Introduction

Our traditional COP Summary presents a comprehensive overview of the COP 30 negotiations and their main outcomes. This conference aimed to be the COP of implementation, inaugurating a new phase after the completion of all pending regulations of the Paris Agreement in previous cycles.

The Brazilian Presidency innovated by creating a specific negotiation space to address sensitive issues that had been systematically avoided—among them, global roadmaps to combat deforestation and promote the transition away from fossil fuels, essential elements for keeping the 1.5°C limit within reach. Although these roadmaps are not included in the formal decisions, they will be developed as political initiatives of the COP 30 Presidency throughout the next year.

COP 30 also recorded significant progress in just transition and approved the long-awaited Belém Indicators for the Global Adaptation Target, a milestone expected since the creation of the GGA.

The COP in Brazil, like all others, could have gone further. Even so, it left behind relevant political directions and structured debates that will be decisive in future conferences, consolidating Belém as a turning point in the agenda for implementing the Paris Agreement.

But first… about LACLIMA

LACLIMA is an institute dedicated to researching, developing, disseminating, and implementing climate knowledge and policies through the lens of law, with a multidisciplinary approach focused on Brazil, Latin America, and Portuguese-speaking countries.

Since 2019, LACLIMA has been present in the UNFCCC regime negotiations, systematically monitoring the main items on the negotiating agenda, producing content, informing and training members and organizations of Brazilian civil society and other Latin American countries.

LACLIMA monitors the progress of negotiations, the agenda, and the results of events and meetings mandated by the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. This summary is the result of this monitoring work, which takes place throughout the year, culminating in the COPs.

To stay updated on the Paris Agreement, register on our website to receive the Paris Agreement Monitor , a monthly newsletter sent by email.

LACLIMA also fosters a network of legal professionals and law students that currently has over 1,300 members throughout Brazil, known as the "LACLIMA Network." If you are a law student, law graduate, or lawyer and are interested in joining the LACLIMA Network, please access the registration form.

Joint Decision

The process of building the decision of the Joint Effort began with the Brazilian Presidency opening a series of informal consultations on four central axes: response to the synthesis reports of the NDCs and BTRs, operationalization of Article 9.1, handling of unilateral trade measures (UTMs), and ways to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement. AOSIS, LDCs, the EU, EIG, and others pressed for a "response plan" to the NDCs and the 1.5°C gap, while LMDCs, the Arab Group, and AGN insisted that the real bottleneck is financing and advocated for a robust action plan or work program for Article 9.1, with burden-sharing arrangements. In parallel, developing countries demanded a concrete result on UTMs, while the EU and its allies rejected the creation of a permanent agenda item, fearing interference in domestic policies. Throughout the first week, the atmosphere was one of strong polarization, but also of confidence-building efforts, with the Presidency proposing political safeguards (preserving the architecture of the Paris Agreement, avoiding "finger-pointing," respecting the nationally determined nature of the NDCs) and encouraging written contributions to transform frustrations into proposals.

In the second week, based on a summary of the consultations and successive text versions, negotiations entered intensive mode: heads of delegation were called upon to clarify priorities for the "Bethlehem Package" and to react to a first draft of the "Joint Decision: uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change". Disagreements persisted regarding ambition (especially around 1.5°C), the design of a mechanism dedicated to Article 9.1, and how to deal with unilateral trade measures, but points of convergence also emerged: the need to accelerate implementation, strengthen international cooperation, respond politically to the ambition gap of the NDCs, and offer a clear signal of increased funding for adaptation, including in the context of the new collective quantified target (NCQG). The Presidency used mobile diplomacy and small "huddles" on financing for adaptation, response to NDCs, and trade to refine the text, reducing the number of options and seeking a balance between climate justice demands from developing countries and concerns about sovereignty and flexibility from developed countries.

The final outcome of the Joint Efforts decision structured this effort around three main pillars. First, it launched the Global Implementation Accelerator , a cooperative, facilitative, and voluntary initiative, under the guidance of the CMA7 and CMA8 presidencies, aimed at accelerating the implementation of the Paris Agreement across all actors, keeping 1.5°C within reach, and supporting the implementation of NDCs and national adaptation plans. The text tasks the presidencies with organizing open and inclusive sessions with subsidiary bodies (SB 64 and SB 65), promoting a high-level event in 2026, and presenting a progress report at CMA8, creating a dedicated political space to transform diagnoses – such as the NDC and BTR synthesis reports – into concrete actions.

Secondly, the decision establishes the “Belém Mission for 1.5°C” , guided by the presidencies of CMA6, CMA7 and CMA8, with the objective of boosting the ambition and implementation of NDCs and adaptation plans, articulating international cooperation and investments in mitigation and adaptation. The Mission functions as a political umbrella to organize specific initiatives, commitments and collaborations, and should result in a final report at CMA8, offering a political roadmap for the critical decade until 2035. Thirdly, the text responds to tensions over trade and finance by reaffirming the commitment to an open and non-discriminatory international economic system – recalling that climate measures, including unilateral ones, cannot become a disguised restriction on trade – and by mandating a cycle of formal dialogues in the subsidiary bodies (SB 64, 66 and 68) with the participation of ITC, UNCTAD and WTO on trade and climate, culminating in a high-level event in 2028.

Finally, the Joint Effort Decision establishes a two-year work program on climate finance , encompassing Article 9.1 within the context of Article 9 as a whole, to be led by two co-chairs (one from a developed country and one from a developing country) appointed at CMA7. This program was designed as a partial response to the demands of developing countries for a dedicated space to address methodologies, predictability, burden-sharing, and quality of financing, without, however, accepting all proposals for stronger institutionalization of Article 9.1. Thus, the Joint Effort Decision consolidates a political commitment to accelerating implementation, international economic cooperation, and a structured debate on finance and trade, even though it leaves open central controversies regarding the volume of resources, differentiated obligations, and the future treatment of unilateral trade measures.

