LACLIMA SUMMARY

Bonn Conference 2025

SB 62

In a "community effort" atmosphere, LACLIMA's summary of this SB62 is longer than usual, packed with information and history about the outcomes of some of the main negotiation topics in Bonn, as well as the relevant mandated events that took place, paving the way for COP 30.

As always, there was drama. But (almost everything) was concluded and some progress was made to Belém, with basic texts to finalize the negotiations in Brazil.

Adaptation

The adaptation agenda remains one of the central pillars of climate negotiations, and continues to mobilize the active engagement of a diversity of stakeholders, both inside and outside the negotiation rooms. Discussions on the main agenda item, the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), focused on three main fronts: 1) the work program on climate resilience indicators; 2) the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, established at COP 29; and 3) the incorporation of diverse approaches to adaptation. In parallel with the GGA, the Parties also discussed other relevant fronts of the adaptation agenda, including National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Adaptation Communications (AdComs), the review of the Adaptation Committee (AC), and the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP).

Global Goal on Adaptation

The negotiations on the GGA are the most prominent theme on the adaptation agenda, advancing with great negotiating effort and under intense pressure. At the beginning of the Conference, a hybrid workshop was held within the scope of the UAE-Belém Work Programme aimed at discussing the current list of almost 500 climate resilience indicators. The workshop highlighted the poor coordination of the process, the fragility in the definition of mandates, and the growing frustration among Parties and experts. Despite the relative turmoil on the first day, the broad recognition of the need to refine the list by COP 30 was brought to the negotiation room, where the Parties began to define the continuity of the experts' mandate, with the objective of offering more robust guidance and clearer criteria to reduce and refine the list of indicators. Deep disagreements persisted throughout all sessions on the indicators for measuring means of implementation and on cross-cutting considerations.

The conclusion approved at the end of SB62 requests that the experts reduce the list to a set of at most 100 globally applicable indicators, including indicators related to means of implementation and enabling factors, as well as cross-cutting considerations such as social inclusion, youth, gender, and human rights. The Parties also decided to incorporate criteria and methodological guidance for the next stage, including the removal of irrelevant indicators (for example, related to mitigation), the improvement of non-specific indicators, and the inclusion of qualitative narratives, when relevant. It was also defined that the sub-indicators should capture the diverse contexts of adaptation actions, allowing the Parties to choose those most appropriate to their national circumstances. Furthermore, indicators for means of implementation should be included that allow for the measurement of access, quality, and financing for adaptation, including its provision, in line with the Paris Agreement. It was also recognized that the limitation of available data should not restrict the development of new indicators, as long as it is accompanied by support for capacity-building in developing countries.

It was established that the experts should meet again, before the workshop scheduled to take place between SB62 and SB63, in a hybrid meeting, to review the coherence of the metadata, carry out quality control, and verify the adequacy of the indicators with the defined guidelines, as well as to present a final version of the technical report by August 2025. From this, the Secretariat will prepare two consecutive synthesis reports (one on the technical meeting and another on the preparatory workshop).

Considerations on transformational adaptation (and other approaches to adaptation) and on the future of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap ended up taking a backseat. Although they were the subject of attention by the Parties in some negotiation sessions, the sections of the text reflecting these views were included only as an informal note in the provisional conclusions of the SB on the GGA, which should serve as a basis for discussions in Belém in November.

Nairobi Work Programme

The Nairobi Work Programme managed to reach a consensus among the parties in the first week of SB62. After a heated start to the negotiations, the Parties reached a balanced compromise and approved provisional conclusions. The text recognizes the progress made in implementing the NWP's activities between May 2024 and March 2025 and reiterates the central role of the NWP in strengthening adaptive action and resilience to climate impacts, including transboundary ones and those resulting from compound risks. It also reinforces the importance of integrating incremental, urgent, transformational, and nationally context-driven approaches into the NWP's activities, and requests the Secretariat to strengthen collaboration with various knowledge holders, including indigenous peoples, local communities, the private sector, and scientific institutions, as well as the use of emerging and innovative technologies, among other points. This negotiation item represents a rare point of convergence within the adaptation agenda at SB62, highlighting the NWP as a constructive space with the potential to strengthen the technical basis of the UNFCCC's adaptation regime.

Adaptation Communications

The discussions started from the exchange of experiences on the preparation of Adaptation Communications, with a focus on defining the next steps. The negotiations advanced in a relatively positive manner, with widespread recognition that the evolving characteristics of adaptation in the context of the Paris Agreement require adjustments to the formats and content of AdComs. There was broad convergence on the need to preserve their flexible and voluntary nature, especially to avoid imposing new burdens on developing countries. Still, the multiplicity of vehicles currently used has generated fragmentation, and coherence should be sought in the information communicated by the Parties in the reporting instruments. Despite the convergences, the Parties concluded that more time would be needed for reflection on the topic, and decided to continue considerations on this matter in June 2026, during SB 64.

National Adaptation Plans

Informal consultations on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) focused mainly on procedural issues, without reaching an agreement on concrete next steps — in line with a dynamic that has been dragging on from previous conferences, in which procedural issues take center stage in the face of deep disagreements between the Parties regarding the content of the texts, especially with regard to the language on means of implementation and financing. The negotiations were closed with the forwarding of provisional conclusions with a base text to be used in the negotiations at COP 30, indicated in the footnotes.

Adaptation Committee

The review process on the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee (AC) has stalled, reflecting significant divergences on the definition of governance. The G77 and China group presented proposals seeking conciliation to finalize the process, but it was not possible to reach a consensus on the role of the COP and the CMA over the AC. The parties agreed to postpone this decision to SB70. The slowness of these secondary agendas highlights a certain mismatch between the growing political recognition of the importance of adaptation and the effective capacity of the regime to advance with technical and operational decisions that support this momentum.

Global Balance

Discussions on the implementation of the Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes within the UAE Dialogue advanced slowly, marked by strong political divisions regarding the scope, expected outcomes, and mandate of the process. Negotiations began under the impact of the deadlock that occurred at COP 29 in Baku, led by EIG and AILAC. With the resumption of negotiations at this SB 62, the G77+China group, with support from AOSIS and the LMDCs, advocated for discussions to be based on the last text from COP 29, but Saudi Arabia rejected any attempt to address monitoring of the GST implementation, insisting that the focus of the dialogues should be on securing means of implementation, especially financing. The LMDC also rejected the inclusion, in the text, of references to the GST paragraphs on energy transition and the phase-out of fossil fuels — the maintenance of which was defended by Australia and AOSIS.

