LACLIMA SUMMARY

Bonn Conference 2025

SB 62

In a "work-to-work" atmosphere, LACLIMA's summary of this SB62 is longer than usual, packed with information and history about the results of some of the main negotiation topics in Bonn, and also about the relevant mandated events that took place, preparing the ground for COP 30.

As always, there was drama. But (almost everything) was concluded and some progress was made to Belém, with basic texts to finalize the negotiations in Brazil.

Adaptation

The adaptation agenda remains a central focus of the climate negotiations and continues to mobilize the active engagement of a diverse range of stakeholders, both inside and outside the negotiating chambers. Discussions on the main agenda item, the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), focused on three main fronts: 1) the work program on climate resilience indicators; 2) the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, established at COP 29; and 3) the incorporation of diverse approaches to adaptation. In parallel with the GGA, the Parties also discussed other relevant fronts of the adaptation agenda, including National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Adaptation Communications (AdComs), the review of the Adaptation Committee (AC), and the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP).

Global Adaptation Goal

Negotiations on the GGA are the most prominent topic on the adaptation agenda, advancing with significant negotiating effort and under intense pressure. At the beginning of the Conference, a hybrid workshop was held under the UAE-Belém Work Program to discuss the current list of nearly 500 climate resilience indicators. The workshop highlighted the process's lack of coordination, the fragility in defining mandates, and growing frustration among Parties and experts. Despite the relative turbulence on the first day, broad recognition of the need to refine the list by COP 30 carried over to the negotiating room, where Parties began defining the continuity of the experts' mandate, aiming to provide more robust guidance and clearer criteria for reducing and refining the list of indicators. Deep disagreements persisted throughout the sessions regarding the indicators for measuring means of implementation and cross-cutting considerations.

The conclusion approved at the end of SB62 requests that experts reduce the list to a maximum of 100 globally applicable indicators, including indicators related to means of implementation and enabling factors, as well as cross-cutting considerations such as social inclusion, youth, gender, and human rights. The Parties also decided to incorporate criteria and methodological guidance for the next stage, including the removal of irrelevant indicators (e.g., related to mitigation), the improvement of unspecific indicators, and the inclusion of qualitative narratives, where relevant. It was also defined that the sub-indicators should capture the diverse contexts of adaptation actions, allowing Parties to choose those most appropriate to their national circumstances. Furthermore, means of implementation indicators should be included to measure access, quality, and financing for adaptation, including its provision, in line with the Paris Agreement. It was also recognized that the limited data available should not restrict the development of new indicators, as long as it is accompanied by support for capacity building in developing countries.

It was established that the experts should meet again, before the workshop scheduled to take place between SB62 and SB63, in a hybrid meeting, to review the coherence of the metadata, perform quality control and verify the adequacy of the indicators with the defined guidelines, as well as present a final version of the technical report by August 2025. From this, the Secretariat will prepare two consecutive synthesis reports (one on the technical meeting and another on the preparatory workshop).

Considerations on transformational adaptation (and other approaches to adaptation) and the future of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap ultimately took a back seat. Although they were the focus of attention by the Parties in some negotiating sessions, the sections of the text reflecting these views were included only as an informal note in the SB's provisional conclusions on the GGA, which are expected to serve as a basis for discussions in Belém in November.

Nairobi Work Program

The Nairobi Work Program achieved consensus among the parties in the first week of SB62. After a heated initial negotiation, the Parties reached a balanced compromise and approved provisional conclusions. The text recognizes the progress made in implementing NWP activities between May 2024 and March 2025 and reiterates the central role of the NWP in strengthening adaptive action and resilience to climate impacts, including transboundary impacts and those resulting from compound risks. It also reinforces the importance of integrating incremental, urgent, transformational, and nationally-driven approaches into NWP activities and requests the Secretariat to strengthen collaboration with diverse knowledge holders, including Indigenous peoples, local communities, the private sector, and scientific institutions, as well as the use of emerging and innovative technologies, among other points. This negotiation item represents a rare point of convergence within the adaptation agenda in SB62, highlighting the NWP as a constructive space with the potential to strengthen the technical basis of the UNFCCC adaptation regime.

Adaptation Communications

The discussions began with an exchange of experiences on the development of Adaptation Communications, focusing on defining next steps. Negotiations progressed relatively positively, with widespread recognition that the evolving characteristics of adaptation under the Paris Agreement require adjustments to the formats and content of AdComs. There was broad agreement on the need to preserve their flexible and voluntary nature, especially to avoid imposing new burdens on developing countries. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of communication channels currently used has generated fragmentation, and consistency in the information communicated by the Parties in reporting instruments must be sought. Despite the convergence, the Parties concluded that more time would be needed to reflect on the topic and decided to continue consideration of the topic in June 2026, during SB 64.