Following the adoption of the Joint Efforts decision, the President of COP30, André Corrêa do Lago, made an additional statement acknowledging that critical discussions remained unresolved in the formal text and announcing that Brazil will lead, during the remainder of its Presidency, the development of two global roadmaps: one to halt and reverse deforestation and another to promote the phasing out of fossil fuels in a “fair, orderly and equitable” manner. He highlighted that these roadmaps constitute important political outcomes of Belém, even though they are not included in the adopted decision. Both will be science-based and built inclusively, through high-level dialogues with international organizations, producing and consuming countries, the productive sector, workers, academia, and civil society. Brazil will also organize a high-level event in 2026 and report on progress to CMA8, building on the momentum of the first international conference on the phasing out of fossil fuels, scheduled for April 2026 in Colombia.

Global Adaptation Goal - GGA

The Global Adaptation Goal (GAG), foreseen in the Paris Agreement without operational definition, took shape from COP 26 onwards with the creation of the GlaSS program, responsible for structuring the goal and proposing metrics to evaluate its achievement. This process advanced until COP 28, which adopted the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE FGCR), establishing seven thematic targets and four dimensional targets to guide global progress in adaptation. The main point of controversy was the inclusion of financial targets and the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in a context where a significant funding gap persists. In parallel, the UAE FGCR launched the UAE-Belém Program to develop global indicators—a complex technical task that became the focus of most negotiations.

At COP 29 and the intermediate session of SB 62, the focus was on consolidating a list of up to 100 quantitative and qualitative indicators that reflect different contexts, incorporate means of implementation, and include cross-cutting dimensions such as youth, gender, human rights, and traditional knowledge. The Parties also agreed to create the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) to operationalize Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and the elements of the UAE FGCR. However, topics such as transformational adaptation and the future of the BAR made little progress, being left for deliberation at COP 30. Meanwhile, other adaptation fronts—such as the Nairobi Work Programme—registered modest progress, although pending discussions on means of implementation and governance were postponed to Belém and SB 70.

Negotiations on the Global Adaptation Goal (GAG) at COP 30 were marked by intense dispute over the adoption of the list of indicators, a central point for operationalizing the Global Climate Resilience Framework. While most Parties—including the EU, LDCs, SUR, the UK, and several Latin American countries—pressed for the immediate adoption of the indicators in Belém, the African Group (AGN) advocated for an additional two-year work program, which would postpone the decision until COP 32. Despite some convergence on reducing the number of indicators and the need for a clear post-Belém mandate, positions remained far apart until the end of the first week. In parallel, a strong coalition of developing countries consolidated, calling for COP 30 to triple funding for adaptation—to at least US$120 billion by 2030—with proposals also linking the adaptation target to 50–75% of the NCQG. The Presidency insisted on achieving a “COP of adaptation,” but the process suffered from political tensions and technical difficulties, including obstacles regarding the future of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the inadequacy of the revised text, which reduced the indicators from 100 to 59 and raised concerns about its methodological viability.

The decision adopted at CMA.7 recognizes the centrality of adaptation in the Paris Agreement, reaffirms fundamental political principles—such as equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respect for national circumstances—and expresses strong appreciation for the technical work conducted within the framework of the UAE-Belém Programme. Politically, it highlights the role of children, youth, indigenous peoples, local communities, and other groups in building resilience, and reiterates the need for adequate, predictable, and accessible financing for developing countries. In terms of decision-making, CMA.7 formally concludes the UAE-Belém Programme, adopts the Belém Adaptation Indicators, establishes clear guidelines on their voluntary, non-prescriptive, and non-punitive nature, and determines that they do not create additional obligations nor serve as a basis for financial conditionalities. It also creates the Belém-Addis Vision, a two-year technical-political process to improve the methodologies and metadata of the indicators, and structures the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (2026–2028), focusing on initial implementation and cooperation among subsidiary bodies. The decision anchors the use of indicators in reporting instruments (BTRs, adaptation communications, NAPs, NDCs), requests technical and financial support from mechanisms such as GEF, GCF and the Adaptation Fund, defines mandates for new technical work and establishes that the indicators will be reviewed after the second Global Balance Sheet, in 2029, consolidating adaptation as a central pillar of the climate regime towards COP 32.

During the final plenary session, AILAC and other parties raised objections to the decision text after the gavel had fallen (the act that formalizes the adoption of the text). However, the parties stated that they had requested the floor before the decision was adopted and that they would have liked to have been heard before the text was adopted.

At this point, the Secretariat made it clear that once the decision is formalized, it becomes valid and cannot be reversed. Given this, the COP president stated that the issue will be renegotiated at the Bonn Conference in June 2026.

Just Transition

The decision on the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (UAE JTWP) at CMA.7 consolidated, for the first time, a more robust political and operational framework for the topic within the Paris Agreement. Following the creation of the programme in Sharm-El-Sheikh, the process advanced with four technical dialogues organized by the Subsidiary Bodies – held in Germany, Egypt, Panama and Ethiopia – which allowed for the systematization of experiences, good practices and challenges surrounding just transition pathways in multiple sectors and national contexts. The decision reaffirms that just transition is relevant for mitigation, adaptation and response to loss and damage; anchors the work in the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, human rights, the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional communities, gender equality, decent work and broad social participation; and underscores the importance of incorporating just transition into NDCs, NAPs and long-term development strategies, aligned with the first Global Balance Sheet.

Upon arriving in Belém for COP 30, the JTWP negotiating text from the 62 SBs, in the form of informal notes, carried four particularly sensitive themes. Two had been explicitly mandated by the SB co-chairs: (i) Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, concerning the obligation of developed countries to lead financing for developing countries; and (ii) unilateral trade measures, with the potential to negatively impact developing economies. Two other points emerged from the debates in Bonn: (iii) the transition away from fossil fuels; and (iv) institutional arrangements, involving the possible creation of a network or mechanism to coordinate efforts in just transition. Among these, institutional arrangements were the most strategic and proactive agenda for civil society: the Climate Action Network (CAN) articulated a strong campaign in favor of the creation of the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), advocating a global “umbrella” that would connect initiatives, support, and knowledge about just transition at different scales.

The negotiations in Belém were marked by significant tensions surrounding these four elements, especially at the interface with financing, international trade, and the fossil fuel agenda. As talks progressed on the "joint effort"—the broader, cross-cutting decision aimed at organizing the overall outcomes of COP 30—discussions on the responsibilities of developed countries regarding climate finance (Article 9.1), unilateral trade measures, and language on transitioning away from fossil fuels were transferred to the joint effort decision, removing them from the specific just transition decision. This move, while not eliminating the controversy surrounding the content, opened up room for maneuver, allowing the JTWP to focus on designing a robust institutional arrangement capable of supporting the issue in the medium term.