On the second to last day of the conference, the facilitators presented two drafts — one in the morning, another in the afternoon. The most recent version, from 06/25, reorganized and expanded the options under negotiation, without consolidating consensus. The text presented multiple alternatives on the nature, scope, and duration of the dialogue, reflecting divergent positions. Among the changes was the expansion of the thematic scope from four to seven options and the detailing of information sources and more operational language for the expected products. The controversies remained in brackets, signaling progress in structuring but not in resolving the impasses.

Australia, Japan, the European Union, and others supported forwarding the afternoon version to Belém, while LMDCs and the Arab Group preferred the previous version. India, supported by Egypt, Morocco, Australia, and the Maldives, proposed forwarding both versions in a single document. The facilitators took the proposal to the SBI chair, presenting four paths: the morning draft, the afternoon draft, a combination of both, or no text.

In the plenary, the continuation of discussions at COP 30 was approved based on an “informal note,” which was prepared with the objective of organizing the proposals and divergent positions of the Parties on how to operationalize the UAE Dialogue. The two text versions presented the previous day, both with different wording options, were considered in the note. The first days in Belém should define which of these versions will be considered as the basis for the start of the negotiations.

Just Transition

The first two days of SB62 were taken up by negotiations involving the adoption of the agenda. This moment was important for the Just Transition Work Programme because, as a solution to the impasse created by the LMDCs' proposal to include two items on the agenda — one on the restriction of unilateral measures, and another on financing (Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement) — the chairs of the subsidiary bodies determined that these topics should be discussed within the negotiation item on just transition. This decision led to the negotiation room being dominated by interventions from the parties on unilateral measures, diverting the focus of the discussion to this topic. During the first week, the co-facilitators of the Work Programme — a representative from Italy and another from Singapore — addressed seven topics identified as relevant based on previous dialogues. They then presented an informal note. The second week began with the first discussion of this note. Right at the beginning, three problems arose: the first concerned the language used on energy transition and renewable energies; the second, the space dedicated to unilateral measures; and the third, the options for “institutional arrangements” — that is, the creation of a body to address the global dimension of the just transition, supporting countries in their implementations.

In the last two days of negotiation, an impasse consolidated: the LMDCs and other groups expressed dissatisfaction that the space reserved for the discussion on unilateral measures did not contain an express mention of the term. It was then requested that an option with this language be included. Furthermore, the LMDCs, the Arab Group, and Russia indicated that they would not move forward until the language on the “transition away from fossil fuels,” contained in paragraph 11g of the text, was revised. On the other hand, countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia argued that there would not be enough time to include all the parties' views in a way that would fully reflect them in the informal note. Therefore, any alteration to the text would necessarily be unbalanced. Thus, they stated that the text should be forwarded to Belém in its entirety or not at all.

Faced with the impasse, two informal negotiation sessions (the “hallway” ones!) were necessary for the United Kingdom and other countries to accept the inclusion of options related to priority topics for the LMDCs and their allies. In return, the LMDCs also had to show flexibility, accepting options with wording that was acceptable to both sides.

In the end, a decision was adopted that forwards the informal note to COP 30 in Belém as a basis for discussions. The forwarded text is not consensual and contains several points of dissonance between the parties, reflecting two of the most difficult debates of the Paris Agreement: the transition away from fossil fuels and the unilateral measures adopted by developed countries that particularly impact developing and least developed countries. Topics that are expected to generate new clashes in Belém include: mentions of NDCs, the 1.5°C target, and international cooperation — which covers discussions on means of implementation. It has been a long road since COP29 in Baku, where we left without a decision and, consequently, without a text. The informal note now represents an important basis for the start of discussions in Belém.

Mitigation

Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) in Bonn were marked by intense debates on the scope of the mandate, the concept of a 'safe space', and the proposal to create a new digital platform to facilitate implementation. Countries like Egypt, China, the LMDCs, and the Arab Group argued that the MWP should remain strictly within the mandate established by decision 4/CMA.4 — that is, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, based on national sovereignty, and without imposing targets. On the other hand, AOSIS, the European Union, and Australia emphasized the need for the MWP to contribute to increasing ambition and implementing key messages from the dialogues, including references to the GST outcomes and the synthesis reports of the NDCs. The Brazilian proposal for a digital platform to connect projects with funders generated controversy: while some countries valued its potential for innovation and implementation, others warned of risks of duplication of efforts, lack of clarity about its objectives, and possible undue overlap with the MWP's mandate. AOSIS and Colombia stressed that the platform should not divert focus from the central mitigation messages nor be used as a justification for delaying decisions. Although the discussion about the platform partly served as an escape valve for countries little interested in concrete progress in the MWP to consume time with a new item, the Brazilian proposal also represented a break in the vicious dynamic that had been blocking progress in the program for years. By introducing a new element into the debate, the initiative forced reactions, drew attention to implementation, and reopened negotiation paths that had been stalled. Despite the technical clarifications provided by Brazil — on modular scope, low costs, and its complementary nature to existing platforms — the debate revealed divergences regarding the proposal's feasibility within the MWP's timeframe, whose continuation will be discussed in 2026. The discussion on the elements of a decision to be adopted in Belém also advanced timidly, with divergent proposals on the inclusion of next steps — including whether or not to consider the platform within the scope of negotiations — on the continuation of the MWP, and on the expected outcomes. Given the lack of consensus, the facilitators committed to preparing an informal note reflecting only the structure discussed — without substantive elements — as a preliminary record of the conversations. In the last session, the parties met to resolve points of divergence and the parts of the text that remained in brackets. After more than an hour in which the negotiators met informally, standing in a corner of the room, they reached an agreement on the text from which negotiations would begin in Belém. However, at the last moment before the session closed, Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, requested that the wording of the conclusion introducing the informal note include the provision for an information session before COP 30, to address and deepen discussions on the platform. This point had not been agreed upon among the Parties, and this prevented the text of the informal note from being approved during that session. The decision was then left for the final plenary. The document adopted in the plenary did not reflect Saudi Arabia's request, with the text that had been agreed upon in the last negotiation session being approved by the Parties at the end. The text consists merely of a list of subheadings that should form the decision to be adopted in Belém: I. Preamble; II. Acknowledgment to the co-facilitators, host countries, and the Secretariat; III. Improvements to the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) (global dialogues and investment-focused events) [, including considerations on the digital platform]; IV. Outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, taking into account the annual report; V. [Views on the continuation of the work programme]; VI. Submissions as mandated by decision 4/CMA.4, decision 4/CMA.5, and decision 2/CMA.6. The divergences manifested in the text are the bracketed parts: whether the digital platform will be considered in the discussions on MWP improvements and whether there will be a chapter in the decision dedicated to addressing the continuation of the work programme.