National Adaptation Plans

The informal consultations on the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) focused largely on procedural issues, without reaching an agreement on concrete next steps—in line with a trend that has persisted since previous conferences, in which procedural issues take center stage amid profound disagreements between the Parties regarding the content of the texts, particularly regarding the language on means of implementation and financing. The negotiations concluded with the submission of provisional conclusions with a base text to be used in the negotiations at COP 30, as indicated in the footnotes.

Adaptation Committee

The review process on the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee (AC) has stalled, reflecting significant disagreements over the definition of governance. The Sur Group presented proposals seeking conciliation to finalize the process, but it was not possible to reach consensus on the role of the COP and the CMA in the AC. The parties agreed to postpone this decision until SB70. The slow pace of these secondary agendas highlights a certain disconnect between the growing political recognition of the importance of adaptation and the regime's effective capacity to move forward with technical and operational decisions that sustain this momentum.

Global Balance

Discussions on implementing the Global Stocktake (GST) results within the UAE Dialogue have progressed slowly, marked by strong political divisions regarding the scope, expected outcomes, and mandate of the process. Negotiations began under the impact of the deadlock that occurred at COP 29 in Baku, led by EIG and AILAC. With the resumption of negotiations under SB 62, the G77+China group, with the support of AOSIS and the LMDCs, advocated for discussions to be based on the latest COP 29 text. However, Saudi Arabia rejected any attempt to address monitoring of GST implementation, insisting that the focus of the dialogues be on securing means of implementation, especially financing. The LMDC also rejected the inclusion in the text of references to the GST paragraphs on energy transition and fossil fuel phase-out—the preservation of which was advocated by Australia and AOSIS.

On the penultimate day of the conference, the facilitators presented two drafts—one in the morning, one in the afternoon. The most recent version, dated June 25th, reorganized and expanded the options under negotiation, without solidifying consensus. The text presented multiple alternatives regarding the nature, scope, and duration of the dialogue, reflecting divergent positions. Among the changes was the expansion of the thematic scope from four to seven options, the detailing of information sources, and more operational language for the expected deliverables. The controversies remained in brackets, signaling progress in structuring, but not in resolving the impasses.

Australia, Japan, the European Union, and others supported forwarding the afternoon draft to Belém, while LMDCs and the Arab Group preferred the previous version. India, supported by Egypt, Morocco, Australia, and the Maldives, proposed forwarding both versions in a single document. The facilitators presented the proposal to the SBI president, presenting four paths: the morning draft, the afternoon draft, a combination of both, or no text at all.

The plenary session approved the continuation of discussions at COP 30 based on an "informal note," which was prepared to organize the parties' divergent proposals and positions on how to operationalize the UAE Dialogue. The two versions of the text presented the previous day, both with different wording options, were considered in the note. The first few days in Belém should determine which of these versions will be considered as the basis for initiating negotiations.

Just Transition

The first two days of SB62 were taken up by negotiations involving the adoption of the agenda. This was an important moment for the Just Transition Work Program because, as a solution to the impasse created by the LMDCs' proposal regarding the inclusion of two agenda items—one on restricting unilateral measures and the other on financing (Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement)—the chairs of the subsidiary bodies determined that these topics be discussed within the negotiating item on just transition.

This decision resulted in the negotiating room being dominated by interventions from the parties on unilateral measures, diverting the focus of the discussion from this topic. During the first week, the Work Program co-facilitators—a representative from Italy and another from Singapore—addressed seven topics identified as relevant based on previous discussions. They then presented an informal note. The second week began with the first discussion on this note. Early on, three issues emerged: the first concerned the language used on energy transition and renewable energy; the second, the space dedicated to unilateral measures; and the third, the options for "institutional arrangements"—that is, the creation of a body to address the global dimension of the just transition, supporting countries in their implementation.

In the final two days of negotiations, a stalemate consolidated: the LMDCs and other groups expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the space reserved for discussion on unilateral measures did not contain an express mention of the term. They then requested that an option with this language be included. Furthermore, the LMDCs, the Arab Group, and Russia indicated that they would not move forward until the language on "transition away from fossil fuels," contained in paragraph 11g of the text, was revised. On the other hand, countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia argued that there would not be enough time to include all the parties' views in a way that would be fully reflected in the informal note. Therefore, any changes to the text would necessarily be unbalanced. Thus, they stated that the text should be forwarded to Belém in its entirety or not at all.

Faced with the impasse, it took two informal negotiation sessions (those "corridor" ones!) for the United Kingdom and other countries to accept the inclusion of options related to priority issues for the LMDCs and their allies. In return, the LMDCs also had to demonstrate flexibility, accepting options with wording that was acceptable to both parties.