The decision adopted at CMA.7 consolidates this commitment by recognizing the intrinsic connection between efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C and the construction of just transition pathways; reaffirming core policy principles – such as equity, CBDR-RC, human rights and the participation of workers, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, women and vulnerable groups – and highlighting the need for adequate, predictable means of implementation that do not exacerbate the indebtedness of developing countries. Operationally, the decision: (i) systematizes key messages from the JTWP dialogues on decent work, social protection, energy transition, education and vocational training; (ii) requests the Secretariat to map relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the UNFCCC and within the UN system; and (iii) invites established bodies to integrate just transition elements into their work plans and reports.

The most innovative aspect is the creation of a just transition mechanism, aimed at strengthening international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity building, and knowledge sharing to support equitable and inclusive just transitions, in conjunction with other existing mechanisms and programs. The decision mandates the Subsidiary Bodies, at SB 64 (June 2026, in Bonn), to draft a decision on the operationalization process of this mechanism to be considered at CMA.8, within the same negotiation package that will assess the renewal of the JTWP as a whole. In keeping with the spirit of collaborative effort, the decision invites Parties and observers to submit, by March 15, 2026, their views on the design of the mechanism and on the review of the effectiveness and continuity of the program. This arrangement concludes COP 30 with a clear political signal: although structural issues regarding financing, trade, and fossil fuels have shifted to the decision-making body, the just transition has gained its own institutional space, with a medium-term horizon and a technical and political path capable of giving substance to the program.

Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement ( Global Stocktake - GST)

At COP 30, there were three agenda items for discussion regarding the GST. The first aimed to analyze the GST presented in 2023 through the “United Arab Emirates Dialogue,” focused on exploring how the results of GST-1 could guide the preparation of the next NDCs (looking “backwards”). An informal note had been prepared at SB 62 to serve as a basis for discussions at COP 30, and there was an expectation that the Parties would move forward in clearly defining the scope, mandate, and operational modalities of the dialogue, to decide how the diagnoses and recommendations of GST-1 could contribute to the elaboration of GST-2 in advancing the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The second agenda item concerned the next GST to be presented in 2028, discussing its logistical and procedural elements (looking “forward”). The expectation was that, considering lessons learned from the first cycle, including the relationship with IPCC reports, data sources, and the integration of mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage dimensions, CMA 7 would define the guidelines for GST-2. Finally, the third agenda item, more procedural, concerned the approval of reports on the dialogues held in 2024 and 2025, as per paragraph 187 of Decision 1/CMA.5.

Regarding the UAE Dialogue, negotiations were marked by strong disagreements about its scope and timeframe. Blocs such as AILAC, AOSIS, LDCs, EIG, the EU, and countries like Norway, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan argued that the dialogue should have a broad approach, covering all the results of GST-1, identifying gaps, and accelerating implementation opportunities, positioning the Dialogue as a crucial link (“a bridge”) between GST-1 and GST-2. Thus, they argued that GST-1 should serve as an instrument for calibrating the next cycle of NDCs. In contrast, the LMDC and the Arab Group advocated a more restricted scope, arguing that the Dialogue and GST-1 would only have an informational character and could not be prescriptive in terms of policies to be adopted by the Parties. In this regard, they emphasized the need to focus on the means of implementation, especially financing, and to avoid duplicating the GST mandate and the risk of it becoming a new space for negotiations and analysis of "collective progress," which led some countries to say that the Dialogue would become a "mini GST."

Regarding the Dialogue's timeline, countries such as India and China, and the LMDC bloc, expressed strong concern about an "ad infinitum process," which would become a parallel negotiation process to GST-2, proposing its early termination to avoid overlapping work. On the other hand, EIG, the United Kingdom, and AOSIS supported the continuation of the Dialogue until 2028.

Regarding the procedural and logistical elements of GST-2, there were disagreements on three main points. Firstly, there was discussion about the "best available science" as a source for GST-2, with the LMDC and India questioning the consideration of the IPCC as the primary scientific source, arguing for the need to include other sources of knowledge, especially from developing countries. Blocs such as AILAC, LDC and the EU strongly affirmed that the IPCC should be recognized as the primary and central source of "best available science," but showed flexibility in terms of language to acknowledge other possible sources of knowledge.

Another point of intense discussion was the definition of deadlines for the next phases of the GST, with proposed timetables for technical dialogues between 2026 and 2027, but with concerns about overlap between the technical and political phases, as well as with the UAE Dialogue. Finally, the issue of Loss and Damage was also discussed, with blocs such as LDC and AILAC and countries such as Indonesia, Maldives and Grenada arguing that the topic should be considered as an autonomous thematic area in GST-2.

In this context, with regard to the UAE Dialogue, a decision was adopted that explicitly states that it will be facilitative and not prescriptive, for the sharing of opportunities, challenges, barriers, and needs in the implementation of the GST results. Furthermore, it was decided that the Dialogue will take place at the first meeting of the State Bureaux in Bonn in 2026 and 2027, and will then be concluded; additionally, a high-level ministerial roundtable will be organized at CMA 9. For each dialogue, a factual and non-prescriptive report will be prepared, which will serve as input for GST-2.

For GST-2, a flexible language was adopted for the sources of scientific information, referring to paragraphs 35-37 of Decision 19/CMA.1 , which indicates the sources of information for the GST, including the latest IPCC reports, recognizing the critical importance of the IPCC, but encouraging the scientific community to provide contributions from the best available science, as well as comprehensive and representative inputs from developing countries and reports from regional groups and institutions. Regarding the issue of loss and damage, the decision only encourages the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue to strengthen consideration of efforts to prevent, minimize, and address loss and damage.

Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation, Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP)

The mandate of the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation, Ambition and Implementation (MWP) Work Programme is defined in Decision 4/CMA.4, which establishes its non-prescriptive, non-punitive and sovereign nature, reaffirming that no new targets or obligations can be created. For COP 30 in Belém, it would be indicated that the Parties should move forward on three fronts: deciding the future of the programme after 2026; understanding the results of the Global Dialogues; and debating the Brazilian proposal for a digital mitigation platform, including its governance, integration with the NMA platform of Art. 6.8 and its possible function of bringing projects and funders closer together.