Article 6

Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) in Bonn were marked by intense debates on the scope of the mandate, the concept of a 'safe space', and the proposal to create a new digital platform to facilitate implementation. Countries like Egypt, China, the LMDCs, and the Arab Group argued that the MWP should remain strictly within the mandate established by decision 4/CMA.4 — that is, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, based on national sovereignty, and without imposing targets. On the other hand, AOSIS, the European Union, and Australia emphasized the need for the MWP to contribute to increasing ambition and implementing key messages from the dialogues, including references to the GST outcomes and the synthesis reports of the NDCs. The Brazilian proposal for a digital platform to connect projects with funders generated controversy: while some countries valued its potential for innovation and implementation, others warned of risks of duplication of efforts, lack of clarity about its objectives, and possible undue overlap with the MWP's mandate. AOSIS and Colombia stressed that the platform should not divert focus from the central mitigation messages nor be used as a justification for delaying decisions. Although the discussion about the platform partly served as an escape valve for countries little interested in concrete progress in the MWP to consume time with a new item, the Brazilian proposal also represented a break in the vicious dynamic that had been blocking progress in the program for years. By introducing a new element into the debate, the initiative forced reactions, drew attention to implementation, and reopened negotiation paths that had been stalled. Despite the technical clarifications provided by Brazil — on modular scope, low costs, and its complementary nature to existing platforms — the debate revealed divergences regarding the proposal's feasibility within the MWP's timeframe, whose continuation will be discussed in 2026. The discussion on the elements of a decision to be adopted in Belém also advanced timidly, with divergent proposals on the inclusion of next steps — including whether or not to consider the platform within the scope of negotiations — on the continuation of the MWP, and on the expected outcomes. Given the lack of consensus, the facilitators committed to preparing an informal note reflecting only the structure discussed — without substantive elements — as a preliminary record of the conversations. In the last session, the parties met to resolve points of divergence and the parts of the text that remained in brackets. After more than an hour in which the negotiators met informally, standing in a corner of the room, they reached an agreement on the text from which negotiations would begin in Belém. However, at the last moment before the session closed, Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, requested that the wording of the conclusion introducing the informal note include the provision for an information session before COP 30, to address and deepen discussions on the platform. This point had not been agreed upon among the Parties, and this prevented the text of the informal note from being approved during that session. The decision was then left for the final plenary. The document adopted in the plenary did not reflect Saudi Arabia's request, with the text that had been agreed upon in the last negotiation session being approved by the Parties at the end. The text consists merely of a list of subheadings that should form the decision to be adopted in Belém: I. Preamble; II. Acknowledgment to the co-facilitators, host countries, and the Secretariat; III. Improvements to the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) (global dialogues and investment-focused events) [, including considerations on the digital platform]; IV. Outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, taking into account the annual report; V. [Views on the continuation of the work programme]; VI. Submissions as mandated by decision 4/CMA.4, decision 4/CMA.5, and decision 2/CMA.6. The divergences manifested in the text are the bracketed parts: whether the digital platform will be considered in the discussions on MWP improvements and whether there will be a chapter in the decision dedicated to addressing the continuation of the work programme.

Article 6.2 – Ambition and Cooperation Dialogue At COP 29, the UNFCCC Secretariat was mandated to promote ambition dialogues during all sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies, with the objective of stimulating the exchange of information between Parties and observers on how cooperative approaches can support increased climate ambition. The first Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue was then held, initiating the full implementation phase of the instrument. The event was divided into two parts – "Ambition" and "Cooperation" – with roundtables guided by key questions. In the first part, presentations from Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, the European Union, and CfRN on the contribution of Article 6.2 to increasing the ambition of NDCs stood out; from ICAO and Sweden on the use of ITMOs for other international mitigation purposes (OIMP), such as CORSIA; and from Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Kenya, who addressed private sector engagement and the potential of Article 6.2 to finance voluntary climate commitments. In the second part, the focus was on cooperation. The first session dealt with benefit sharing and justice in cooperative approaches, with speeches from the PACM's SBM, the European Union, Zambia, Carbon Market Watch, and the Grassroots Justice Network. The second addressed capacity building, with contributions from the Secretariat, GGGI, A6IP, Germany, and Chile. Finally, the third dealt with multilateral cooperation, with interventions from the AGN, EBRD, ADB, and IETA. Among the main points discussed, the need for caution from ITMO-selling countries regarding their carbon budget, avoiding "overselling," was highlighted, as well as the urgency of joint capacity-building efforts to expand market participation. Buying countries also warned about the risk that the absence of a domestic legal framework and delays in issuing corresponding adjustments could stall the formalization of agreements. Technical sessions led by the Secretariat addressed the data review process, reporting requirements, and the functioning of the International Registry. Article 6.4 – Capacity Building on the Crediting Mechanism (PACM) After the adoption at COP 29 of the basic operational rules for the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), provided for in Article 6.4, the focus then shifted to the development of the complementary guidelines necessary for the full functioning of the mechanism — such as additionality rules, baseline definition, and methodology approval — led by the Mechanism's Supervisory Body (SBM), with support from its expert panels. In this context, a capacity-building day was held in Bonn focused on the operation of and participation in the PACM, bringing together a diversity of stakeholders, including government representatives from Parties interested in hosting activities, experts from the UNFCCC Secretariat, the private sector, and project developers. The training covered the main outcomes of COP 29 and the benefits of the PACM in the context of Article 6.2 approaches, as well as technical and procedural aspects. The transition process from the CDM to the PACM was discussed; the mechanism's information system; the forms for participation of Parties and other entities; the status of the designation of Designated National Authorities (DNAs) and the requirements for the participation of host Parties; the functioning of the registry system; the authorization procedures for entities and activities; and the functionalities of the official PACM website. Article 6.8 – Non-Market Approaches and the NMA Platform During the negotiations in Bonn, the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), provided for in Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, held a workshop with Parties and observers to discuss the use of the NMA Platform — a digital tool intended to give visibility to climate mitigation and adaptation projects. Structured in a world café and roundtable format, the event highlighted relevant obstacles, such as the limitation of project registration to national authorities and only when already established in partnership, which restricts dissemination. Also pointed out were low usability, lack of mobile responsiveness, and the scarcity of records — by the end of the conference, only two projects (Uganda and Japan) were on the platform. In the thematic groups (spin-off groups), experiences in renewable energy and green infrastructure, ways to identify NMAs, and suggestions on how to allow registration by just one Party were discussed. In the formal negotiation meeting, the LMDC group proposed to present a comprehensive text, with measures such as the inclusion of projects not yet implemented, the creation of a financing channel via the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the holding of side events at COP 30, including a session on the Amazon Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation with Integrated and Sustainable Forest Management, and a forum on financing NMAs in 2027. The proposal, however, faced resistance from countries like Switzerland and CfRN, especially regarding the inclusion of forest activities linked to Article 5 as NMAs. The Secretariat presented cost estimates to support decisions on events and technical improvements to the Platform. After more than six hours of negotiation, a new generic text was presented, providing for the improvement of the Platform's functionalities, but without addressing the controversial points. Bolivia expressed its opposition to the text, while other Parties expressed frustration at the disregard for the efforts applied in the negotiations. Without consensus, it was decided only to forward the status of the discussions to the SBSTA Chair, without a closed text.