In the end, a decision was adopted forwarding the informal note to COP 30 in Belém as a basis for discussions. The submitted text is not consensual and contains several points of disagreement between the parties, reflecting two of the most difficult debates of the Paris Agreement: the transition away from fossil fuels and the unilateral measures adopted by developed countries that especially impact developing and least developed countries.

Topics likely to spark new debate in Belém include mentions of NDCs, the 1.5°C target, and international cooperation—which includes discussions on means of implementation. It's been a long road since COP29 in Baku, where we left without a decision and, consequently, without a text. The informal note now represents an important basis for the beginning of discussions in Belém.

Mitigation

Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Program (MWP) in Bonn were marked by intense debates over the scope of the mandate, the concept of a "safe space ," and the proposed creation of a new digital platform to facilitate implementation. Countries such as Egypt, China, LMDCs, and the Arab Group argued that the MWP should remain strictly within the mandate established by decision 4/CMA.4—that is, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, based on national sovereignty, and without imposing targets. On the other hand, AOSIS, the European Union, and Australia emphasized the need for the MWP to contribute to increased ambition and implement key messages from the dialogues, including references to the GST outcomes and NDC synthesis reports.

The Brazilian proposal for a digital platform to connect projects with financiers generated controversy: while some countries valued its potential for innovation and implementation, others warned of the risks of duplication of effort, lack of clarity regarding its objectives, and possible undue overlap with the MWP mandate. AOSIS and Colombia emphasized that the platform should not divert focus from core mitigation messages or be used as a justification to delay decisions. Although the discussion about the platform served, in part, as an escape valve for countries uninterested in concrete progress on the MWP to waste time on a new item, the Brazilian proposal also represented a break in the stale dynamic that had blocked progress on the program for years. By introducing a new element into the debate, the initiative forced reactions, drew attention to implementation, and reopened negotiation avenues that had been stalled.

Despite the technical clarifications provided by Brazil—regarding its modular scope, low costs, and complementary nature to existing platforms—the debate revealed disagreements regarding the proposal's viability within the MWP's timeframe, the continuation of which will be discussed in 2026. Discussion on the elements of a decision to be adopted in Belém also progressed tentatively, with divergent proposals on the inclusion of next steps—including whether or not to consider the platform within the scope of the negotiations—the continuation of the MWP, and the expected outcomes. Given the lack of consensus, the facilitators committed to drafting an informal note reflecting only the structure discussed—without substantive elements—as a preliminary record of the discussions.

In the final session, the parties met to resolve points of disagreement and sections of the text that remained in brackets. After more than an hour of informal standing in a corner of the room, the negotiators reached an agreement on the text from which negotiations would begin in Belém. However, at the last moment before the session closed, Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, requested that the drafting of the conclusion introducing the informal note include a provision for an information session before COP 30 to address and deepen discussions on the platform. This point had not been agreed upon by the Parties, and this prevented the text of the informal note from being approved during that session. The decision was then left to the final plenary.

The document adopted at the plenary did not reflect Saudi Arabia's request, and the Parties ultimately approved the text agreed upon at the last negotiating session. The text consists merely of a list of subheadings that should form the decision to be adopted in Belém: I. Preamble; II. Acknowledgments to the Co-Facilitators, Host Countries, and the Secretariat; III. Improvements to the Mitigation Work Program (MWP) (Global Dialogues and Investment-Focused Events) [including considerations on the digital platform]; IV. Outcomes of the Fifth and Sixth Global Dialogues, taking into account the Annual Report; V. [Views on the Continuation of the Work Program]; VI. Submissions as mandated by decision 4/CMA.4, decision 4/CMA.5, and decision 2/CMA.6. The differences evident in the text are the sections in brackets: whether the digital platform will be considered in discussions on improvements to the MWP and whether there will be a chapter in the decision dedicated to addressing the continuation of the work program.

Article 6

Article 6.2 – Dialogue on Ambition and Cooperation

At COP 29, the UNFCCC Secretariat was mandated to hold ambition dialogues during all Subsidiary Body sessions, aiming to stimulate the exchange of information between Parties and observers on how cooperative approaches can support increased climate ambition. The first Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue was then held, kicking off the full implementation phase of the instrument. The event was divided into two parts – "Ambition" and "Cooperation" – with roundtable discussions guided by key questions.