The negotiations were marked by polarization between developed countries, which advocated for greater operationalization, integration into the GST, and recognition of the dialogues on forests and waste, and developing countries, especially the Arab Group, LMDC, and part of the AGN, which insisted on the autonomy of the mandate, resistance to automatic integration into the GST, and caution regarding new structures. The creation of a digital platform became the main point of conflict, dividing the Parties between those who wanted expanded functionalities, those who accepted discussions only after technical studies, and those who rejected any expansion due to the risk of overlap with Article 6.8 and overloading mechanisms such as the TEC and CTCN. Debates on the results of the 2025 dialogues also divided the Parties; developed countries and AILAC advocated for a detailed text on forests and waste, while LMDC, the Arab Group, and Russia preferred only to "note" the results. Regarding the continuation of the program, a majority favored initiating a process of consultations and synthesis immediately, although LMDC, India, and Russia insisted on strictly maintaining the original mandate and postponing all decisions until 2026. After lengthy informal consultations, a more concise, less prescriptive text was reached and accepted as the basis for the second week, presented in the package of texts prepared by the presidency.

The final text reinforces the voluntary, non-prescriptive, and sovereign nature of the MWP, maintaining strict alignment with the original mandate. In the results of the dialogues on forests and waste, consensus language was chosen, recognizing only the critical role of these sectors, the importance of indigenous peoples and recognition of their lands, sustainable management, co-benefits, and international cooperation, without prescriptive details. Regarding the digital platform, the result was moderate; Parties are encouraged to register projects on the NMA Platform, and the secretariat should prepare a technical study on possible new functionalities, to be considered by the SBSTA in 2026, without the immediate creation of new structures. Regarding continuity, it was decided to solicit submissions from Parties and observers by April 15, 2026, on opportunities, challenges, and suggestions for the future of the MWP; these contributions will be analyzed at SB 64 in June 2026, and the final decision on the continuity or reformulation of the program will only be made at CMA 8 in 2026.

In the final plenary session, Colombia expressed its disagreement with the adopted text, arguing that it lacked ambition and advocating for the inclusion of the phrase "transitional away from fossil fuels" in the final wording. However, these observations were made only after the formal adoption of the text by the plenary. In response, the secretariat clarified that, at that stage of the process, the document had already been approved and could not be reopened for amendments. Thus, despite the concerns expressed by both countries, the text was officially adopted.

Article 6 and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

Article 6.2 – The ITMO Market

Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement establishes the framework for voluntary cooperation between countries through the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). At COP 30, the Parties made progress on key elements to strengthen the integrity and operationalization of this market, focusing primarily on lessons learned from the technical review processes of information submitted by participants in the instrument and on the need for greater predictability for the registration and monitoring infrastructure.

The second Ambition Dialogue brought together Parties and observers, highlighting recurring challenges to domestic implementation and pathways to increase collective ambition. Positions were diverse: the AGN advocated for the creation of guiding principles for engagement under Article 6.2; Australia announced that, at this time, it does not intend to use ITMOs, prioritizing domestic decarbonization; and the European Union, aligned with its updated NDC, will consider the use of ITMOs only from 2035 onwards, with strong scrutiny of potential partners. AOSIS highlighted the role of voluntary cancellation of ITMOs in strengthening the Overall Global Emissions Mitigation (OGM), while several constituent groups – ENGO, TUNGO, YOUNGO and IPO – criticized the use of ITMOs for offsetting, to the detriment of increasing the ambition of host countries. Among the developments presented, the following stand out: the issuance of 1,009 tCO₂eq of ITMOs under the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) agreement between Japan and Thailand, and the new Japan-India partnership.

As a result of the negotiations, the decision on Article 6.2 requested its Technical Review Group to explain more clearly the inconsistencies identified in the information provided and to present recommendations for correcting them. It also requires the Secretariat to organize interactive informal dialogues during COP 31 to facilitate the identification of recurring patterns and structural needs in reporting. The objective is to improve transparency, strengthen the technical capacity of the Parties, and support the development of more consistent reporting documents, including contributions to the adaptation and voluntary cancellation of ITMOs. The Parties also expressed concern about the slow implementation of the registration and monitoring infrastructure and asked the Secretariat to accelerate this process.

The financial agenda also gained prominence. Faced with an $8 million deficit and an estimated cost of $14 million to operationalize Article 6.2 until 2027, the Parties requested that the SBI, at its 64th Session (June 2026), recommend a long-term resource allocation plan for infrastructure, experts, and capacity building. Discussions connected to the future of the International Transaction Log (ITL), the electronic system for recording transactions under the CDM, which is to be deactivated with the termination of the Mechanism. After debates on how to redistribute the remaining ITL resources—including proposals for redirection to adaptation and response measures—it was decided that the available $2 million will be allocated until 2027, with $1.5 million earmarked for activities supporting Article 6 (including registration infrastructure) and $0.5 million for supplementary activities associated with environmental and social impacts not directly covered by Article 6.

Article 6.4 – The PACM

Article 6.4 establishes the Paris Agreement Credit Mechanism (PACM), whose operation is carried out by the Supervisory Body (SBM). At COP 30, the CMA's mandate focused on reviewing the work carried out by the SBM and its Methodology Expert Panel (MEP), in light of the annual report submitted to the Conference. The negotiations were marked by extensive debates on the need to expand the institutional capacity of the Body, especially given the scarcity of experts in the market, which led to discussion about a possible extension of the members' mandates and the suspension of the rule on the minimum interval between consecutive mandates. To avoid reopening decisions without a specific mandate, the Parties agreed to resume the topic only in 2028, when there will be formal authorization to revisit these rules.

The Parties and observers expressed significant concerns regarding the process of developing rules, standards, and methodologies by the SBM and the MEP. Criticisms focused on the limited rationale behind the decisions and the short timeframe offered for stakeholder contributions. In response, the COP 30 decision reinforced the need for high standards of transparency, without compromising the swift operationalization of the mechanism. The Secretariat was tasked with expanding and disseminating engagement opportunities, ensuring the participation of a greater diversity of actors—especially Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities—and facilitating more inclusive consultations.