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) in Bonn were marked by intense debates on the scope of the mandate, the concept of a 'safe space', and the proposal to create a new digital platform to facilitate implementation. Countries like Egypt, China, the LMDCs, and the Arab Group argued that the MWP should remain strictly within the mandate established by decision 4/CMA.4 — that is, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, based on national sovereignty, and without imposing targets. On the other hand, AOSIS, the European Union, and Australia emphasized the need for the MWP to contribute to increasing ambition and implementing key messages from the dialogues, including references to the GST outcomes and the synthesis reports of the NDCs. The Brazilian proposal for a digital platform to connect projects with funders generated controversy: while some countries valued its potential for innovation and implementation, others warned of risks of duplication of efforts, lack of clarity about its objectives, and possible undue overlap with the MWP's mandate. AOSIS and Colombia stressed that the platform should not divert focus from the central mitigation messages nor be used as a justification for delaying decisions. Although the discussion about the platform partly served as an escape valve for countries little interested in concrete progress in the MWP to consume time with a new item, the Brazilian proposal also represented a break in the vicious dynamic that had been blocking progress in the program for years. By introducing a new element into the debate, the initiative forced reactions, drew attention to implementation, and reopened negotiation paths that had been stalled. Despite the technical clarifications provided by Brazil — on modular scope, low costs, and its complementary nature to existing platforms — the debate revealed divergences regarding the proposal's feasibility within the MWP's timeframe, whose continuation will be discussed in 2026. The discussion on the elements of a decision to be adopted in Belém also advanced timidly, with divergent proposals on the inclusion of next steps — including whether or not to consider the platform within the scope of negotiations — on the continuation of the MWP, and on the expected outcomes. Given the lack of consensus, the facilitators committed to preparing an informal note reflecting only the structure discussed — without substantive elements — as a preliminary record of the conversations. In the last session, the parties met to resolve points of divergence and the parts of the text that remained in brackets. After more than an hour in which the negotiators met informally, standing in a corner of the room, they reached an agreement on the text from which negotiations would begin in Belém. However, at the last moment before the session closed, Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, requested that the wording of the conclusion introducing the informal note include the provision for an information session before COP 30, to address and deepen discussions on the platform. This point had not been agreed upon among the Parties, and this prevented the text of the informal note from being approved during that session. The decision was then left for the final plenary. The document adopted in the plenary did not reflect Saudi Arabia's request, with the text that had been agreed upon in the last negotiation session being approved by the Parties at the end. The text consists merely of a list of subheadings that should form the decision to be adopted in Belém: I. Preamble; II. Acknowledgment to the co-facilitators, host countries, and the Secretariat; III. Improvements to the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) (global dialogues and investment-focused events) [, including considerations on the digital platform]; IV. Outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, taking into account the annual report; V. [Views on the continuation of the work programme]; VI. Submissions as mandated by decision 4/CMA.4, decision 4/CMA.5, and decision 2/CMA.6. The divergences manifested in the text are the bracketed parts: whether the digital platform will be considered in the discussions on MWP improvements and whether there will be a chapter in the decision dedicated to addressing the continuation of the work programme.

Article 6.2 – Ambition and Cooperation Dialogue At COP 29, the UNFCCC Secretariat was mandated to promote ambition dialogues during all sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies, with the objective of stimulating the exchange of information between Parties and observers on how cooperative approaches can support increased climate ambition. The first Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue was then held, initiating the full implementation phase of the instrument. The event was divided into two parts – "Ambition" and "Cooperation" – with roundtables guided by key questions. In the first part, presentations from Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, the European Union, and CfRN on the contribution of Article 6.2 to increasing the ambition of NDCs stood out; from ICAO and Sweden on the use of ITMOs for other international mitigation purposes (OIMP), such as CORSIA; and from Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Kenya, who addressed private sector engagement and the potential of Article 6.2 to finance voluntary climate commitments. In the second part, the focus was on cooperation. The first session dealt with benefit sharing and justice in cooperative approaches, with speeches from the PACM's SBM, the European Union, Zambia, Carbon Market Watch, and the Grassroots Justice Network. The second addressed capacity building, with contributions from the Secretariat, GGGI, A6IP, Germany, and Chile. Finally, the third dealt with multilateral cooperation, with interventions from the AGN, EBRD, ADB, and IETA. Among the main points discussed, the need for caution from ITMO-selling countries regarding their carbon budget, avoiding "overselling," was highlighted, as well as the urgency of joint capacity-building efforts to expand market participation. Buying countries also warned about the risk that the absence of a domestic legal framework and delays in issuing corresponding adjustments could stall the formalization of agreements. Technical sessions led by the Secretariat addressed the data review process, reporting requirements, and the functioning of the International Registry. Article 6.4 – Capacity Building on the Crediting Mechanism (PACM) After the adoption at COP 29 of the basic operational rules for the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), provided for in Article 6.4, the focus then shifted to the development of the complementary guidelines necessary for the full functioning of the mechanism — such as additionality rules, baseline definition, and methodology approval — led by the Mechanism's Supervisory Body (SBM), with support from its expert panels. In this context, a capacity-building day was held in Bonn focused on the operation of and participation in the PACM, bringing together a diversity of stakeholders, including government representatives from Parties interested in hosting activities, experts from the UNFCCC Secretariat, the private sector, and project developers. The training covered the main outcomes of COP 29 and the benefits of the PACM in the context of Article 6.2 approaches, as well as technical and procedural aspects. The transition process from the CDM to the PACM was discussed; the mechanism's information system; the forms for participation of Parties and other entities; the status of the designation of Designated National Authorities (DNAs) and the requirements for the participation of host Parties; the functioning of the registry system; the authorization procedures for entities and activities; and the functionalities of the official PACM website. Article 6.8 – Non-Market Approaches and the NMA Platform During the negotiations in Bonn, the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches (GCNMA), provided for in Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, held a workshop with Parties and observers to discuss the use of the NMA Platform — a digital tool intended to give visibility to climate mitigation and adaptation projects. Structured in a world café and roundtable format, the event highlighted relevant obstacles, such as the limitation of project registration to national authorities and only when already established in partnership, which restricts dissemination. Also pointed out were low usability, lack of mobile responsiveness, and the scarcity of records — by the end of the conference, only two projects (Uganda and Japan) were on the platform. In the thematic groups (spin-off groups), experiences in renewable energy and green infrastructure, ways to identify NMAs, and suggestions on how to allow registration by just one Party were discussed. In the formal negotiation meeting, the LMDC group proposed to present a comprehensive text, with measures such as the inclusion of projects not yet implemented, the creation of a financing channel via the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the holding of side events at COP 30, including a session on the Amazon Joint Mechanism for Mitigation and Adaptation with Integrated and Sustainable Forest Management, and a forum on financing NMAs in 2027. The proposal, however, faced resistance from countries like Switzerland and CfRN, especially regarding the inclusion of forest activities linked to Article 5 as NMAs. The Secretariat presented cost estimates to support decisions on events and technical improvements to the Platform. After more than six hours of negotiation, a new generic text was presented, providing for the improvement of the Platform's functionalities, but without addressing the controversial points. Bolivia expressed its opposition to the text, while other Parties expressed frustration at the disregard for the efforts applied in the negotiations. Without consensus, it was decided only to forward the status of the discussions to the SBSTA Chair, without a closed text.