The first part featured presentations from Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, the European Union, and CfRN on the contribution of Article 6.2 to increasing the ambition of NDCs; from ICAO and Sweden on the use of ITMOs for international mitigation purposes (OIMP), such as CORSIA; and from Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Kenya, which addressed private sector engagement and the potential of Article 6.2 to finance voluntary climate commitments. The second session focused on cooperation. The first session addressed benefit-sharing and justice in cooperative approaches, with presentations from the PACM SBM, the European Union, Zambia, Carbon Market Watch, and the Grassroots Justice Network. The second session addressed capacity building, with contributions from the Secretariat, GGGI, A6IP, Germany, and Chile. Finally, the third session addressed multilateral cooperation, with interventions from the AGN, EBRD, ADB, and IETA.

Among the main points discussed was the need for caution on the part of ITMO-selling countries regarding their carbon budget, avoiding "overselling," as well as the urgency of joint capacity-building efforts to expand market share. Buyer countries also warned of the risk that the lack of a domestic legal framework and the delay in issuing the corresponding adjustments could hinder the formalization of agreements. Technical sessions led by the Secretariat addressed the data review process, reporting requirements, and the operation of the International Registry.

Article 6.4 – Training on the Credit Mechanism (PACM)

Following the adoption, at COP 29, of the basic rules for operationalizing the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), as provided for in Article 6.4, the focus from then on shifted to developing the complementary guidelines necessary for the full functioning of the mechanism — such as additionality rules, baseline definition and approval of methodologies —, led by the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM), with the support of its panels of experts.

In this context, a training day focused on the functioning and participation of the PACM was held in Bonn, bringing together a diverse range of stakeholders, including representatives of governments of Parties interested in hosting activities, experts from the UNFCCC Secretariat, the private sector, and project developers. The training covered the main outcomes of COP 29 and the benefits of the PACM in the context of Article 6.2 approaches, as well as technical and procedural aspects.

The transition process from the CDM to the PACM was discussed; the mechanism's information system; the forms for participation of Parties and other entities; the status of the designation of Designated National Authorities (DNAs) and the requirements for the participation of host Parties; the functioning of the registration system; the procedures for authorizing entities and activities; and the functionalities of the PACM's official website.

Article 6.8 – Non-Market Approaches and the NMA Platform

During the negotiations in Bonn, the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), mandated by Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, held a workshop with Parties and observers to discuss the use of the NMA Platform—a digital tool designed to provide visibility to climate mitigation and adaptation projects. Structured as a world café and roundtable, the event highlighted significant obstacles, such as limiting project registration to national authorities and only when already established in partnership, which restricts dissemination. Poor usability, lack of mobile responsiveness, and scarcity of registrations were also highlighted—by the end of the conference, only two projects (Uganda and Japan) were listed on the platform.

The spin-off groups discussed experiences in renewable energy and green infrastructure, ways to identify NMAs, and suggestions on how to allow registration by only one Party. At the formal negotiation meeting, the LMDC group proposed presenting a comprehensive text, with measures such as the inclusion of projects not yet implemented, the creation of a financing channel through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the holding of side events at COP 30, including a session on the Joint Amazon Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation with Integrated and Sustainable Forest Management, and a forum on financing NMAs in 2027. The proposal, however, faced resistance from countries such as Switzerland and CfRN, especially regarding the inclusion of forestry activities linked to Article 5 as NMAs. The Secretariat presented cost estimates to inform decisions on events and technical improvements to the Platform.

After more than six hours of negotiations, a new, generic text was presented, providing for improvements to the Platform's functionalities but without addressing the controversial points. Bolivia expressed its opposition to the text, while other Parties expressed frustration at the disregard for their efforts in the negotiations. With no consensus reached, it was decided to simply forward the status of the discussions to the SBSTA Chair, without a finalized text.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

The agenda for the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) focused on its discontinuation, with a view to the creation of the PACM and its future absorption by it. During SB 62, the Parties discussed deadlines for the closure of CDM activities, including the issuance of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), approval and review of methodologies, accreditation of designated operational entities, interaction with stakeholders, the closure of the Executive Board's activities, and the deactivation of the mechanism's registration. The final draft decision maintained options for closure dates, ranging from 2025 to 2028, to be defined at COP 30.

There was disagreement among the countries: the LMDC group advocated extending the deadlines until the PACM is fully operational, while other Parties, such as AOSIS, warned of the excessive costs of a prolonged extension. As a follow-up, the Secretariat was asked to present, at COP 30, an update on the resources available in the CDM trust fund and an assessment of the costs and resources associated with the proposed dates, to inform the Parties' decision.

Another point of debate was the fate of the remaining resources from this fund. Some Parties proposed maintaining the resources tied to the CDM until its complete deactivation. Others suggested redirecting them, in whole or in part, to the Adaptation Fund, to Article 6 capacity-building activities for developing countries, to market infrastructure, or to actions to improve transparency under the Paris Agreement. Ultimately, the Parties agreed to resume discussions at CMP 20 during COP 30, based on the draft decision agreed upon in Bonn.