A central point of expectation was the possible revision of the rules adopted in 2025, especially regarding the mitigation of the risk of non-permanence in forestry projects. Despite the pressure, the COP preserved the decision-making autonomy of the SBM and reaffirmed that future rules should ensure the high environmental integrity of the mechanism and be based on the best available science. The deadline for host countries to submit approval for the transition of CDM activities to the PACM was also extended until June 30, 2026, considering the still pending volume of applications.

The financing of the PACM was one of the most sensitive issues and was directly connected to the closure of the CDM operations. With the complete shutdown of the Mechanism scheduled between June and December 2026 — including the issuance of CERs, transfers to Article 6.4, cancellations, methodological reviews, and accreditation of DOEs — it became possible to reallocate its remaining resources. After intense negotiations, it was decided to transfer US$26.8 million from the CDM trust fund to the Article 6.4 fund, ensuring the operational sustainability of the PACM. Of this total, up to US$5 million will be allocated to capacity-building initiatives. Furthermore, it was established that, once the PACM becomes self-financing, it must make annual contributions to the Adaptation Fund until it reaches US$56.8 million, with transfers beginning by 2035.

Article 6.8 – Non-Market Approaches (NMAs) Instrument

Meetings related to the agenda item of Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, which deals with non-market approaches (NMAs), were conducted as part of an event mandated and organized by SBSTA, in the context of the 8th meeting of the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches and negotiations to define the work program on NMAs for the coming year, along with guidance for improving the platform. In the first week, a workshop was held to exchange information on NMAs. Parties such as Japan, Malaysia, Uganda, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) , as well as non-parties such as CGIAR, LACLIMA, NDC Partnership, and the Bolivian Platform on Climate Change (PBFCC) , shared views, lessons learned, challenges, and proposals related to the implementation and improvement of NMAs. On the SBSTA agenda, the secretariat updated the Platform's information, highlighting the registration of a new NMA submitted by Chile and Canada, focused on recycling organic waste to reduce methane, and reporting that there are currently 105 national focal points and 31 registered support providers.

Still in the first week, a consultation was held to define the theme of the spin-off group, focused on developing input for the text to be submitted to the CMA. The discussions, guided by AILAC, AOSIS, the Coalition of Tropical Forest Countries, and LMDC, addressed ways to encourage new NMAs, initiatives related to the ocean ecosystem, and the possibility of "single NMAs," understood as approaches implemented by a single Party, without the need for bilateral cooperation. Among the actions taken to the second week were guidelines on the use of the Platform and the discussion forum—including the recommendation of new filters and encouragement of engagement, especially in the "opportunities for collaboration" tab. The structure for the 2026 work program also remained under negotiation, including the organization of the calendar, the topics for the next workshops, and the expected input for the program review, among them the analysis of adjustments to the Platform to allow each country to submit information individually through its focal points, increasing the visibility of its needs for financial, technological, and capacity-building support.

In the second week, negotiations within the CMA focused on defining the agenda for the work program. One of the most controversial points was the LMDC's proposal to include references to the impact of unilateral climate-related trade restrictions, a topic that did not reach consensus and was rejected by groups such as AILAC, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. The final text removed this reference and stipulated that Parties and observers should submit, by March 31, suggestions for topics to be discussed at the 9th and 10th meetings of the Glasgow Committee. Finally, progress was made in preparing the review of the work program, which should assess the effectiveness of activities, the participation of focal points, and the contribution of NMAs to achieving the NDCs, contingent on budgetary availability for 2026.

Synergies between the Rio Conventions

Discussions on synergies between the three Rio Conventions—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)—advanced at COP 30 within the framework of the agenda for cooperation among international organizations. Although the topic is already more mature in the CBD, where there is a specific decision on integration and coordination, the expectation of this COP was to formalize its incorporation into the UNFCCC process as well. The initiative had broad support from various Parties and strong engagement from stakeholders, who have seen the agenda as strategic for strengthening integrated approaches to climate, biodiversity, and desertification. Countries such as Brazil and Colombia played a particularly active role in advocating for the advancement of the agenda.

Despite majority support, some Parties—especially Saudi Arabia—expressed resistance, proposing to postpone the discussion to SB 64 in Bonn. Faced with the risk of paralysis, the COP 30 presidency conducted intensive informal consultations to keep the issue alive and seek a minimum path to convergence. These efforts resulted in consensus around draft conclusions presented by the COP President, ensuring that the agenda remained open and evolving.

The agreed text recalls that the SBSTA, at its 62nd Session, had already recognized the need to expand cooperation with other international organizations and decided to continue considering the topic at SBSTA 63. The conclusions also express appreciation for the submissions made by Parties and observers before and during the COP, and acknowledge that, although the Rio Conventions have their own mandates, governance structures and principles, cooperation between them is important and should be strengthened whenever appropriate.

The final conclusion requests that the UNFCCC Secretariat intensify its engagement in the Joint Liaison Group —a joint group of the UNFCCC, CBD, and UNCCD secretariats—within its institutional mandate, and invites Parties and observers to submit, by May 1, 2026, new contributions on how to enhance cooperation with international organizations and among the secretariats of the Rio Conventions. SBSTA 64 will revisit the topic based on these submissions, keeping the process active and consolidating.

Transparency

Reports from Parties not included in Annex I of the Convention: Timeframe, composition, terms of reference and report of the Advisory Group of Experts

The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) is the main mechanism for providing technical support to developing countries in fulfilling their transparency obligations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Its mandate was extended until 2026 by decision 11/CP.24, and its terms of reference were revised in Glasgow by decision 14/CP.26. For COP 30, a comprehensive decision was expected on the CGE's mandate, composition, and terms of reference, including the possibility of making it a permanent group, revising the regional distribution of seats, and updating its functions to reflect the transition from the previous reporting system to the new transparency regime of the Paris Agreement. Negotiations on the CGE revolved around funding, composition, and mandate, which directly shaped the final outcome. The unprecedented absence of the CGE's annual report, caused by a lack of resources, dominated the initial interventions of the G77+China, the Arab Group, AGN, and AOSIS, generating pressure to institutionalize the group and prevent budgetary constraints from continuing to block its work. In parallel, the debate on composition emerged, as developing countries insisted on preserving regional balance and safeguards for LDCs and SIDS within the group. The discussion on the role of the CGE in supporting BTRs served to reinforce its centrality in the ETF, influencing the updating of the terms of reference and ongoing work elements. The final result was politically significant, as the CGE now has a permanent mandate, eliminating recurring uncertainty about its continuity and strengthening predictability for developing countries that depend on its technical support. The new composition sets the group at 27 members, including 2 from Annex I countries, 6 from non-Annex I countries, 1 additional non-Annex I country from Eastern Europe, 3 representatives from each regional group (Africa, Asia-Pacific, GRULAC and WEOG), plus 1 representative from LDCs, 1 from SIDS, 1 from Eastern Europe and 3 from international organizations. Regarding future revisions, it was established that the next one will take place at SBI 78, preparing material for COP 38—a regular eight-year cycle. Concerning financing, the provision for “adequate resources” has disappeared, leaving only language subject to budgetary availability, which frustrates demands from developing countries. CMA 7 will also decide to “take note” of the COP decision and confirm that the CGE will also serve the Paris Agreement, consolidating its dual function within the ETF.