The agenda related to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol focused on its discontinuation process, in view of the creation of the PACM and its future absorption by it. During SB 62, the Parties discussed the deadlines for the closure of CDM activities, including the issuance of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), approval and revision of methodologies, accreditation of designated operational entities, interaction with stakeholders, closure of the Executive Board's activities, and deactivation of the mechanism's registry. The final draft decision maintained options for closure dates, ranging from 2025 to 2028, to be defined at COP 30. There was divergence among countries: the LMDC group advocated for extending the deadlines until the PACM is fully operational, while other Parties, such as AOSIS, warned of the excessive costs of a prolonged extension. As a way forward, the Secretariat was requested to present, at COP 30, an update on the resources available in the CDM trust fund and an assessment of the costs and resources associated with the proposed dates, to support the Parties' decision. Another point of debate was the fate of the remaining resources from this fund. Some Parties proposed keeping the resources linked to the maintenance of the CDM until its complete deactivation. Others suggested redirecting them, wholly or partially, to the Adaptation Fund, to capacity-building activities on Article 6 for developing countries, to market infrastructure, or to actions to enhance transparency under the Paris Agreement. In the end, the Parties agreed to resume discussions at CMP 20, during COP 30, based on the draft decision agreed upon in Bonn.

Financing

The topic of financing was not on the formal negotiation agenda, but it was discussed in other meetings mandated by previous decisions. Baku to Belém Roadmap for USD 1.3 trillion The Roadmap - to be produced by the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies - is not a formal negotiation item, but consultations were held during SB62 to hear the views of Parties and stakeholders on the draft initially prepared by the Presidencies. During the consultation with non-state actors, Brazil's Ministry of Finance - which supports the COP30 Presidency with inputs for the Roadmap - presented the main priorities for the report of the Circle of Finance Ministers: reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs); expansion of concessional financing and climate funds; creation of national platforms and increased national capacity to attract sustainable investments; development of innovative financial instruments for private capital mobilization; and strengthening of regulatory frameworks for climate finance. There were calls for financing for adaptation as a priority and the use of innovative financial instruments, such as mechanisms based on the polluter-pays principle. Developing countries highlighted barriers related to the quality of climate finance, including bureaucratic issues that hinder direct access, increased indebtedness, and also pointed to the complementary role of Multilateral Banks and International Financial Institutions, which does not replace the responsibility of developed countries to provide public finance. On the developed countries' side, feedback focused on the importance of the Roadmap considering a wide variety of resource sources, especially ways to mobilize more private finance. Regarding the process, there is frustration with the lack of clarity on the next steps and on how the contributions made during the consultations will be reflected in the Roadmap. It is still unclear how it will be incorporated or recognized in the formal negotiations of COP30, and what its effectiveness will be in relation to actors beyond the UNFCCC structure. Sharm el Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1.c in complementarity with Article 9 The mandate of this Dialogue is for the parties to exchange views and improve their understanding of the scope of Article 2.1c, which concerns making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, and its complementarity with Article 9, which addresses the responsibility of developed countries to provide financing to developing countries. The first workshop of 2025 featured presentations by experts on three pre-selected topics - adaptation, just transition, and how Article 2.1.c can support the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) - followed by discussions in smaller groups among Parties and stakeholders. However, there was not enough time to deepen the discussions, and some Parties were unable to intervene on the last day. The next workshop will take place before COP 30, a crucial moment to debate what viable decision can be made in Belém to recognize the work done, to continue (or not) the dialogue, and what is the most effective format to ensure not only the continuation of the discussions but also an implementation process. Workshop on Article 9.5 The third biennial workshop on Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement brought together Parties and observers to discuss experiences in preparing biennial climate finance communications, their usefulness for developing countries, and ways to improve them, especially to inform the Global Stocktake. Challenges such as the low predictability of financial commitments due to political and budgetary obstacles in developed countries, technical difficulties in data consolidation, and the need for a clear definition of climate finance were highlighted. Other Parties also advocated for common standards and more quantitative data on the balance between mitigation and adaptation. Improvements in coordination with the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), the separation of voluntary communications, and the importance of aligning reports with the needs of developing countries were also addressed. Finally, it was emphasized that the next COP will feature a High-Level Ministerial Dialogue aimed at updating the guidelines for these communications, focusing on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, direct access to finance, and the comparability between the ex-ante and ex-post reports of Articles 9.5 and 9.7.

Gênero

Durante a SB 62, as Partes deram início à construção do novo Plano de Ação de Gênero (GAP), que deverá ser negociado e adotado na COP30. Essa foi a primeira rodada de negociações sob o novo mandato do Programa de Trabalho de Lima sobre Gênero (LWPG), prorrogado por mais dez anos na COP29. O processo começou com um workshop técnico de três dias, que reuniu as partes e representantes da sociedade civil para revisar as atividades do plano atual, identificar lacunas e propor novas ações. A metodologia adotada foi participativa e colaborativa, tomando como referência central para o novo plano o Plano de Ação de Gênero anterior.

Com base nos insumos técnicos resultantes do workshop, o Secretariado elaborou um primeiro rascunho do novo plano, que passou a ser discutido nas consultas informais entre os países. Ao longo das três sessões realizadas, as Partes revisaram as 31 atividades propostas, optando por deixar para a COP as discussões sobre entregas esperadas, entidades responsáveis e cronograma. O ambiente das negociações foi marcado majoritariamente pela cooperação, com esforço conjunto das Partes para avançar, apesar das divergências.

