversity.

Regarding the first theme, the discussions were brought from the United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC-3), which took place in Nice, France, one week before SB 62.

There, Brazil and France jointly launched the “Blue NDC Challenge,” calling on Parties to include ocean-based actions in their NDCs.

On the first day of the dialogues at SB 62, the presentation by Professor Marinez Scherer, special envoy of the COP 30 Presidency, stood out. She stated that the ocean must be recognized as a central part of the global system and should therefore be considered in NDCs with measurable and traceable commitments.

With regard to the GGA, the dialogues recalled that, beyond the carbon sequestration carried out by oceans, there are numerous co-benefits to their preservation, contributing to the response to or accommodation of various impacts caused by climate change, especially on coastal populations.

The representative of the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS), for example, mentioned that it would be possible to use existing indicators from international conventions to assess adaptation in the context of oceans.

In addition, the dialogues discussed the need to include oceans in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

Regarding synergies, discussions focused heavily on synergy with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), considering the need to restore marine ecosystems.

Colombia, for example, presented its National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), with specific provisions for marine biodiversity restoration, such as coral reef restoration targets, in order to integrate climate action, biodiversity conservation, and coastal resilience in a coherent and inclusive manner.

Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings

During SB 62, discussions on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings (AIM) focused on preparations for COP 30 in Brazil, debates on the choice of the host country for COP 31, with Australia and Türkiye reiterating their interest, and negotiations on the efficiency of the UNFCCC process and the engagement of observer organizations.

Although Parties did not reach consensus on the host of COP 31, important issues were debated during the two weeks of negotiations.

Regarding process efficiency, it was noted that COPs are becoming very large events with high costs for host countries, and that a limit should be considered for accreditation as “party overflow,” a type of credential issued by Parties to people who are not part of the negotiating team or government.

Another issue was how to seek greater geographic balance among observer organizations and in the speaking order during negotiations, with some Parties defending, without consensus, that observers should speak before Parties on themes that concern civil society.

There were also requests that agreements with COP host countries be published on the UNFCCC website in order to increase transparency and reduce conflicts of interest.

On the final day of negotiations, a debate over the application of host country national laws inside the negotiation venue took over the room. Parties did not reach consensus on this issue, since the norm is that these buildings are governed by UN rules during the conference, and it was decided that further negotiations on the matter would take place at SB 63, in Belém, at the end of the year.

The text with the final conclusions adopted by Parties reflects all of these issues, with emphasis on the request that the COP 31 host be decided as soon as possible, considerations on the number of accredited participants, and the statement that the agreement with the host country will be published as soon as it is signed.

UNFCCC Budget

The negotiation on the UNFCCC core budget for the 2026-2027 biennium extended until the final minutes before the closing plenary.

There was broad recognition of the financial challenges faced by the Secretariat, and Parties discussed different budget scenarios, including proposals ranging from a 1.2% increase, totaling EUR 75 million, to a 24% increase, totaling EUR 92.2 million, compared to the previous budget. Both scenarios remained below the actual needs estimated by the UNFCCC Secretariat at EUR 109.8 million.

Brazil, for example, defended the 24% increase as an important signal in defense of multilateralism and in recognition of the Secretariat’s crucial role in global climate governance.

A proposal was also considered for a one-time transfer of EUR 6 million from the Clean Development Mechanism Fund to modernize the Secretariat’s infrastructure and support Article 6.2 and 6.4 activities.

Parties agreed on a 10% increase, totaling EUR 81.5 million and covering only 74% of the actual needs presented by the Secretariat.

This agreement is very important so that the Secretariat can inform each Party, by COP 30, how much it should contribute for the next cycle.