Item 4(b) – Provision of financial and technical support

Item 4(b) is directly linked to Article 4.1(b) of the Convention, which stipulates that all Parties must formulate, implement and update national (and where appropriate regional) mitigation and adaptation programs, taking into account common but differentiated responsibilities and their national circumstances. For non-Annex I countries to fulfill these obligations, financial and technical support is considered a fundamental pillar. For COP 30, it was expected to consolidate progress on facilitated access to GEF financing, strengthen technical support for reporting activities, and maintain simplified mechanisms that reduce the administrative burden on developing countries.

Negotiations on item 4(b) were, among all the transparency texts, the ones that progressed most rapidly towards consensus, reaching the second week with virtually no political disagreements. The base text, drafted in Bonn as an informal note, served as a stable starting point, and most paragraphs were approved immediately. The few sensitive issues arose around the paragraph encouraging the joint submission of NCs and BTRs, with AILAC, India and the Arab Group initially requesting its removal, while the United Kingdom and Australia advocated for its retention. The remaining debates on paragraphs 8 and 15 were also resolved thanks to final concessions between Saudi Arabia and Australia. With this, the text emerged from the informal consultations completely clean.

The final text emphasizes the importance of maintaining and expanding the financial and technical support offered through bilateral, multilateral, and other mechanisms, recognizing that such support is essential for non-Annex I countries to meet the mitigation and adaptation requirements set out in the Convention and the transparency system. The decision explicitly values the GEF's efforts to simplify its processes and to allow the joint submission of National Communications and BTRs, reducing the institutional burden on developing countries. The SBI also strongly encourages those countries that have already received funding but have not yet submitted their BURs to do so as quickly as possible, reinforcing the principle of efficient use of resources. Furthermore, it celebrates the more than 30% increase in GEF resources allocated to capacity building and transparency in the most recent cycle and underlines the need to maintain these levels. Finally, it mandates that the GEF conduct periodic reviews of the support provided and that the UNFCCC secretariat strengthen its technical assistance, ensuring that countries can effectively fulfill their reporting and implementation obligations.

Provision of financing and technical support to developing countries for reporting and capacity building.

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes the enhanced transparency regime for action and support (ETF), with flexibility for developing countries, a non-intrusive character, and a focus on building mutual trust. It requires countries to submit emissions inventories, progress tracking information on NDCs, impact and adaptation data, and comprehensive information on support provided, received, and needed. The Article also mandates technical reviews (TERs), multilateral progress consultations, and ongoing capacity-building support. In the context of COP 30, SBI item 5 was expected to consolidate ETF implementation guidelines, define the 2026–2028 activity cycle, and reaffirm the commitment to adequate and predictable support for developing countries. It was also expected to update the submission status of BTRs and advance guidance on technical support provided by the secretariat and financial institutions.

Negotiations on this item were marked by strong political and linguistic tension, especially between the United Kingdom and the Arab Group, which disagreed on references to support, funding, and governance. As a consequence, there was not enough convergence to produce a draft decision during the first week. Australia proposed sending only an informal note, with the text still bracketed for later negotiation, while the African Group insisted that the document should reflect that there had been “substantial progress” and that the Parties were close to a draft text. With the disagreements persisting, the item was escalated to the high-level segment (“package”), where ministers sought political compromises to unlock the text. It was only on Thursday of the second week that a finalized text emerged, the result of political mediation and the removal of the most controversial elements, mainly those related to funding gaps and explicit criticism of the pace of support provided by developed countries.

The final decision is significantly more concise than previous versions. The text updates the ETF's operational data, including the number of BTRs submitted (“119 BTRs as of November 19, 2025”), ensuring accuracy without prescriptive language. Controversial elements from previous versions have been completely removed, especially paragraphs that acknowledged funding gaps in GEF-7, pointed to underutilization of resources in GEF-8, or explicitly requested that developed countries strengthen their provision of support. In their place, only a general formulation reaffirming the importance of adequate support was maintained, without assigning additional obligations.

The main technical advancement lies in the reformulation of the ETF's future activities. The three options originally proposed for the 2026–2028 cycles have been consolidated into a single, more objective and functional list, clearly defining an annual cycle comprised of: research/survey, preparation of the research report, calls for submissions, synthesis of submissions, holding workshops in a "world café" format, regional workshops, and production of summaries of these meetings. This consolidation reduces disputes and creates predictability for countries and the secretariat.

Financing

Article 2.1c in conjunction with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement

During the three years of the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1c, in conjunction with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, the Parties had the opportunity to exchange experiences, opportunities and challenges regarding what it truly means to “make financial flows compatible with a trajectory towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development” (Article 2.1c). The negotiations mandated for CMA7 should consider the work done and decide on the future of this agenda.

The Parties shared that the Dialogues were useful in building a common understanding of the scope of Article 2.1c, but that further work was still needed. Developed countries such as the EU, New Zealand, the UK, Australia and Canada emphasized the importance of basing future work on the report presented by the Co-facilitators, while the G77 + China, the LDCs, the Arab Group and the African Group raised the point that future work should first consider certain safeguards. An entire session was dedicated to this issue, with the Parties stating the importance of having a facilitative rather than prescriptive approach, based on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, with Article 2.1c as complementary to Article 9 (and not as a replacement), as well as including the prevention of greenwashing and maladaptation, ensuring the meaningful participation of affected communities, addressing barriers to access to financing and recognizing the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS.