O principal ponto de impasse foi a inclusão de linguagem sobre fi nanciamento. Países do G77+China, Grupo Africano e AOSIS defenderam a necessidade de reconhecer a importância do apoio fi nanceiro para a implementação do plano, inclusive com referência ao fi nanciamento direto a organizações de base lideradas por mulheres. Países desenvolvidos, por outro lado, argumentaram que o mandato atual não permite a criação de novos compromissos fi nanceiros, sugerindo que o foco permaneça na implementação e na capacitação institucional. A Noruega propôs uma posição intermediária, aceitando a inclusão de referências à conscientização e ao fortalecimento de capacidades em finanças com perspectiva de gênero, desde que sem compromissos explícitos. Outro tema muito presente foi a menção ao reconhecimento de grupos específi cos, como pessoas afrodescendentes, mulheres agricultoras, povos indígenas e comunidades locais.

As negociações foram concluídas em oito dias, com a realização da última consulta informal. Após a segunda versão enviada pelo secretariado, o texto não sofreu novas alterações e foi mantido como base para a negociação fi nal durante a COP30. No entanto, as Partes acordaram a realização de um novo workshop técnico antes da conferência, com o objetivo de consolidar as atividades, discutir as entregas e reduzir o número de notas informais atualmente presentes no texto. O Grupo Africano propôs que esse encontro seja sediado na Etiópia, durante a Semana Africana do Clima, em setembro. O saldo da SB 62 é um documento preliminar extenso, fortemente ancorado no plano anterior, que incorpora uma diversidade de propostas apresentadas, e que agora deverá ser politicamente amadurecido em Belém.

Transparência

As discussões sobre transparência na SB 62 foram intensas e refl etem tanto desafi os técnicos quanto tensões políticas. Um dos principais pontos da agenda foi o item sobre provisão de apoio financeiro e técnico aos países em desenvolvimento. Ao longo da semana, G77+China, AILAC, LMDCs e países africanos relataram os entraves enfrentados no acesso ao fi nanciamento do GEF, apontando lentidão, burocracia e prejuízo à continuidade institucional dos processos de relato. Já o Reino Unido e outros países desenvolvidos insistiram que a UNFCCC não possui mandato para orientar diretamente o GEF, travando parte das negociações. Na segunda semana, com o objetivo de ter algo mais estruturado para trabalhar em Belém na COP 30, o Brasil solicitou tempo adicional para negociação, e como resultado tivemos uma minuta com propostas como a simplifi cação de processos de financiamento, realização de workshops, e incentivos a diálogos entre países e o GEF. Mas o texto permanece repleto de colchetes, sinalizando divergências a serem superadas.

Outro ponto importante foi o debate sobre o Grupo de Especialistas Consultivos (CGE), considerado essencial para o apoio técnico e a capacitação dos países em desenvolvimento. Houve consenso entre as Partes quanto à importância do grupo, especialmente no contexto da implementação das novo arcabouço de transparência do Acordo de Paris (Enhanced Transparency Framework – “ETF”). No entanto, persistiram divergências em três pontos centrais do texto: o prazo de renovação do mandato, a composição dos membros e a revisão dos termos de referência. Os países em desenvolvimento, liderados por G77+China, defenderam um mandato permanente, com manutenção da composição atual e sem alterações substanciais nos termos de referência. Já os países desenvolvidos propuseram que o CGE tenha um mandato renovável (de três ou seis anos, com opções para 2029 ou 2032), além de uma nova composição com distribuição numérica de membros por região, incluindo assentos específicos para LDCs, SIDS e representantes de organizações internacionais. Frases como “transição para os BTRs” e “implementação plena do ETF” foram especialmente contestadas por G77+China, enquanto a UE defendeu sua inclusão. O texto segue com múltiplas opções entre colchetes e será retomado na COP 30.

Quanto à provisão de apoio financeiro e técnico nos termos do Artigo 13 do Acordo de Paris, as Partes buscaram organizar uma resposta mais estruturada às difi culdades enfrentadas na implementação do ETF. O G77+China propôs um plano de trabalho trienal, sínteses periódicas de aprendizados e mais canais de interlocução com o GEF. A oposição do Reino Unido e outros países desenvolvidos a qualquer menção de orientação ao GEF marcou os debates. O texto discutido previa orientações sobre ações de simplificação de processos de fi nanciamento, modelos padronizados de projeto e fortalecimento de capacidades institucionais. O conteúdo será retomado em Belém, com a expectativa de novos workshops e submissões sobre as experiências nacionais.

A agenda referente às informações contidas nas Comunicações Nacionais de Países não incluídos no Anexo I da Convenção teve encaminhamento limitado. As discussões não avançaram em torno da proposta de consolidar as informações em relatórios de síntese, proposta essa contestada por países como a África do Sul e o Grupo Africano, que alertaram para os riscos de comparações indevidas entre países com capacidades técnicas muito distintas. Diante da falta de consenso, foi decidido que o tema será incluído na agenda provisória da SB63, mas que será considerado mantido em suspenso (held in abeyance) até que haja condições mais favoráveis para seu tratamento.

Já o evento mandatado de Consideração Facilitadora e Multilateral de Progresso (FMCP) permitiu uma rica troca de experiências entre países como Guiana, Panamá e Andorra sobre seus processos de elaboração e revisão dos BTRs. Foram relatadas difi culdades técnicas, além de estratégias de superação, como uso de recursos próprios e recontratação de equipes envolvidas no primeiro ciclo de relato. O formato do FMCP foi considerado útil, e sugestões como envio prévio de perguntas técnicas foram propostas para facilitar futuras rodadas.

Medidas de resposta

Os impactos da implementação de medidas de resposta referem-se aos efeitos – tanto dentro como fora das jurisdições nacionais – resultantes de políticas e ações de mitigação adotadas pelas Partes no âmbito da Convenção, do Protocolo de Quioto e do Acordo de Paris. Nas negociações sobre o tema, além do Fórum sobre Medidas de Resposta, em 2018 foi instituído o Comitê de Especialistas de Katowice (KCI), responsável por apoiar tecnicamente o Fórum por meio de relatórios anuais.

Em Baku, na COP29, foi adotado um novo plano de trabalho do Fórum sobre Medidas de Resposta referente ao período 2026-2030, contemplando 17 atividades. Na ocasião também foi solicitado que o KCI determinasse, em seu relatório de 2025, um cronograma e modos de implementação das atividades ali previstas. Além disso, determinou-se que o Fórum incorporasse em seu plano de trabalho a consideração de “questões substanciais”, baseado no relatório anual do KCI.