Financing

The topic of financing was not present on the formal negotiation agenda, but was discussed in other meetings mandated by previous decisions.

Baku to Bethlehem Roadmap for USD 1.3 Trillion

The Roadmap—which will be produced by the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies—is not a formal negotiation item, but consultations were conducted during SB62 to hear the views of Parties and stakeholders on the draft initially prepared by the Presidencies. During the consultation with non-state actors, the Brazilian Ministry of Finance—which supports the COP30 Presidency with input for the Roadmap—presented the main priorities for the report of the Circle of Economy Ministers: reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs); expansion of concessional finance and climate funds; creation of national platforms and increased national capacity to attract sustainable investments; development of innovative financial instruments to mobilize private capital; and strengthening regulatory frameworks for climate finance.

There were calls for adaptation finance to be prioritized and for the use of innovative financial instruments, such as mechanisms based on the polluter-pays principle. Developing countries highlighted barriers to the quality of climate finance, including bureaucratic issues that hinder direct access and increased debt, as well as the complementary role of Multilateral Banks and International Financial Institutions, which does not replace the responsibility of developed countries in providing public financing. Developed countries' feedback focused on the importance of the Roadmap considering a wide variety of funding sources, especially ways to mobilize more private financing.

Regarding the process, there is frustration with the lack of clarity regarding next steps and how the contributions made during the consultations will be reflected in the Roadmap. It is still unclear how it will be incorporated or recognized in the formal COP30 negotiations, and how effective it will be in relation to stakeholders beyond the UNFCCC framework.

Sharm el Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1.c in complementarity with Article 9

The mandate of this Dialogue is for the parties to exchange views and improve understanding of the scope of Article 2.1c, which concerns making financial flows consistent with a pathway to low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, and its complementarity with Article 9, which addresses the responsibility of developed countries to provide finance to developing countries.

The first workshop of 2025 featured expert presentations on three pre-selected topics—adaptation, just transition, and how Article 2.1.c can support the implementation of the new collective climate finance target (CQFT)—followed by smaller group discussions among Parties and stakeholders. However, there was insufficient time for in-depth discussions, and some Parties were unable to intervene on the final day.

The next workshop will take place before COP 30, a crucial moment to discuss what viable decision can be made in Belém to recognize the work accomplished, continue (or not) the dialogue, and what is the most effective format to ensure not only the continuity of discussions, but also an implementation process.

Workshop on Article 9.5

The third biennial workshop on Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement brought together Parties and observers to discuss experiences in preparing biennial climate finance communications, their usefulness for developing countries, and ways to improve them, especially to inform the Global Stocktake. Challenges highlighted included the low predictability of financial commitments due to political and budgetary constraints in developed countries, technical difficulties in consolidating data, and the need for a clear definition of climate finance. Other Parties also advocated for common standards and more quantitative data on the balance between mitigation and adaptation. Also discussed were improvements in coordination with Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), the separation of voluntary communications, and the importance of aligning reports with the needs of developing countries. Finally, it was highlighted that the next COP will feature a High-Level Ministerial Dialogue aimed at updating the guidelines for these communications, focusing on the new collective target for climate finance, direct access to finance, and comparability between the ex-ante and ex-post reports of Articles 9.5 and 9.7.

Gender

During SB 62, the Parties began developing a new Gender Action Plan (GAP), which will be negotiated and adopted at COP30. This was the first round of negotiations under the new mandate of the Lima Work Program on Gender (LWPG), which was extended for another ten years at COP29. The process began with a three-day technical workshop that brought together the Parties and civil society representatives to review the current plan's activities, identify gaps, and propose new actions. The methodology adopted was participatory and collaborative, using the previous Gender Action Plan as a central reference for the new plan.

Based on the technical input from the workshop, the Secretariat prepared a first draft of the new plan, which was then discussed in informal consultations among the countries. Over the course of the three sessions, the Parties reviewed the 31 proposed activities, opting to defer discussions on expected deliverables, responsible entities, and timelines to the COP. The negotiations were largely characterized by cooperation, with the Parties making a joint effort to move forward despite differences.

The main sticking point was the inclusion of language on financing. Countries from the G77+China, the African Group, and AOSIS advocated for the need to recognize the importance of financial support for the plan's implementation, including reference to direct financing for women-led grassroots organizations. Developed countries, on the other hand, argued that the current mandate does not allow for the creation of new financial commitments, suggesting that the focus remain on implementation and institutional capacity-building. Norway proposed a middle ground, accepting the inclusion of references to awareness-raising and capacity-building in gender-sensitive finance, as long as there were no explicit commitments. Another frequently discussed topic was the recognition of specific groups, such as people of African descent, women farmers, indigenous peoples, and local communities.