Regarding the future of the agenda, the options raised by the Parties included: non-prescriptive exchanges on domestic policies, with high-level guidance and global coordination, and linkage to the GST cycle, High-Level Dialogues, and the Climate Finance Flows Platform. The final text describes that discussions will now take place within the framework of the Veredas Dialogue, which will convene the Xingu Finance Talks, annual high-level roundtables to facilitate cooperative exchange between Parties and non-Party actors in the implementation of Art. 2.1c in complementarity with Art. 9. Notably, the Parties also agreed on important language regarding safeguards, providing greater confidence and security for future commitments; and there was recognition of the convening power of the UNFCCC, an initial step to connect climate finance negotiations in the Convention with other external actors.

Article 9.5

The negotiations focused primarily on updating the content of the Biennial Communications (BCs) on climate finance required by Article 9.5. Some parties, including the EU, EIG, the UK, Canada, and Australia, maintained that the content of the BCs should not be updated. However, considering the NCQG and the new climate finance architecture, AOSIS, AILAC, and especially other developing countries raised the need to update it to include quantitative and qualitative information. The Parties were very divided during the two weeks, but the final text was concluded with an updated annex that incorporates important information, including new and additional reports and public financing, as well as greater transparency of the priorities and methodologies used by developed countries.

Adaptation Fund

Financing for Adaptation was one of the most contentious issues at COP30. Negotiations on the Adaptation Fund at COP30 focused on the transition to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement, governance issues—especially the composition of the Fund's Board (AFB) and terminology—and the fifth review of the Fund. The terminology of the AFB is a key issue because the Adaptation Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol, where Parties are divided into Annex I and non-Annex I countries, and to transition to the Paris Agreement, this must be updated to the terminology adopted in 2015, which divides Parties into developed and developing countries. Despite general consensus on the need for a smooth transition allowing the Fund to receive revenue from Article 6.4, deep political differences over governance prevented the adoption of conclusions by the Subsidiary Bodies, leading the SBI Chair to forward a preliminary text to the CMA and the CMP. Throughout the second week, many developing countries (AGN, LDC, AILAC, Arab Group) advocated for advancing the technical work of the transition, leaving the political elements to higher authorities, while developed countries (EU, UK, Australia) insisted that these points should be resolved within the same package.

The lack of resource mobilization also marked the discussions. The Fund failed to meet its annual mobilization target of US$300 million in 2023 and 2024; and 2025 is heading towards a similar scenario. Although the high-level segment announced new contributions totaling approximately US$127.9 million, the amount was still far below expectations and exacerbated concerns about the Fund's financial sustainability. Overall, negotiations progressed on the technical transition, but remained inconclusive on governance and financing issues, which will now proceed to SB 64 in 2026, especially regarding the terminology on the composition of the Board.

Technology

The technology mandate under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement guides support for the development and transfer of climate technologies to developing countries. It is operationalized by the Technology Mechanism, composed of the TEC (analytical and guidance function) and the CTCN (technical assistance and implementation). In 2025, this mandate assumed central importance, as after the first Global Stocktake there was a strong expectation of transforming technology into a real pillar of implementation. COP30, therefore, became a decisive moment to update functions, create new programs, and adjust the institutional capacity of the Technology Mechanism.

In this context, the COP30 technology agenda had four items to be decided: (1) the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) , designed to structure an operational implementation mechanism; (2) the Review of the Functions of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) , which would redefine its role for the next decade; (3) the connections between technology and financial mechanisms , aimed at improving the connection between TEC/CTCN and the GCF/GEF; and (4) the Joint TEC–CTCN Report , which annually compiles recommendations and strategic coordination between the two bodies. Among these items, the highest expectations for completion were concentrated on the TIP and the review of the CTCN, considered essential to address the implementation needs identified after the Global Stocktake. The "connections" item, however, carried low expectations due to historical divergences regarding financial guidelines.

During the negotiations, the issue of financing, while not resulting in a decision of its own, permeated all agendas, including the TIP and the CTCN. Groups such as G77+China, LMDC, LDC, and AILAC insisted that any new program, function, or institutional review needed to reflect the real capacity of the bodies to support developing countries in seeking and accessing financing, an essential condition for technology development and transfer to occur in practice. In the CTCN review, this debate was particularly prominent; several countries pressed for the text to abandon language restricted to "facilitation" and incorporate explicit mandates for direct implementation support, including technical assistance for preparing fundable proposals and mechanisms for connecting with funders. The progress of linkages and the joint report was hampered precisely by the lack of consensus on adequate financing for the Technology Mechanism. Thus, it became clear by the end of the second week that only the TIP and the CTCN had the political maturity to be adopted.

COP30 approved substantive decisions on these two pillars. The Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) was established with the objectives of supporting technological priorities of developing countries, strengthening national innovation systems, improving enabling environments, supporting NDEs, and expanding the preparation of fundable projects (FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.18). The TIP begins its implementation immediately and foresees global dialogues under the SBI from 2027 and will be reviewed in 2034.

The CTCN review introduced structural innovations (FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.4), with an explicit mandate for direct support for the deployment, dissemination, and demonstration of technologies; strengthening national innovation systems and endogenous technologies; expanding technical support to NDEs; institutionalizing international networks and partnerships; introducing monitoring and evaluation; and, above all, strengthening the CTCN's role as a bridge between projects and funding, with clear matchmaking functions (Annex I, d(vi)) and support for the preparation of fundable proposals (Annex I, a(vi)). The decision also extends its mandate until 2041 and initiates the selection process for the new host, to be decided by SBI 64 in 2026.

On the other hand, the agendas for "connections" and the TEC-CTCN Joint Report were not completed and will be resumed at SBI/SBSTA 64 in June 2026.

Impact of implementing Response Measures

For COP 30, it was expected that the forum on the impacts of implementing response measures would decide on the group's priority activities, based on the 2026-2030 work plan adopted at COP 29. In addition, the forum was expected to discuss the continuation of annual global dialogues and the impacts of unilateral trade measures, as well as receive the annual report of the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI), which determined the timetable and modalities for the activities of the 2026-2030 work plan.

