Our traditional summary of the COP offers a general overview of the COP 29 negotiations and its main results.

We knew that it would be extremely challenging to adopt a new objective of fair climate financing at this COP, considering the current geopolitical context, the complexity and sensitivity inherent to its own discussion on financing at the CMNUCC, and the circumstances that led Bakú, rich in oil, to assume the Presidency of this COP. But Nadie had imagined that it would be possible to accumulate so many failures on a single COP.

COP 29 could be remembered as the COP that was not fulfilled. We failed to adopt a decision to operationalize the Fair Transition Work Program, a program that will continue for a year but is completely empty and has an indefinite scope. We also delivered a decision to implement the Paris World Balance Agreement recommendations and ensure that the next round of NDCs is aligned with its results, including a fossil fuel transition process. And a unanimous decision was not reached on the new climate financing objective, with several objections expressed during the plenary session, and an ambiguous and somewhat blunt language.

With the exception of the expected decision on article 6 of the Paris Agreement, this COP 29 on the ground was not very representative in terms of substantial advances in the agenda of the CMNUCC, but which also contributed to destabilizing confidence in the multilateral process as a cooperation mechanism to face the climate crisis, given its somewhat transparent and obstructive conduct by the Presidency, including in the plenary session. As always in these negotiations, decisions are made at the expense of the agony of others.

He will come to Brazil at COP 30 next year to “save” the CMNUCC regime from this crisis of confidence.

But first… about LACLIMA

LACLIMA – Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action – is an institute dedicated to studying, investigating, developing and disseminating knowledge about the right to climate change in Brazil and Latin America. Our work has the objective of supporting Brazilian and Latin American society in the implementation of the Paris Accord, the promotion of a decarbonized economy and the construction of a more climate-resilient society, with climate justice.

Since 2019, LACLIMA has been present in the negotiations of the CMNUCC regime, systematically following the main themes of the negotiation agenda, producing content, informing and empowering members and organizations of Brazilian civil society and other Latin American countries.

LACLIMA monitors the development of negotiations, the agenda and the results of events and meetings mandated by the conferences of the Parties of the CMNUCC and the Agreement of Paris through the Monitoring of the Agreement of Paris , a monthly bulletin sent by electronic mail. Any person can sign up to receive the Monitoreo del Accuerdo de París at the bottom of the Observatorio del Accuerdo de París page on our website.

LACLIMA also promotes a network of jurists and legal scholars that currently has more than 1,350 members in Latin America: the “Red LACLIMA”. This initiative seeks to create a community of trained and committed professionals, promoting actions aimed at education, research and awareness in the field of climate legislation. If you are a law student, licensed lawyer or interested in becoming part of Red LACLIMA, access the registration form .

Nuestro trabajo en la COP 29

LACLIMA is present at COP 29 with a delegation of 6 lawyers, following negotiations on topics of Adaptation, Losses and Damages, Carbon Markets, Mitigation, Financing, Fair Transition, Technology Transfer and Transparency, with the main objective of translating the development of negotiations towards civil society. During the conference, six informative meetings ( briefings ) were held, which can be consulted on LACLIMA's Instagram or through the following links:

· Briefing on 15/11 on negotiation updates

· Briefing on 16/11 with MMA and MRE on the general balance of the first week of COP 29

· Briefing on 19/11 on negotiation updates

· Briefing on 11/20 with MRE on transparency

· Briefing on 21/11 with opening by Mary Robinson on negotiation updates

The LACLIMA delegation also trained 12 young people over the course of the year and 6 young people between 20 and 28 years old from the states of BA, CE, PA, PE, SP and TO during COP 29, in collaboration with Climate Reality Project Brasil, through the “Operation COP” project . This project seeks to train young leaders specialized in climate negotiations, offering training and training on the most relevant themes of the CMNUCC regime. Young people will participate in COP 29, accompanying LACLIMA delegates in the negotiation rooms, learning in practice how the multilateral climate negotiation process works.

During the last few weeks, LACLIMA also participated in 15 debate panels at COP 29.