Nesse contexto, logo no início das negociações, o G77/China, apoiado pelo Grupo Árabe, pelo Grupo Africano e pelos LMDCs, solicitou que fossem discutidas as atividades prioritárias para o KCI e o Fórum, considerando o plano de trabalho para 2026-2030. Houve grande controvérsia com relação a uma atividade listada no plano como análise de impactos de medidas de resposta, “inclusive de impactos transfronteiriços”. Com base nessa redação, o G77/China sugeriu que fosse determinada como atividade prioritária ao KCI e ao Fórum a discussão sobre medidas unilaterais de comércio, ou medidas protecionistas, ponderando que tais medidas ocasionam a retirada de fi nanciamento climático de países em desenvolvimento. Por outro lado, a União Europeia, Reino Unido, Austrália, Canadá e outros países desenvolvidos argumentaram que não havia motivo para apressar essas discussões, considerando que o relatório do KCI de 2025 só será publicado no segundo semestre e que, na visão deles, o Fórum não tinha mandato para discutir medidas unilaterais.

Outro tema discutido foi a realização de diálogos globais anuais sobre o tema dos impactos das medidas de resposta. Alguns países, como o Japão, demonstraram preocupação sobre os recursos fi nanceiros envolvidos. Para os países em desenvolvimento, tais diálogos representam oportunidades de trazer para discussão novos impactos das medidas de respostas, inclusive decorrentes das medidas unilaterais.

No último dia da SB62, as Partes concordaram em aceitar a consolidação de um resumo informal das discussões, que não representa acordo formal adotado, mas que servirá de base para as negociações em Belém.

Tecnologia

As negociações sobre tecnologia climática concentraram-se em três frentes principais: a defi nição da estrutura e escopo do novo Programa de Implementação de Tecnologia (Technology Implementation Programme, “TIP”), a revisão das funções e do futuro do Centro e Rede de Tecnologia do Clima (Climate Technology Centre and Network, “CTCN”), e os vínculos institucionais entre o Mecanismo de Tecnologia e o Mecanismo Financeiro da Convenção, que inclui fundos como o GCF e o GEF.

Vínculos entre o Mecanismo de Tecnologia e o Mecanismo Financeiro da UNFCCC

As discussões sobre as conexões entre o Mecanismo de Tecnologia e o Mecanismo Financeiro da UNFCCC giraram em torno de três eixos principais: o escopo da colaboração institucional e o papel do Secretariado; o tipo e frequência dos relatórios sobre apoio financeiro à transferência de tecnologia; e a permanência ou não do item específi co de conexões na agenda da UNFCCC. O G77 + China tem sustentado que esse tema é estratégico para garantir acesso a recursos nos processos de reposição do GCF e GEF, e demonstrou abertura para ajustar a linguagem, desde que a discussão seja tratada pelos negociadores de fi nanciamento.

Países desenvolvidos, como Reino Unido, Noruega e Canadá, propuseram diluir o item, transferindo a discussão para relatórios conjuntos do TEC (Comitê Executivo de Tecnologia do Mecanismo de Tecnologia) e CTCN, o que reduziria sua força política. Também houve controvérsias sobre a proposta do G77 de incluir relatórios técnicos regulares detalhando como os pedidos de assistência técnica se convertem (ou não) em projetos fi nanciados. Por fim, o futuro do item na agenda permanece em disputa. O rascunho de texto traz uma opção que propõe encerrá-lo como ponto autônomo, e outras que defendem sua manutenção, com revisões periódicas vinculadas aos ciclos de reposição dos fundos. As Partes decidiram continuar as considerações da agenda na SBI 63 com base no texto disponível, para decisão na COP30.

Revisão das Funções e do Futuro do CTCN

As Partes também discutiram a renovação do mandato do CTCN. Apesar do reconhecimento geral de sua importância, permanece indefi nida a duração da renovação, bem como a necessidade de revisar o processo de seleção da entidade anfi triã. O G77 tem pressionado por um mandato mais amplo e orientado à implementação, com maior presença regional. Países desenvolvidos, por sua vez, preferem preservar o foco técnico do centro, evitando expansão institucional sem avaliação de desempenho clara.

Outro ponto em debate na revisão do escopo funcional do CTCN, liderada por países em desenvolvimento, é que o centro atue mais diretamente na formulação de propostas de fi nanciamento e no apoio à implementação tecnológica. Alguns países desenvolvidos, no entanto, demonstram preocupação com uma possível sobreposição de funções com o GCF, o GEF e até mesmo o TEC. Também está em jogo o papel do CTCN em relação ao novo TIP: se ele será o principal executor do programa, ou apenas um parceiro técnico, ainda é questão em aberto.

Programa de Implementação de Tecnologia

Criado pela decisão da COP 28, o TIP visa apoiar a implementação de prioridades tecnológicas defi nidas pelos países em desenvolvimento. Ele busca ir além da fase de planejamento para se tornar um instrumento operacional de entrega tecnológica. Para que o TIP possa entrar em vigor, é necessário defi nir sua governança, escopo funcional, fontes de fi nanciamento e articulação institucional — todos pontos ainda em debate.

As Partes demonstraram visões divergentes sobre o nível de ambição do programa. O G77, especialmente os PMA e pequenos Estados insulares, defende uma estrutura robusta, com metas concretas, foco em inovação endógena e justiça climática. Países desenvolvidos mostraram cautela quanto a compromissos vinculantes, especialmente no que se refere a financiamento, barreiras comerciais e propriedade intelectual. Também há discordância sobre os critérios para defi nição das tecnologias incluídas no programa: o Reino Unido, por exemplo, quer ancorá-las nos resultados do GST, com ênfase na transição energética, enquanto países como Brasil, China, AILAC e o Grupo Africano defendem que as prioridades devem ser orientadas pelas necessidades nacionais.

Outro debate central é o tipo de relação que o TIP terá com os mecanismos financeiros. As opções variam entre um modelo baseado em parcerias fl exíveis com bancos de desenvolvimento e atores privados, e outro focado no fortalecimento de capacidades endógenas, com atuação mais direta do TEC e do CTCN. Também está em discussão a estrutura do programa e como ele será operacionalizado. O G77 e China propõem um modelo amplo, com diálogos técnicos globais anuais sob coordenação da SBI/SBSTA ou do TEC, participação multissetorial e forte integração com programas existentes da UNFCCC. Essa proposta inclui ainda diálogos regionais e relatórios sistemáticos.