Negotiations concluded in eight days, with the final informal consultation. After the second draft was submitted by the secretariat, the text underwent no further changes and was maintained as the basis for final negotiations during COP30. However, the Parties agreed to hold a new technical workshop before the conference, with the aim of consolidating activities, discussing deliverables, and reducing the number of informal notes currently present in the text. The African Group proposed that this meeting be held in Ethiopia during the African Climate Week in September. The outcome of SB 62 is a comprehensive draft document, strongly anchored in the previous plan, incorporating a variety of proposals presented, and which must now be politically matured in Belém.

Transparency

Discussions on transparency in SB 62 were intense and reflected both technical challenges and political tensions. One of the main agenda items was the provision of financial and technical support to developing countries. Throughout the week, the G77+China, AILAC, LMDCs, and African countries reported on the obstacles they faced in accessing GEF funding, highlighting slowness, bureaucracy, and disruption to the institutional continuity of reporting processes. The United Kingdom and other developed countries insisted that the UNFCCC does not have a mandate to directly guide the GEF, stalling part of the negotiations. In the second week, aiming to have something more structured to work on in Belém at COP 30, Brazil requested additional time for negotiations. As a result, we received a draft with proposals such as simplifying financing processes, holding workshops, and encouraging dialogue between countries and the GEF. However, the text remains full of brackets, signaling differences that need to be overcome.

Another important point was the debate on the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), considered essential for providing technical support and capacity-building to developing countries. There was consensus among the Parties regarding the group's importance, especially in the context of implementing the Paris Agreement's new transparency framework (Enhanced Transparency Framework - ETF). However, disagreements persisted on three key points of the text: the term for renewing the mandate, the composition of the members, and the revision of the terms of reference. Developing countries, led by G77+China, advocated for a permanent mandate, maintaining the current composition and without substantial changes to the terms of reference. Developed countries, on the other hand, proposed that the AGE have a renewable mandate (three or six years, with options for 2029 or 2032), as well as a new composition with a numerical distribution of members by region, including specific seats for LDCs, SIDS, and representatives of international organizations. Phrases like "transition to BTRs" and "full implementation of the ETF" were particularly opposed by the G77+China, while the EU defended their inclusion. The text continues with multiple options in brackets and will be revisited at COP 30.

Regarding the provision of financial and technical support under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, the Parties sought to organize a more structured response to the difficulties faced in implementing the ETF. The G77+China proposed a three-year work plan, periodic summaries of lessons learned, and more channels of dialogue with the GEF. The opposition of the United Kingdom and other developed countries to any mention of guidance to the GEF marked the debates. The text discussed provided guidance on actions to simplify financing processes, standardized project models, and strengthen institutional capacities. The content will be revisited in Belém, with the expectation of new workshops and submissions on national experiences.

The agenda regarding the information contained in National Communications of Countries not included in Annex I of the Convention received limited progress. Discussions did not progress on the proposal to consolidate the information into summary reports, a proposal contested by countries such as South Africa and the African Group, which warned of the risks of undue comparisons between countries with very different technical capabilities. Given the lack of consensus, it was decided that the topic would be included on the provisional agenda of SB63, but that it would be considered held in abeyance until more favorable conditions for its treatment arose.

The Facilitative and Multilateral Consideration of Progress (FMCP) event, mandated by the Ministry of Finance (MFCP), enabled a rich exchange of experiences among countries such as Guyana, Panama, and Andorra regarding their BTR development and review processes. Technical difficulties were reported, as well as strategies for overcoming them, such as the use of internal resources and the rehiring of teams involved in the first reporting cycle. The FMCP format was considered useful, and suggestions such as advance submission of technical questions were proposed to facilitate future rounds.

Response measures

The impacts of implementing response measures refer to the effects—both within and outside national jurisdictions—resulting from mitigation policies and actions adopted by Parties under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. During the negotiations on this topic, in addition to the Forum on Response Measures, the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) was established in 2018, responsible for providing technical support to the Forum through annual reports.

In Baku, at COP29, a new work plan for the Forum on Response Measures was adopted for the period 2026-2030, encompassing 17 activities. The KCI was also requested to determine, in its 2025 report, a timeline and implementation methods for the activities outlined therein. Furthermore, the Forum was required to incorporate "substantial issues" into its work plan, based on the KCI's annual report.