The LACLIMA delegation included members of the executive board Flávia Bellaguarda, Caroline Rocha and André Santos, and coordinators and consultants Gaia Hasse, Enéas Xavier, Juliana Marcussi, Maria Gabriella and Yago Freire. Members of the LACLIMA Council Caroline Prolo, Carlos Rittl and Rodrigo Sluminsky were also present. This was all possible thanks to the support of the LACLIMA administrative team, composed by Bárbara Prado and Giovana Serra, and the communications team of Causo and Mariana Maraschin.

Climate Finance

The financing agenda at COP 29 covered several negotiation topics. However, the countries chose to focus their efforts primarily on the New Quantified Climate Financing Collective Objective (NCQG, by its acronym in English), given the timeframe for the adoption of a decision on this topic at this COP.

Negotiation history

The discussions about the NCQG began with the reactions of the Parties to the text eraser prepared by the co-facilitators of the ad hoc work program . This preliminary text was widely rejected, as it did not adequately reflect the opinions of the Parties. Before this, the document was reformulated and expanded, allowing progress in some technical questions, such as transparency, access to financing and capacity building. Despite these specific advances, no significant progress was made in the central elements of the goal at the end of the first week.

At the end of the first week, the text was sent to the COP Presidency, which took measures to promote negotiations. Ministers were appointed to carry out political consultations with the Parties, with the objective of advancing fundamental issues such as the total amount of the target ( quantum ), the contributor base and the general financing structure. Furthermore, under the leadership of the Presidency, sessions were held with the delegation heads to address the technical aspects of the goal. Asimismo, Brazil and the United Kingdom were invited to advise the Presidency in the search for balanced results at COP 29.

During the second week of negotiations, several versions of the draft decision on the NCQG were published, reflecting ongoing interactions between the Parties. Initially, a first simplified compilation of proposals was presented as a transition to the preliminary text of the Presidency's decision, which included options arising from ministerial consultations. This document was considered balanced, incorporating qualitative and quantitative elements, such as provision obligations for developed countries, regional financing floors for vulnerable countries, the granting of financial resources in the form of grants or under highly concessionary conditions, among other provisions.

However, as negotiations progressed, the Presidency published a new version of the text, with a more concise and simplified language. Even though this version sought to facilitate consensus, it was widely criticized for its ambiguity and for omitting essential elements. It did not explicitly mention resource provision obligations, proposing a global target based on the responsibility of all actors to mobilize USD 1.3 billion annually by 2035. The text also addressed human rights and did not exclude certain financial flows, such as loans, from climate finance accounting. Furthermore, the new wording did not include any position contrary to investments in fossil fuels, which generated concerns about its suitability to promote a fair and effective climate transition.

Decision adopted

The adopted decision calls on “all actors” to work together to increase funding for developing countries, from all public and private sources, with the objective of reaching at least USD 1.3 billion annually by 2035 .

Specifically, in relation to the developed countries, it was decided to establish a target “as an extension of the target” of USD 100 thousand million per year mentioned in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21. This goal includes a leadership commitment from developing countries , with at least USD 300 billion annually until 2035 , allocated to developing countries. Although the developed countries are expected to lead the achievement of this part of the goal, this can be achieved through a wide variety of sources, public and private , bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources. In this way, it will be possible to count the totality of financial flows related to the climate, including those mobilized by multilateral development banks. The request from the countries in development to establish a specific allocation of public financing by the developed countries did not materialize.

The decision encourages developing countries to make voluntary contributions, including through Sur-Sur cooperation.

Furthermore, it addresses the critical importance of significantly reducing the cost of capital, increasing the proportion of financing mobilized from public sources for 2030 and creating fiscal space in developing countries through the use of innovative instruments, such as first loss instruments, guarantees, financing in local currency and risk mitigation instruments exchanges.

In terms of quantum , the decision establishes that a significant increase in public resources must be provided through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Fund for Least Adelantated Countries and the Special Fund for Climate Change. Asimismo, it is decided to triple, as a minimum, the annual flows of these funds with respect to the levels of 2022, to 2030 .

During this process, the “Route from Bakú to Belém for USD 1.3 billion” is being launched, with the objective of increasing climate financing for developing countries and supporting development pathways with low winter and climate-resilient gas emissions. This includes the implementation of NDC and National Adaptation Plans, through donations, concessional instruments and non-deuda generators, as well as measures to create fiscal space, taking into account relevant multilateral initiatives, as appropriate. The respective COP Presidencies must prepare a report that summarizes the work as it concludes until COP 30/CMA 7.