Por outro lado, países como União Europeia, Noruega e Reino Unido mostraram preferência por modelos mais contidos e episódicos, com dois diálogos técnicos focados em temas específi cos, ou formatos mistos que combinem encontros técnicos com eventos de alto nível. Essas opções priorizam visibilidade política e contribuições pontuais ao Balanço Global, mas com menor grau de institucionalização. Assim, as opções variam entre modelos de governança multissetorial permanentes (como os preferidos pelo G77) e alternativas mais restritas, centradas em ciclos específi cos de implementação. As Partes decidiram continuar as considerações da agenda na SBI 63 com base no texto disponível, para decisão na COP 30.

Oceanos

Embora não constitua um item das negociações formais da SB62, o tema dos oceanos teve grande destaque na SB62 por meio de eventos mandatados, dada as sinergias robustas entre a mudança do clima e a proteção dos oceanos.

Na COP 26, havia sido adotado o “Pacto Climático de Glasgow”, decisão que determinava ao SBSTA a organização de diálogos anuais para fortalecer ações baseadas nos oceanos. Assim, na SB 62, foram realizados dois dias dos “Diálogos sobre Oceanos e Mudanças Climáticas”, em que diferentes stakeholders puderam fazer apresentações sobre ações que têm os oceanos como centro, demonstrando suas relações com os tópicos discutidos nas negociações climáticas internacionais. Além disso, no segundo dia dos diálogos, foi realizado um workshop, em que os presentes foram divididos em pequenos grupos para discutir ações e a atuação dos diálogos no sistema da UNFCCC.

As discussões sobre oceanos foram baseadas em três principais temas: (i) a adoção de medidas baseadas nos oceanos nas NDCs; (ii) a inclusão de indicadores baseados nos oceanos no GGA; e (iii) as sinergias entre oceanos, clima e biodiversidade.

Em relação ao primeiro tema, as discussões foram trazidas da Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Oceanos (UNOC-3), que aconteceu em Nice (França), uma semana antes da SB62. Lá, o Brasil e a França, lançaram conjuntamente o “Desafio da NDC Azul”, chamando as Partes para incluírem ações baseadas no oceano em suas NDCs. No primeiro dia dos diálogos na SB62, destaca-se a apresentação da Profa. Marinez Sherer, enviada especial da Presidência da COP30, que afi rmou que o oceano deve ser reconhecido como parte central do sistema global, devendo ser assim considerado nas NDCs com compromissos mensuráveis e rastreáveis.

No que diz respeito ao GGA, os diálogos lembraram que, para além do sequestro de carbono realizado pelos oceanos, há inúmeros co-benefícios na sua preservação, contribuindo para a resposta ou acomodação de diversos impactos causados pelas mudanças do clima, principalmente sobre as populações costeiras. A representante da plataforma Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS), por exemplo, mencionou que seria possível se valer de indicadores já existentes em convenções internacionais para análise da adaptação no contexto dos oceanos. Além disso, os diálogos discutiram a necessidade de inclusão dos oceanos nos Planos Nacionais de Adaptação (NAPs).

Já em relação às sinergias, as discussões focaram bastante na sinergia com a Convenção sobre a Diversidade Biológica (CDB), considerando a necessidade de restauração de ecossistemas marinhos. A Colômbia, por exemplo, apresentou a sua Estratégia Nacional e Plano de Ação de Biodiversidade (National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, “NBSAP”) com previsões específi cas de restauração da biodiversidade marinha, como metas de restauração de recifes coralíneos, de forma a integrar a ação climática, a conservação da biodiversidade e a resiliência costeira de forma coerente e inclusiva.

Arranjos para as reuniões intergovernamentais

Durante a SB 62, as discussões sobre os arranjos para reuniões intergovernamentais (AIM) concentraram-se nos preparativos para a COP30 no Brasil, debates sobre a escolha do país anfi trião da COP31, com Austrália e Turquia reiterando seu interesse, além de negociações sobre a efi ciência do processo da UNFCCC e engajamento de organizações observadoras. Embora não tenham chegado a um consenso sobre o anfi trião da COP31, questões importantes foram debatidas entre as Partes nas duas semanas de negociações. Sobre a efi ciência do processo, foi ponderado que as COPs estão se tornando eventos muito grandes e com elevados custos para os países anfi triões, e que deve ser considerado um limite para o credenciamento como “party overflow” – um tipo de credencial emitida pelas Partes para pessoas que não fazem parte do time negociador ou do governo. Outra questão foi como buscar maior equilíbrio geográfico entre organizações observadoras e a ordem de falas nas negociações, com algumas Partes defendendo, sem consenso, que observadores devem falar antes das Partes em temáticas que dizem respeito à sociedade civil. Houve também pedidos para que os acordos com países anfi triões de COPs fossem publicados no site da UNFCCC de maneira a aumentar a transparência e reduzir confl itos de interesse. No último dia de negociações, um debate sobre a aplicação das leis nacionais dos países anfi triões dentro do prédio-sede das negociações tomou conta da sala. As Partes não chegaram a um consenso sobre isso, já que a norma é que esses prédios sejam regidos pelas leis da ONU durante a conferência, e foi decidido que mais negociações sobre isso acontecerão no SB 63 – em Belém, no final do ano.

O texto com as conclusões finais adotadas pelas Partes pondera todas essas questões, com destaques para o pedido que o anfitrião da COP 31 seja decidido o mais rápido possível, considerações sobre o número de credenciados, e afirmando que o acordo com o país anfitrião será publicado assim que for assinado.

Orçamento da UNFCCC

A negociação sobre o orçamento central da UNFCCC para o biênio 2026-2027 se estendeu até os últimos minutos antes da plenária final. Houve reconhecimento generalizado dos desafi os fi nanceiros enfrentados pelo secretariado e as Partes discutiram diferentes cenários orçamentários, incluindo propostas que variavam de um aumento de 1,2% (75 milhões de euros) até 24% (92,2 milhões de euros), com relação ao último orçamento, ainda abaixo das necessidades reais estimadas pelo Secretariado da UNFCCC em 109,8 milhões de euros. O Brasil, por exemplo, defendeu o aumento em 24% como um importante sinal de defesa do multilateralismo em reconhecimento ao papel crucial do secretariado na governança climática global. Também foi considerada uma proposta de transferência única de 6 milhões de euros do Fundo do Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo para modernização da infraestrutura do secretariado e apoio às atividades do Artigo 6.2 e 6.4.

As Partes acordaram em um aumento de 10%, totalizando 81.5 milhões de euros e cobrindo apenas 74% das necessidades reais apresentadas pelo Secretariado. Esse acordo é muito importante para que o Secretariado consiga informar, até a COP30, quanto cada Parte deve contribuir para o próximo ciclo.