In this context, early in the negotiations, the G77/China, supported by the Arab Group, the African Group, and the LMDCs, requested that priority activities for the KCI and the Forum be discussed, taking into account the 2026-2030 work plan. There was significant controversy regarding an activity listed in the plan as analyzing the impacts of response measures, "including transboundary impacts." Based on this wording, the G77/China suggested that discussion of unilateral trade measures or protectionist measures be designated as a priority activity for the KCI and the Forum, considering that such measures lead to the withdrawal of climate finance from developing countries. On the other hand, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and other developed countries argued that there was no reason to rush these discussions, considering that the 2025 KCI report will only be published in the second half of the year and that, in their view, the Forum did not have a mandate to discuss unilateral measures.

Another topic discussed was the holding of annual global dialogues on the impacts of response measures. Some countries, such as Japan, expressed concern about the financial resources involved. For developing countries, such dialogues represent opportunities to discuss new impacts of response measures, including those resulting from unilateral measures.

On the last day of SB62, the Parties agreed to accept the consolidation of an informal summary of the discussions, which does not represent a formally adopted agreement, but which will serve as a basis for negotiations in Belém.

Technology

Negotiations on climate technology focused on three main fronts: defining the structure and scope of the new Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), reviewing the functions and future of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), and establishing institutional links between the Technology Mechanism and the Convention's Financial Mechanism, which includes funds such as the GCF and GEF.

Links between the Technology Mechanism and the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism

Discussions on the connections between the Technology Mechanism and the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism revolved around three main axes: the scope of institutional collaboration and the role of the Secretariat; the type and frequency of reports on financial support for technology transfer; and whether or not the specific item on connections should remain on the UNFCCC agenda. The G77 + China has maintained that this topic is strategic for ensuring access to resources in the GCF and GEF replenishment processes and has expressed openness to adjusting the language, provided the discussion is addressed by the financing negotiators.

Developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada, proposed diluting the item, transferring the discussion to joint reports by the TEC (Technology Executive Committee of the Technology Mechanism) and the CTCN, which would reduce its political clout. There was also controversy over the G77 proposal to include regular technical reports detailing how requests for technical assistance convert (or fail) into funded projects. Finally, the item's future on the agenda remains in dispute. The draft text includes an option that proposes ending it as a standalone item, and others that advocate for its maintenance, with periodic reviews linked to fund replenishment cycles. The Parties decided to continue consideration of the agenda at SBI 63 based on the available text, for decision at COP30.

Review of the Functions and Future of the CTCN

The Parties also discussed the renewal of the CTCN's mandate. Despite general recognition of its importance, the duration of the renewal remains unclear, as does the need to review the host entity selection process. The G77 has been pushing for a broader, implementation-oriented mandate, with a greater regional presence. Developed countries, in turn, prefer to preserve the center's technical focus, avoiding institutional expansion without a clear performance evaluation.

Another point under debate in the review of the CTCN's functional scope, led by developing countries, is that the center should play a more direct role in formulating financing proposals and supporting technology implementation. Some developed countries, however, express concern about a possible overlap of functions with the GCF, the GEF, and even the TEC. Also at stake is the CTCN's role in relation to the new TIP: whether it will be the program's main executor or merely a technical partner is still an open question.

Technology Implementation Program

Created by the COP 28 decision, the TIP aims to support the implementation of technological priorities defined by developing countries. It seeks to go beyond the planning phase to become an operational instrument for technology delivery. For the TIP to come into effect, its governance, functional scope, funding sources, and institutional coordination must be defined—all points still under debate.

The Parties expressed divergent views on the program's level of ambition. The G77, especially the LDCs and small island states, advocated for a robust framework with concrete targets, a focus on indigenous innovation, and climate justice. Developed countries were cautious about binding commitments, especially regarding financing, trade barriers, and intellectual property. There was also disagreement on the criteria for defining the technologies included in the program: the United Kingdom, for example, wants to anchor them to the GST results, with an emphasis on the energy transition, while countries such as Brazil, China, AILAC, and the African Group argue that priorities should be guided by national needs.

Another central debate is the type of relationship the TIP will have with financial mechanisms. Options range from a model based on flexible partnerships with development banks and private actors to another focused on strengthening endogenous capacities, with more direct involvement from the TEC and CTCN. The program's structure and operationalization are also under discussion. The G77 and China propose a broad model, with annual global technical dialogues coordinated by the SBI/SBSTA or the TEC, multisectoral participation, and strong integration with existing UNFCCC programs. This proposal also includes regional dialogues and systematic reporting.

On the other hand, countries such as the European Union, Norway, and the United Kingdom have shown a preference for more contained and episodic models, with two technical dialogues focused on specific topics, or mixed formats that combine technical meetings with high-level events. These options prioritize political visibility and specific contributions to the Global Stocktake, but with a lower degree of institutionalization. Thus, the options range from permanent multistakeholder governance models (such as those favored by the G77) to more restricted alternatives focused on specific implementation cycles. The Parties decided to continue consideration of the agenda at SBI 63 based on the available text, for decision at COP 30.