Finally, it is decided that the implementation of this decision will be evaluated as part of the World Balance of the Paris Agreement, starting deliberations on the next steps before 2035, including a review of this decision in 2030.

“Consensus” on adoption

After proclaiming the adoption of the decision, the President of COP 29/CMA 6 spoke to India, who expressed his explicit objection to its adoption, claiming that he had attempted to intervene before the President had taken a decision. (The President read the report and decided immediately, without waiting for reactions from the Parties or announcing the traditional words: “Hearing no objections, it is so decided”, surprising everyone). Later, Bolivia, Nigeria and the Group of Least Advanced Countries supported India's position. The President took note of these statements and continued the session, maintaining the adopted decision.

For an analysis of the consensus process at CMNUCC, we recommend reading this opinion prepared by our colleagues at Legal Response International .

Adaptation

The agenda of negotiations on adaptation faced several challenges during COP 29. While discussions on the Report and Revision of the Adaptation Committee (AC) were blocked by the African Group of Negotiators, a decision was also reached on the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), due to their resistance. developed countries to include commitments to provide climate finance for the preparation of NAPs. Therefore, this debate is postponed until next year. Therefore, attention is focused on negotiations on the Global Adaptation Objective (GGA), focused on three key aspects:

1. The UAE-Belém work program on indicators to measure the progress of thematic and dimensional goals established at COP 28.

2. Aspects related to paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5, which addresses operational questions for the functioning of the GGA and its relationship with future World Balance processes.

3. Debates on the concept of transformational adaptation and its possible relationship with the GGA

   
   

After two intense weeks of debates, a difficult consensus was reached between the Parties, resulting in a decision that defines the path of the GGA to Belém. The decision reaffirms the mandate for the group of technical experts to review and refine the map of the indicators to measure the progress of the adaptation goals, confirming that the final decision on the list of indicators will be adopted by the CMA 7 in Belém.

The recognition of the importance of gender balance and geographic diversity among members of the group of experts stands out, as well as the relevance of including traditional knowledge, indigenous communities and local knowledge systems in the indicator work program. The decision encourages continuous dialogue between Parties, experts and other key actors, foreseeing the realization of workshops and dialogues over the next year to facilitate the progress of this complex work.

The text establishes additional criteria for indicators , which include:

· Measurability and availability of data to monitor progress in a transparent manner.

· Ability to use existing data or easily collect it.

· Use of consolidated and available metrics.

· Relevance to multiple thematic goals.

· Guidance for results.

To avoid burdening countries with new reporting obligations, the decision defines that the final result of the UAE-Belém Work Program on indicators will be a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators.

These indicators must be globally applicable and compiled in a menu that covers different contexts of action and adaptation, allowing Parties to select what they will report, according to their national circumstances. It should also allow you to evaluate progress across the various components of the goals.

The decision recognizes the importance of indicators reflecting information on social inclusion, indigenous communities, participatory processes, human rights, gender equality, migrants, children and young people, and people with disabilities . Furthermore, quantitative and qualitative indicators will be mapped to facilitate the implementation of adaptation actions.

The reference to implementation means —financing, capacity development and technology transfer— was marginally included in the final moments of COP 29. The decision stipulates that technical experts develop, when necessary, indicators of enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation actions, including the means of implementation.

At the same time, the Bakú Adaptation Route was launched , a proposal from the Arab Group that initially encountered resistance. This route aims to advance the fulfillment of Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and support the implementation of the elements described in paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5. Given the limited time, the Parties agreed to continue these discussions at a later stage.

Finally, regarding transformational adaptation , the Parties opted for an intermediate solution: they recognized that both incremental and transformational approaches are essential to protect the well-being of people and the planet, and took note of the technical report prepared by the Secretariat. Discussions will continue next year.

Article 6

Unlike the failure that occurred at COP 28, where decisions on this topic were not reached, advances in the operationalization of the cooperation instruments of article 6 of the Paris Agreement quickly began with a decision at the opening plenary session of COP 29. This decision addressed the Accreditation Mechanism of the COP 29. Paris Agreement provided for in article 6.4 ( “PACM” – Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism ). In this case, the Parties decided to recognize the adoption, by the Supervision Body of the Mechanism (SBM), of the requirements for the approval of methodologies and activities for the removal of GEI from the atmosphere . These requirements will serve as a basis for the selection of activities that can issue certified units of emissions, which will be traded on the market.