In adopting the COP 30 agenda, the Presidency decided that the issue of unilateral trade measures would be addressed in specific consultations, effectively removing it from the response measures forum. Thus, discussions focused primarily on procedural aspects of the response measures forum and the KCI. Regarding the report presented by the KCI, some Parties, such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Canada, questioned the modalities and deadlines established by the body, questioning the availability of financial resources for this purpose. Blocs such as the G77 and China, AGN, and LDCs considered this questioning inappropriate, since the activities and the Work Plan had already been adopted in Baku (Decision 16/CP.29), and this would mean reopening a consensus decision. The priority activities of the 2026-2030 work plan were the subject of side discussions, in which developing countries, such as the G77 + China, AGN and Honduras, argued that the forum's priority was to address the negative impacts of response measures, while developed countries, such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Canada, felt that the activities were unbalanced and that the positive impacts (co-benefits) should be discussed.

Faced with these impasses, several informal meetings were held between the Parties, but they failed to reach a consensus on the text of the decision. Parties such as the AGN, the G77, and China and Honduras said they could agree to flexible language, as long as it was within the forum's mandate, without revising the already adopted work plan. Thus, the co-chairs forwarded a report of the discussions to the COP Presidency, which was responsible for drafting a new text and reaching a consensus on it through closed-door meetings.

In this context, the Presidency proposed, and the COP adopted, a decision that welcomes the annual report prepared by the KCI, including its modalities and deadlines. Regarding the priority activities for the 2026-2030 work plan, it was decided that, always at the second annual meeting of the forum (held at the COPs), the activities to be carried out in the following year will be decided, so that the 17 activities are covered holistically over the five years of work. Finally, it was decided that annual two-day dialogues, in a hybrid format, will be held concurrently with the KCI inter-session meeting from 2026 to 2029, at which time the SBs will consider whether or not to continue holding the dialogues.

Gender and Climate

The gender track at COP30 operated under the mandate to adopt a new Gender Action Plan (GAP) within the framework of the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG), renewed for ten years at COP29. The Parties arrived in Belém with a consolidated technical draft from SB62 and further developed in workshops held in Addis Ababa and Brasília, which presented the preliminary structure of the plan and pointed out gaps from the previous cycle. The expectation was that COP30 would resolve these outstanding issues and adopt the new plan that will guide gender and climate policies until 2034.

Negotiations began slowly due to delays in adopting the agenda, which postponed the first formal sessions. During this period, blocs, notably the G77+China, coordinated internally to align positions. In the initial informal consultations, the Parties presented priorities, with a special focus on terminology and Activity D, aimed at implementation and means of implementation—a central theme for developing countries, which advocated for the inclusion of clear references to gender-sensitive financing. Simultaneously, there was apprehension about attempts to restrict the term "gender" through footnotes, which could affect the coherence of the decision. After the adoption of the agenda, sessions began to try to reduce the text and clarify compromise options; however, disagreements persisted between developed and developing countries, and much of the text remained in brackets, i.e., without consensus. Therefore, the document was forwarded to the ministerial level in the second week. The political facilitators appointed by the Presidency, ministers from Chile and Sweden, conducted brief consultations with blocs and Parties, identifying areas of flexibility and limits to negotiation. Based on these consultations, the Presidency drafted the final version submitted to the plenary, which was subsequently approved. In this regard, civil society organizations registered criticisms of the process, pointing to a lack of transparency in the final phase.

At the closing plenary session, the new Belém Gender Action Plan (2026–2034) was adopted. The document maintains the structure in five priority areas and incorporates substantial advances. Among the approved elements, the unprecedented inclusion, in the preamble, of the recognition of the contribution of women and girls of African descent stands out—the first reference of this type in a UNFCCC decision text. The plan also includes, for the first time, explicit references to violence against women and girls and to care work as structuring factors of climate vulnerability, providing for capacity-building actions, data production, and the integration of these themes into national policies. Additionally, it introduces language dedicated to the protection of environmental defenders—the first reference to this group in a UNFCCC decision text.

The new GAP, more detailed and operational than the previous one, provides clear guidelines to orient gender-sensitive climate policies in the period 2026–2034.

Losses and Damages

The Loss and Damage track for COP 30 consisted of 2 main items: (i) the Joint Annual Report (JAR) of the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Santiago Network and (ii) the WIM review; issues that lacked consensus at COP 29, but generated, respectively, a draft decision and an informal note at SB62.

The JAR 2024 was adopted at the opening plenary session of COP 30, as per the draft decision produced in Bonn, acknowledging the progress of the WIM ExCom in implementing the 2023–2027 work plan and the advances in structuring the Santiago Network and its interim secretariat, but without providing for new political commitments. Furthermore, at the end of the first week, the JAR 2025 was also approved. The new report reflects a model very similar to the JAR 2024, maintaining the same general approach to reporting the activities of the ExCom and the Santiago Network, without assuming additional responsibilities.

The WIM Review, on the other hand, proved politically challenging. After discussions began based on the informal note from SB62, negotiations quickly polarized around a few issues: the Loss and Damage Gap Report; the inclusion of the necessary funding scale; the cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network; the inclusion of references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion; human rights language; mention of the GST; and the preparation of voluntary loss and damage reports in NDCs and BTRs.

The Parties reached a consensus only on the last day, after many hours of discussions and considerable effort to reach a decision. Among the topics addressed in the final text, the following stand out: approval of the preparation of a periodic report on the loss and damage gap/state; strengthening the production of data and knowledge on climate impacts, including economic and non-economic losses; improving the accessibility of technical guidance focused on ensuring direct support to the most vulnerable communities, with the definition of a minimum percentage of assistance; the need for more effective institutional coordination between the WIM Executive Committee, the Santiago Network Council, and the Loss and Damage Response Fund; recognition and continuity of the ExCom's voluntary guidance in collaboration with the BTRs; mention of human rights in a footnote; and a strong focus of the Santiago Network on cost-effectiveness, demanding the application of the maximum possible resources to its ultimate goal of assisting developing countries. Furthermore, the decision emphasizes the recognition of the significant existing funding gaps in the face of the increasing incidence of loss and damage, a circumstance that, unfortunately, was not as strongly reinforced at this COP.

Finally, with regard to the governance of the WIM, due to the prolonged discussions on the revision of the mechanism and the lack of time, the Parties postponed, once again, the debate on the topic to the next COP, having agreed to adopt the decision taken in Belém by the CMA and the COP, without this conclusion affecting in any way future negotiations on the matter.