Oceans

Although not a formal SB62 negotiation item, oceans were prominently featured in SB62 through mandated events, given the robust synergies between climate change and ocean protection.

At COP 26, the Glasgow Climate Pact was adopted, a decision that mandated the SBSTA to organize annual dialogues to strengthen ocean-based actions. Thus, at SB 62, two days of "Dialogues on Oceans and Climate Change" were held, where different stakeholders were able to present on ocean-centered actions, demonstrating their connections to the topics discussed in international climate negotiations. Additionally, on the second day of the dialogues, a workshop was held, in which attendees were divided into small groups to discuss actions and the role of the dialogues within the UNFCCC system.

Discussions on oceans were based on three main themes: (i) the adoption of ocean-based measures in NDCs; (ii) the inclusion of ocean-based indicators in the GGA; and (iii) the synergies between oceans, climate and biodiversity.

Regarding the first topic, discussions were brought forward from the United Nations Conference on Oceans (UNOC-3), held in Nice, France, a week before SB62. There, Brazil and France jointly launched the "Blue NDC Challenge," calling on Parties to include ocean-based actions in their NDCs. On the first day of the SB62 dialogues, a highlight was the presentation by Professor Marinez Sherer, Special Envoy of the COP30 Presidency, who stated that the ocean must be recognized as a central part of the global system and should therefore be considered in NDCs with measurable and traceable commitments.

Regarding the GGA, the dialogues noted that, in addition to the oceans' carbon sequestration, there are numerous co-benefits to their preservation, contributing to the response to or accommodation of various impacts caused by climate change, particularly on coastal populations. The representative of the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS), for example, mentioned that it would be possible to use indicators already existing in international conventions to analyze adaptation in the context of the oceans. Furthermore, the dialogues discussed the need to include the oceans in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

Regarding synergies, discussions focused heavily on synergy with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), considering the need to restore marine ecosystems. Colombia, for example, presented its National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) with specific provisions for restoring marine biodiversity, such as coral reef restoration targets, to integrate climate action, biodiversity conservation, and coastal resilience in a coherent and inclusive manner.

Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings

During SB 62, discussions on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings (ICMs) focused on preparations for COP30 in Brazil, debates on the choice of host country for COP31, with Australia and Turkey reiterating their interest, and negotiations on the efficiency of the UNFCCC process and the engagement of observer organizations. Although no consensus was reached on the host of COP31, important issues were discussed among the Parties during the two weeks of negotiations. Regarding the efficiency of the process, it was considered that COPs are becoming very large events with high costs for host countries, and that a limit should be considered for accreditation as "party overflow"—a type of credential issued by the Parties to individuals who are not part of the negotiating team or the government. Another issue was how to achieve greater geographic balance between observer organizations and the order of speaking in the negotiations, with some Parties arguing, without consensus, that observers should speak before the Parties on issues concerning civil society. There were also requests that agreements with COP host countries be published on the UNFCCC website to increase transparency and reduce conflicts of interest. On the last day of negotiations, a debate over the application of host countries' national laws within the headquarters building took over the room. The Parties did not reach a consensus on this, as the norm is for these buildings to be governed by UN law during the conference. It was decided that further negotiations on this matter would take place at SB 63 – in Belém, at the end of the year.

The text with the final conclusions adopted by the Parties considers all these issues, with highlights including the request that the host of COP 31 be decided as soon as possible, considerations on the number of accredited participants, and stating that the agreement with the host country will be published as soon as it is signed.

UNFCCC Budget

Negotiations on the UNFCCC's core budget for the 2026-2027 biennium extended until the final minutes before the final plenary session. There was widespread recognition of the financial challenges facing the secretariat, and the Parties discussed different budget scenarios, including proposals ranging from a 1.2% increase (€75 million) to a 24% increase (€92.2 million), compared to the last budget, still below the actual needs estimated by the UNFCCC Secretariat at €109.8 million. Brazil, for example, defended the 24% increase as an important sign of multilateralism and recognition of the secretariat's crucial role in global climate governance. A proposal for a one-time transfer of €6 million from the Clean Development Mechanism Fund to modernize the secretariat's infrastructure and support Article 6.2 and 6.4 activities was also considered.

The Parties agreed to a 10% increase, totaling €81.5 million and covering only 74% of the actual needs presented by the Secretariat. This agreement is crucial for the Secretariat to be able to report, by COP30, how much each Party should contribute to the next cycle.