With this result, countries could move forward with other essential resolutions for market implementation. As a result, decisions and mandates were established, including the SBM application to accelerate the implementation of the mechanism registration and develop standards and instructions related to the selection of activities that will issue credits. Furthermore, a decision was made on the procedure for authorizing corresponding adjustments for the use of these credits in compliance with NDCs or other international mitigation objectives. Accordingly, an extension was granted until 12/31/2025 for the transition of registered forestry activities under the Clean Development Mechanism to the mechanism of article 6.4.

From these decisions, the details of the requirements for the approval of activities that generate credits from article 6.4 and work to implement the registration structure and operational processes of the mechanism will begin.

Regarding cooperative approaches (article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement) , related to the international transfer of mitigation results (ITMOs), negotiations began with the challenge of a 43-page decision eraser, full of divergent options and positions. During the Conference, following warnings from the President of the SBSTA and the Presidency of the COP, the negotiators made joint efforts to overcome differences, achieving at the end of the first week a clean 19-page blot. This text served as a basis for the negotiations of the second week, carried out mainly in closed door meetings, without the participation of observers.

From this decision onwards, the countries worked bilaterally to overcome remaining points of divergence, such as:

1. The authorization process required for the use of ITMOs.

2. The information that must contain authorizations and the possibility of future modification or revocation.

3. The inclusion of additional information in the initial report on ITMO agreements.

4. The rules for the first transfer of ITMOs.

5. The forms and tables for the annual information report.

6. The process to identify, notify and correct inconsistencies in reports, as part of the work of the article 6 technical review team.

7. Interoperability between the international registry of article 6.2 and the registry of article 6.4, as well as additional functionalities of the international registry of article 6.2 to support countries without national registries, among other deliberations.

   
   

While the instrument provided for in Article 6.8, referring to market mitigation and adaptation approaches (NMAs) , an agreement was quickly achieved. At the end of the first week, the Parties agreed on a decision text that was sent directly for approval by the CMA. This reflects activities carried out during the COP, focused on the exchange of information about NMAs in development, success stories and support for training initiatives, technology transfer and financing. It was also reported that countries began to register NMAs on the Platform created by the Secretariat , optimizing the exchange of information.

During negotiations, some countries proposed promoting the connection between the CMNUCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity , exploring synergies between NMAs and joint initiatives. Even though this proposal was not accepted, the decision recognizes the importance of developing NMAs that link climate action with biodiversity conservation and sustainable development, including the so-called Actions in Pro de la Madre Tierra , based on different value systems, such as balance and harmony with the Mother Tierra.

Finally, the Parties will prepare to continue training activities and information exchange through the Platform and events to be promoted next year, with the objective of promoting greater participation of key actors, such as international organizations, technical experts, the private sector, civil society, indigenous communities and financial institutions.

Mitigation

The main theme of the mitigation agenda at COP 29 was the Mitigation Work Program ( MWP ) . This program became one of the most polarized, with the Parties adopting firm and inflexible stances, especially regarding the possibility that the MWP would address metrics and mitigation gaps identified in the COP 28 decision on the global balance (GST). The countries developing the LMDC group and the Arab Group remained firm in their opposition to the results of the GST guiding the work of the MWP. On the other hand, countries like Australia, South Korea, Switzerland and the group of small island states (AOSIS) are pressing in the opposite direction.

The LMDC and the Arab Group justified their position by arguing that including metrics or objectives, including collective ones, in the MWP would compromise the nationally determined character of mitigation commitments, something they considered unacceptable. Brazil, for its part, did not align itself with anyone on either side of the polarization, arguing that the MWP should be a space of trust and exchange of experiences between the Parties, focused on implementation rather than increasing mitigation ambition.

Given the lack of consensus during the first week, the Parties applied Regla 16 of the CMNUCC procedural norms, which postpones discussions for the next year without considering any of the documents produced in this session.

However, thanks to the great effort of the Presidency and the presidency of countries that wanted to continue discussions in this session, it was possible to resume negotiations during the second week. The MWP negotiations were resumed from scratch, with the Parties invited to express their expectations regarding the CMA 6 decision on the program. Despite the reiteration of previous setbacks, the Brazilian proposal to create a digital platform to connect initiatives and mitigation projects with investment potential was, in general, well received .

In this new context, the Parties agreed to exclude references to the GST and the mitigation loopholes recognized in the Dubái decision. The Brazilian proposal to create a “digital platform to facilitate the implementation of mitigation actions, promoting collaboration between governments, financiers and other interested parties in the development of reversible projects, in a manner aligned with national interests and determined by the country itself” is maintained. This initiative could give a new purpose to the MWP, the implementation of which would be debated at the 2025 Bonn conference.

The decision adopted in the plenary takes note of the Brazilian proposal and invites Parties, observers and other interested parties to present, through the submission portal, their opinions on the design and characteristics of the platform mentioned before May 1, 2025, with the objective of exchanging points of view in Bonn in June 2025.

World Balance of the Paris Agreement

The controversial issue that blocked the progress of the MWP during the first week was addressed in the decision of the UAE Dialogue ( UAE-Dialogue ), a point on the agenda aimed at discussing the modalities of a continuous dialogue on the implementation of the recommendations of the Primer World Balance of the Paris Agreement adopted at COP 28. There was a great expectation that this point of The agenda will address how to monitor the implementation of the World Primer Balance to ensure that the new NDCs follow guidelines, including those related to the transition away from fossil fuels. However, from the beginning, these discussions proved to be conflictive, with the group of LMDCs firmly resisting addressing the issue and trying to frame it solely as a discussion about financing for the adoption of the recommended measures.

In the end, the decision-making decision submitted to the plenary was a considerably diluted text, although it included certain elaborations on the operationalization of the dialogue until the year 2026, through parallel routes for the follow-up of the GST recommendations, including mitigation, adaptation, losses and damages and response measures.

However, the text was largely rejected during the final plenary session, due to which Rule 16 was applied, referring the matter for consideration at the next COP.

Perdidas y Daños

With the adoption of decisions in COP 28 on the operationalization of the Fund for Pérdidas and Daños y la Red de Santiago, and the beginning of a politically intense decision cycle on Pérdidas and Daños, it is expected that negotiations in COP 29 on the apparently technical points of the agendas will be less conflictive. However, this expectation has disappeared since the first week. Kenya's dissatisfaction with the decision to establish the headquarters of the Secretariat of the Red de Santiago in Ginebra resulted in being a major obstacle in negotiations. Finally, the Parties agreed on a procedural decision, vaguely recognizing the advances of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM, by its acronym in English) and the Santiago Network, but referring the discussions on the Joint Annual Report (JAR, by its acronym in English) and the revision of the WIM to SB62. Once again, it is indicated that considerations on WIM governance will continue to be debated at COP 30/CMA 7.

On the other hand, negotiations on the review of the first year of work of the Fondo de Pérdidas and Damages since its operationalization at COP 28 have advanced, resulting in the adoption of a decision that, among other aspects, recognizes the selection of the Philippines as host country of the Consejo del Fondo and the signature of the cooperation agreement corresponding. The decision also values the work of the World Bank in the operationalization of the Fund and thanks the promises of contributions to the Fund by the governments of Australia, Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Sweden, as well as the government of the Walloon Region, in Belgium.

Just Transition

At COP 29, it was expected that the Fair Transition Work Program would be involved in substantive negotiation processes. However, this expectation has been frustrated since the first week, as it was not possible to reach a consensus between the Parties on the decision blank that would serve as a basis for negotiations during the political week.

The second week of the COP is marked by silence in the offices and negotiation rooms. While the Presidency and delegations from Brazil and the United Kingdom held consultations with regional groups, no text was shared, and the Parties had no mandate to self-organize or to sustain informal conversations. Faced with this situation, the Presidency presented a text the next morning (penultimate day of formal negotiations), which included some redaction options, but without significant advances in substantive terms to operationalize the work program.

On the morning of the last day scheduled for negotiations, the Presidency announced that new decision-makers would be shared before the midday, to receive specific comments from the Parties, with the aim of presenting a final text before the midday meeting on November 22nd, prior to the plenary session on Saturday 23rd.

On the middle of November 22nd, a new blurb appeared that contained four main points:

1. The text mentioned expressions such as “human rights” and “gender” only as a means of recognition, without establishing concrete links.

2. Regarding the annual dialogues held in 2024, there are many differences, as the G77 + China was opposed to including this mention due to criticisms about the poor balanced handling of the processes. Therefore, the text is limited to recognizing the work of the subsidiary bodies in the organization of the dialogues, without mentioning their results.

3. As far as the scope of the work plan is concerned, the text highlights the need to address aspects related to energy, labor strength and socio-economic aspects in a balanced manner, avoiding an excessive focus on labor strength, as some developed countries prefer.

4. The most notable point was the Brazilian proposal to create a committee to study concrete results of the program . Even though this proposal was not incorporated, the decision invited the Parties, observers and other actors to present, through the presentation portal, their visions about concrete results to achieve the objectives of the program, according to the provision in paragraph 2 of decision 3/CMA.5. A compilation of these visions was also requested for presentation at the next session of the Subsidiary Organs.

   
   

However, the text was rejected during the final plenary, and Rule 16 was applied, referring the topic for consideration at the next COP.

Transfer of technology

At COP 29, the central themes related to technology transfer included the evaluation and future of the Poznan Strategic Program for Technology Transfer (PSP), launched at COP 14, in 2008. This program aims to facilitate the transfer of Environmentally Acceptable Technologies (TAA) to developing countries, addressing local priorities and specific needs. Another key point was the structure of the Technology Implementation Program (TIP), initially discussed at COP 28. This new program is expected to reinforce the implementation of essential climate technologies to mitigate and adapt to climate change on a global scale.

During the negotiations, the delegations reached a consensus on the beginning of the PSP operation and the general evaluation of the program. While at TIP, there is an intense debate, but without consensus. The main points of divergence included the structure of the program, with proposals for the creation of a technology implementation accelerator and a knowledge transfer center. Furthermore, the participation of civil society organizations in the process and the inclusion, within its reach, of initiatives to facilitate access to countries in the least developed way of technologies, such as the flexibility of intellectual property rights and the overcoming of commercial barriers, were discussed. However, these questions will be postponed for the next year.

In summary, the decision: recognize the efforts of the GEF in the financing and implementation of the program's initiatives in recent years; requests the preparation of a report evaluating the Poznan Strategic Program, which should be completed by June 2026, with a balance of the advances achieved, the main challenges faced and the successes and lessons learned during implementation; requires an analysis of the report to be discussed at COP 31 with the objective of supporting the activities identified in the NDCs, the national adaptation plans, the evaluations of technological needs and the wide-ranging strategies of the developing countries. Furthermore, the process will help inform the next steps of the TIP; and recommends a final decision on the creation and structure of the TIP at COP 30.

Transparency

The Bakú Conference represents an important achievement for transparency in the context of the Paris Agreement, being the last before the delivery of the BTR (Biennial Transparency Reports) in December 2024 . It is worth noting that the Parties decided that 2024 would be the year of transition between the BR and BUR (transparency reports under the CMNUCC) to the BTR.

However, given the possibility of some countries withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, but remaining within the CMNUCC, the need for these countries to continue presenting reports under the Convention was discussed. In this scenario, countries that are not part of the Paris Agreement will still follow BR (for Annex I countries) or BUR (for countries not included in Annex I). In this way, the Secretariat maintained the elaboration of summary reports on the instruments of the Convention, although a reduced number of reports or even just one was presented. Although no official negotiating document reflects this debate, it is expected that the topic will resurface in the Bonn session in June 2025, especially if the United States and other countries begin processes to resolve the Paris Agreement but remain in the CMNUCC.

Another relevant point in negotiations was financing for transparency. The developing countries reported difficulties in accessing sufficient resources and capabilities to comply with the BTR requirements. On the other hand, the developed countries argued that the funds available in the GEF were not fully used by the countries eligible for this purpose.

The discussions advanced about which developing countries tend to have access to these funds (all countries developing the poorest soil?) and about how to make financial flows more efficient and access to them.

In this context, the decision recognizes that developing countries need additional support in institutional arrangements, data management and capacity, as appropriate, to strengthen their capabilities related to data collection, analysis and management. Furthermore, I requested that the Secretariat organize workshops with the participation of the GEF to facilitate the exchange of experiences between countries, in order to identify and overcome the difficulties encountered in the elaboration of the BTR.

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Image: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis